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LANDLORD AND TENANT
I. INTRODUCTION
No aspect of the law of real property affects more people as pervasively
as the law of landlord and tenant. A recent study undertaken by the Vir-
ginia Housing Study Commission showed that almost fifty percent of the
Commonwealth's population are tenants.'
Reflecting the high priority that the ownership of land had at early
common law and the relative power of the landlord to the tenant, it is not
surprising that the law has traditionally favored the landlord. Until re-
cently this tradition had remained virtually unchanged. There has been a
growing realization that the present state of the law as it has evolved from
its feudal origins has become in many respects an anachronism in an
urbanized and mobile society. The fact that the traditional principles have
been unable to resolve equitably the problems of the modern landlord-
tenant relationship has generated a significant movement for reform. In
1973 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved a Uniform Resi-
dential Landlord and Tenant Act. 2 The objective of the Act is to clarify
and delineate specifically the rights, duties, and remedies of the landlord
and tenant.
The Virginia General Assembly in its 1974 session enacted the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. The Virginia Act with several signif-
icant exceptions is patterned after the Uniform Act. As its stated purpose,
the Virginia Act attempts to ". . . simplify, clarify, modernize, revise the
law . . . "3 governing the landlord-tenant relationship in the Common-
wealth. Whether the Act achieves its avowed purpose is open to serious
question, but it does mark an important step forward in a neglected area
of the law.
The purpose of this survey is to provide the practicing Virginia attorney
with a comprehensive treatment of the problem generating areas of the law
of landlord and tenant. Additionally, the article will address those aspects
of the newly enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act that
have materially affected the law.
t The Review would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor J. Rodney Johnson in
the preparation of this article.
The student contributors in this article are Hugh T. Antrim, William A. Beeton, Jr., C.
Felix Cross, III, William G. Hancock, John H. Herbig, Ben R. Lacy, Robert D. Perrow,
Gregory L. Rupe, Gary J. Spahn, Stephen M. Yost.
1. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSING COMMISSION, (Nov. 1973) p. 10.
2. UNIFORM RFsIDENTIAT. LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr, Approved Draft, (January 31, 1973).
3. As enacted, VA. CODr ANN. §§ 55-248.2, -248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
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II. PRE-LEASING PRACTICES
A. Discrimination
Discrimination in the rental of housing on the basis of race, color, reli-
gion, or national origin is no stranger to Virginia. Traditionally, it occurs
in the soliciting and showing of dwellings for sale or rental and most often
it is aimed at blacks. Civil rights advocates urged federal open housing
legislation in the 1960's as the only viable solution to this discrimination.
The violent race riots that scorched our cities during the mid-1960's awak-
ened many, both in and out of Congress, to the fact that the continued de
facto policy of segregation would perpetrate further social disruption.
With this turmoil as background, the year 1968 witnessed the launching
of two major assaults against discrimination in housing: (1) Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Act of 1968 with its Fair Housing Title' (hereinafter
referred to as the 1968 Act) which made it unlawful to refuse to sell or rent
housing because of race, color, religion, or national origin; (2) the Supreme
Court ruled in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., that the refusal to sell or rent
housing because of the race of the buyer or tenant was unlawful. 2 This
decision was based on a federal statute, 42 U.S.C.§1982 (hereinafter re-
ferred to as section 1982) enacted in 1866. 3 A final attack against housing
discrimination occurred in 1972 when Virginia became the first southern
state to enact open housing legislation. The Virginia Fair Housing Law4
(hereinafter referred to as the Virginia Law), like its two federal counter-
parts, makes discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling unlawful.
One might assume that the 1968 Act, section 1982, and the Virginia Law
all cover the same ground. While the three laws are similar in many
respects, they differ substantially in scope of application, methods of
enforcement, and available remedies. An examination of these three pieces
of legislation reveals that it is much more beneficial for an aggrieved party
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 to 3631 (1970).
2. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The petitioner charged that defendant's refusal to sell him a home
because he was black violated 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The Supreme Court held that the 1866
statute bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale or rental of
property, and that thus construed, it is a valid exercise of the power of Congress to enforce
the thirteenth amendment's prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude.
3. The statute at the time of the decision was 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964). It was originally
enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as part of ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, and re-enacted in
the Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140, 144. The present statute is 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) and it reads as follows:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory,
as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey
real and personal property.
4. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-86 to -96 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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to bring his action under the federal statutes than under the Virginia Law.
Thus, an understanding of section 1982 and the 1968 Act is essential to an
attorney representing a complaining prospective tenant.
As between the two federal statutes, the 1968 Act offers a broader um-
brella of protection. It prohibits designated types of discriminatory con-
duct based on race, color, religion, and national origin.' Thus, the pro-
tection of the 1968 Act reaches discriminatory acts against not only blacks,
but also against Jews or Puerto Ricans. Section 1982, on the other hand,
prohibits racial discrimination only. The 1968 Act is also broader than
section 1982 in the types of discrimination proscribed. While both federal
statutes declare that discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling is
unlawful, the 1968 Act goes on to forbid: (1) discrimination in "the terms,
conditions, or privileges of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith;"'6 (2) the making, printing, or publishing
of any notice or advertisement regarding the sale or rental of a dwelling
which indicates any discrimination based on race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin;7 (3) false representations made to any person because of race,
etc., that a dwelling is not available for sale or rental; 8 (4) inducing for
profit, any person to sell or rent a dwelling by representations that persons
of a particular race, etc. are about to enter the neighborhood.'
The far-reaching coverage of the 1968 Act is limited by a number of
exemptions. The 1968 Act exempts an owner who sells or rents his single
family house if that owner does not use a brokerage service, does not violate
the prohibitions on advertising,'0 and does not own more than three such
single family houses at any one time." Also, the 1968 Act does not apply
to the rental of multiple family dwellings occupied by four or fewer families
if the owner occupies one of these units.'2 Other exemptions provided in
the 1968 Act include those for religious organizations selling or renting to
members of their association and private clubs which provide housing for
5. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970) states that it shall be unlawful:
To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate
for the sale, or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any
person because of race, color, religion, or national origin.
6. Id. § 3604(b).
7. Id. § 3604(c).
8. Id. § 3604(d).
9. Id. § 3604(e). The practice deemed unlawful by this section is commonly referred to as
"blockbusting."
10. Id. § 3604(c).
11. Id. § 3603(b)(1). This exemption will apply to a dwelling sold or rented only once
within a twenty-four month period.
12. Id. § 3603(b)(2).
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their members as an incident to their primary purpose.' 3 Section 1982
provides no similar exemptions which allow certain classes to discriminate
in the sale or rental of housing; however, it is imperative to remember that
section 1982 only protects against racial discrimination. 4
The methods by which these statutes are enforced and the remedies
available are of prime importance to an aggrieved prospective tenant. Sec-
tion 1982 does not specify any remedies that are available to an injured
party, but is merely a declaration of affirmative rights.'" However, the
Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, stated that the fact that
section 1982 provides no method of enforcement will not prevent a federal
court from granting relief.'6 Such relief could include: (1) a preliminary
injunction;' 7 (2) a permanent injunction;'8 (3) compensatory damages
where monetary loss occurs as a result of a discriminatory refusal to rent
or buy;' 9 (4) punitive damages in extreme cases of malicious misconduct;2 0
(5) attorney's fees where appropriate.2 '
13. Id. § 3607.
14. The owner of a single-family dwelling is allowed to discriminate against a black in the
sale or rental of his dwelling under the 1968 Act. However, this same practice would be
unlawful under section 1982 because no exceptions are provided. The owner of a single family
dwelling who refuses to sell or rent to a party because of that party's religion or national origin
is engaged in an unlawful act under the 1968 Act or section 1982. Thus, one can only fill some
of the gaps in the 1968 Act by applying section 1982. See Brooke, Smedley, Kinoy, Ervin,
Non-Discrimination in the Sale or Rental of Real Property: Comments on Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 22 VAND. L. REv. 455, 459-73 (1969)
which offers an excellent comparative analysis between 1982 and the 1968 Act. The format
of presentation employed by the authors was used as the structural basis for this article.
15. See note 4 supra.
16. 392 U.S. at 414 n.13. In Jones, the complaining party sought injunctive relief.
17. This could prevent the owner from transferring the property to another until final
determination of a request for a permanent injunction. Young v. Netherlands Owners, Inc.,
306 F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D.D.C. 1969).
18. This could prohibit the defendant from denying to the plaintiff the right to buy or lease
the dwelling because of his race. It could also require the defendant to sell or rent the property
in question to the plaintiff or provide other housing of similar quality. Harris v. Jones, 296
F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1969).
19. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 1970). The Supreme
Court, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 240 (1969), declared that 42
U.S.C. § 1988 provides "that both federal and state rules on damages may be utilized,
whichever better serves the policies expressed in the federal statutes."
20. Punitive damages are rarely awarded. The court in Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F.
Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972) stated that punitive damages have never been favored in the
law and should be awarded with great caution and within narrow limits.
21. The court in Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1037 (N.D. Tex. 1971) in quoting from
Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 429 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1970), stated that an award of
attorney's fees was appropriate "especially so when one considers that much of the elimina-
tion of unlawful racial discrimination necessarily devolves upon private litigants and their
attorneys."
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In contrast, the 1968 Act offers a variety of statutory procedures and
remedies to an aggrieved party. Section 36102 of the 1968 Act allows an
aggrieved party to file a complaint with the Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development within 180 days after the alleged
discriminatory act has occurred." If the Secretary determines that an un-
lawful discriminatory act has in fact occurred, he must attempt to elimi-
nate the practice by conference and persuasion. If satisfactory results can-
not be attained, the aggrieved party may institute a civil action in a United
States district court, subject to the proper time limits. 4 Upon a finding of
guilty, the court is empowered to issue injunctive relief "or order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate.' '2 Where substantially equiva-
lent judicial remedies exist on the state or local level, the complaining
party is required to commence his action there.
2 6
As an alternative to the administratively initiated procedure above, an
aggrieved party may bring a civil action directly in a United States district
court, or in a state or local court of general jurisdiction, under section 3612
to enforce rights granted by the 1968 Act. Remedies available to a com-
plaining party under this section include: 27 (1) a preliminary injunction to
maintain the status quo pending a final hearing of the merits of the
claims;? (2) actual damages;29 (3) up to $1,000 in punitive damages;"0 (4)
attorney's fees in the proper case.3 ' An action under section 3612 may
22. 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (1970).
23. Id. § 3610(a)(b).
24. Id. § 3610(d). This subsection states that if within thirty days after the complaint is
filed with HUD, the Secretary is unable to obtain voluntary compliance, the complaining
party may file suit in federal district court within thirty days thereafter. Where an action
instituted by blacks alleging that they were not permitted to rent apartments because of their
race was commenced more than sixty days after charges were filed with HUD, action could
not be maintained under this section. Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382 (M.D.N.C.
1972).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970).
26. Id.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970). The action must be brought within the 180 day period pro-
vided for in § 3612(a). See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 446 F.2d 1158, 1161
(9th Cir. 1971).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); See, e.g., Young v. Netherlands Owners, Inc., 306 F. Supp.
1282, 1285 (D.D.C. 1969).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 297 (D.
Md. 1973); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970); See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 359 F. Supp. 291, 297 (D.
Md. 1973).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) states that only reasonable attorney's fees may be granted,
and only where the plaintiff, in the opinion of the court, is not financially able to assume the
burden of paying such fees. See, e.g., Sanborn v. Wagner, 354 F. Supp. 291, 297 (D. Md.
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always be brought directly in a United States district court. The existence
of a substantially equivalent state or local fair housing law is immaterial.2
A third alternative provided by the 1968 Act allows the Attorney General
to bring a civil action in any appropriate United States district court. The
action may be brought when there is cause to believe that there is an
individual or group "pattern or practice" violative of the Act or whenever
any group has been denied any rights granted under the Act and "such
denial raises an issue of general public importance.13 3 The remedies enu-
merated for a suit by the Attorney General are a "permanent or temporary
injunction, restraining order, or other order against the person or persons
responsible for such pattern or practice or denial of rights. ' '31
Two other practices are also made unlawful by the 1968 Act. The first
of these forbids one from intimidating or threatening anyone exercising the
rights granted under the Act. This provision may be enforced by "appro-
priate civil action."35 Forcible interference with persons exercising rights
granted by the 1968 Act is made a criminal offense by section 3631. The
severity of the interference determines the degree of the penalty. 6
1973); Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380, 385 (10th Cir. 1973).
32. Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp. 102, 103-05 (E.D. Wis. 1969) declared that section 3612
offers an alternative to the procedures and remedies offered in section 3610. Thus, it is not
necessary to question whether state or local law provides an equivalent judicial remedy. No
prerequisite of seeking administrative relief from HUD is imposed under section 3612. One
may proceed directly into federal court. Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D. Ohio
1972) declared that a clear majority of cases have held that sections 3610 and 3612 are
alternative remedies. See, e.g., Young v. AAA Realty Co., 350 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85
(M.D.N.C. 1972); Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 91 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). There is no simple definition of "pattern or practice." The
court in United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) stated
that the words "pattern or practice" were intended to encompass more than an isolated event.
See, Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 285 (1972). What constitutes "an issue of general public import-
ance" has been left to the determination and discretion of the Attorney General. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bob Laurence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1973). Because most fair
housing litigation conducted by the Attorney General is handled by the very small Housing
Section of the Civil Rights Division, the number of actions brought is quite limited. See, e.g.,
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The court in United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 776, 785 (N.D. Miss. 1972) stated: "In cases of this kind, injunctions should not be
granted grudgingly and their scope should be sufficiently broad to assure non-
discrimination."
35. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970).
36. Id. § 3631(c). Penalties consist of a fine up to $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than
one year, or both. If bodily injury is involved, the penalty shall be a fine of not more than
$10,000 or imprisonment of not more than ten years, or both. If death occurs, the penalty shall
be imprisonment for any number of years or life.
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The Virginia Law is patterned almost exclusively after the 1968 Act.3" It
forbids discrimination in the sale or rental of a dwelling on the basis of
race, color, religion, or national origin .3 However, unlike the 1968 Act, the
Virginia Law extends its coverage to discrimination in the sale or rental of
a dwelling on the basis of sex. 39 It also makes it unlawful to: (1) discrimi-
nate in the terms of the sale or lease;4" (2) publish any advertisement which
indicates any preference with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling;4'
(3) deny to anyone access to a listing service;" (4) make false representa-
tions to any person, for reasons of discrimination, that a dwelling is not
available for sale or rental;4 3 (5) induce any person to transfer an interest
in real property by representations that persons of a particular race, etc.,
are about to enter the neighborhood.44 The Virginia Law provides exemp-
tions to the same parties and transactions as the 1968 Act.45
The major difference between the Virginia Law and its two federal coun-
terparts is in the area of remedies offered to an aggrieved party. The
Virginia Law provides for injunctive relief, court costs, attorney's fees, and
actual damages limited to $250.46 Unlike section 1982 and the 1968 Act, it
offers no provision for punitive damages. An aggrieved party may also file
a complaint with the Attorney General, who is empowered to commence a
civil action "to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable harm. 4 7
What conclusions can be drawn from this multitude of state and federal
legislation which will aid the Virginia attorney who represents an aggrieved
prospective tenant? Because of the limited amount of damages attainable
under the Virginia Law, it would be beneficial to bring the action in federal
court under section 1982 or under the appropriate section of the 1968 Act,
or both.48 This maneuver will take the complaining prospective tenant
37. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3601 to 3631 (1970) with VA. CODE ANN. § 36-86 to -96 (Cum.
Supp. 1973).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-88(l) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
39. Id. § 36-88. A 1973 amendment extended the coverage to discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing due to sex.
40. Id. § 36-88(2).
41. Id. § 36-88(3).
42. Id. § 36-88(5).
43. Id. § 36-88(4).
44. Id. § 36-89. For an analysis of this section, see 7 U. RiCH. L. REv. 416 (1972).
45. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 36-92 (Cum. Supp. 1973) with 42 U.S.C. § 3607 (1970);
compare VA. CODE ANN. § 36-87(b)(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(1)-(2) (1970).
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-94(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
47. Id. § 36-95.
48. The court in Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972) stated that
"the victim of racial discrimination in private housing has a claim under both the 1866 Act
and Title VIII of the 1968 Act." If both federal statutes are available, almost all cases are
litigated under both. See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970);
1974]
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from under the Virginia law's $250 limit on actual damages and place him
in the position to recover unlimited actual damages and punitive damages
in federal court. 9 The federal courts have jurisdiction in actions brought
under section 198210 or under section 3612 of the 1968 Act. The fact that a
substantially equivalent state statute exists is of no consequence.', Not
unsurprisingly, there has been no litigation in the state courts under the
Virginia Law. The limitations on damages and the fact that many housing
discrimination cases are settled before they reach court are two factors
contributing to its nonuse. If the state wishes to gain judicial control over
housing discrimination in Virginia, the remedies available to an injured
party must be made, at the least, equivalent to the federal remedies offered
in the 1968 Act and section 1982.52
James v. Hafler, 320 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D.
Ohio 1969).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) provides for not more than $1,000 punitive damages. How-
ever, in an action under section 1982, there is apparently no limit on the amount of punitive
damages. Wright v. Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222, 223 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
50. The Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238 (1969)
declared that the federal courts have jurisdiction to grant "relief under any Act of Congress
providing for the protection of civil rights." This conclusion was based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(4).
51. See note 34 supra. It is conceivable that an aggrieved party might be able to bring an
action directly into federal court under section 3610. Any action under section 3610 must be
commenced in a state court if that state offers substantially equivalent judicial remedies. It
is arguable that because there is a limit placed on actual damages in Virginia and that there
is no provision for punitive damages, Virginia does not offer substantially equivalent judicial
remedies. Thus, one could proceed directly into federal court under section 3610. But see
McLaurin v. Brusturis, 320 F. Supp. 190, 191 (E.D. Wis. 1970) which concluded that a state
law was substantially equivalent even though it provided for less actual damages, did not
permit punitive damages, and did not allow permanent or temporary injunctions.
52. Are the rights of aggrieved prospective tenants being successfully protected in Virginia?
Some claim that in almost all southern cities a black family has virtually no chance of moving
into a white neighborhood unless the family takes legal action. Thus, many acts of discrimina-
tion in housing are never reported. Subsequent to the passage of open housing legislation,
many fair housing organizations have sprung up across the country. Private in nature, these
groups offer their services to aggrieved parties as an alternative to the HUD proceeding. They
serve as an investigator in housing discrimination cases and provide legal aid when necessary.
There are several of these open housing organizations operating in Virginia and one of the
most successful, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), is located in Richmond. The
members of HOME feel that the organization is more effective than HUD in obtaining results
for aggrieved parties, and they attribute their success to the use of "checkers". A "checker"
is a white person who attempts to rent the same dwelling that was denied to the complaining
black. If the "checker" is successful in his attempt, this could be strong evidence of discrimi-
nation. HUD is not authorized to employ this technique. These local fair housing groups also
attribute their effectiveness to the fact that they are trusted by the black community and
are easily accessible. HOME investigated thirty complaints in Richmond in 1973. (Telephone
interview with Dr. James L. Hecht, President, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME),
January 15, 1974.)
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B. Security Deposits
It is a common practice for a landlord to require his prospective tenant
to advance a certain amount of money as security for the performance of
the contract. This sum of money is referred to as a security deposit. Within
the last few years, several states have enacted legislation or rewritten exist-
ing statutes dealing with security deposits.-" Generally, these statutes pro-
vide time limits for the return of the security deposit after lease termina-
tion." Most place a limit on the amount of the security deposit 5 and
require some form of interest payment to be made to the tenant.56 Many
of these statutes require itemized statements of deductions to be presented
to the tenant. The most stringent prohibit the landlord from commingling
the security deposit funds with his personal funds,5 and prescribe penal-
ties for a late return or for the willful retention of a security deposit.
The 1974 session of the General Assembly ventured into the area of
security deposit regulation with the passage of the Virginia Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act. 0 This legislation is the outgrowth of the Report
of the Virginia Housing Commission. The Report noted that numerous
complaints concerning the handling of security deposits were aired at the
53. Note, Developments in Contemporary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated
Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REV. 689, 694 (1973) provides a list of those states that enacted
legislation regulating the handling of security deposits in addition to other references concern-
ing the subject.
54. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28 (1) (Supp. 1971) which permits the parties
to specify in the lease any amount of time up to sixty days in which the security deposit may
be returned. If not specified, the security deposit must be returned within thirty days after
the termination of the lease. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.261(4) (Supp. 1972) requires that the
security deposit be returned within fifteen days after the termination of the lease. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68 § 250.512(c) (Supp. 1973) requires the landlord to return the security deposit
within thirty days after the termination of the lease.
55. See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 186 § 15B (Supp. 1972) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
68, § 250.511a(a) (Supp. 1973) which limit the amount of the security deposit to the equiva-
lent of two months rent.
56. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5112(b) (Supp. 1970) which requires payment to
the tenant of all interest earned on the security deposit. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 74 § 91 (Supp.
1972) requires payment of 4% interest on security deposits of six months or more.
57. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28(1) (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
25, § 5112(d) (Supp. 1970).
58. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5112(b) (Supp. 1970); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS § 7-
101 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
59. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 58-1-28 (3)(a) (Supp. 1971) which states that the
willful retention of a security deposit by a landlord will result in treble damages. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 5112 (e) (Supp. 1970) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512(c) (Supp. 1973)
both prescribe damages of double the amount of the security deposit for retention past the
specified period by the landlord.
60. VA. CODE ANN. 99 55-248.2 to 55-248.39 (effective July 1, 1974).
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Commission's public hearings.6 ' Most of the comments dealt with concern
over the amounts charged and whether interest should be paid. Others
complained of the untimely return of the deposit and the absence of re-
quirements that landlords itemize deductions. 2 Noting that one Virginia
locality had been granted the power to enact an ordinance dealing with
security deposits, 6 the Commission recommended the enactment of a
statewide law.
Disregarding the fact that the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act applies only to landlords who own more than ten dwelling units," the
section concerning security deposits might be considered slight in strength.
It specifically provides for: (1) the equivalent of two months rent as the
maximum security deposit;6 5 (2) the return of an itemized notice of any
charges against security deposits together with the amount of the deposit
due within forty-five days of lease termination;6 6 (3)recovery by the tenant
of the security due him together with actual damages and reasonable attor-
ney's fees for landlord noncompliance with this section. 7 Additionally, the
Act requires the landlord to: (1) pay 3% interest on all security deposits
held for periods of more than thirteen months;" (2) maintain records for
two years of all deductions against security deposits;69 (3) submit a record
to the tenant within five days of occupancy, of the existing damages to the
dwelling unit which record shall be deemed correct unless the tenant ob-
jects in writing within five days after receipt.6 The Act also allows a tenant
to be present when the landlord inspects the dwelling for damages if the
tenant so advises the landlord in writing. The landlord is required to notify
the tenant of the time of inspection which must be during business hours
and within seventy-two hours of lease termination .7
From the tenant's point of view, several of these provisions will bring
welcome changes without placing too great of a burden on the landlord.
Whether the Commission's recommendations have been sufficiently im-
plemented by this legislation, however, is open to question. The require-
61. REPORT OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSING STUDY COMMISSION, November 1973, at 7 (1973).
62. Id. at 7-8.
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-222.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973) granted Arlington County the power to
enact a local ordinance dealing with security deposits. The passage of the Act repealed this
section.
64. Id. § 55-248.5 (9).
65. Id. § 55-248.11 (a).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. § 55-248.11 (b)(1).
69. Id. § 55-248.11 (b)(2).
70. Id. § 55-248.11 (b)(3).
71. Id. § 55-248.11 (c).
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ment of a 3% interest payment on a deposit held by the landlord for more
than thirteen months will be criticized by both sides. Tenants will assert
that their deposits should draw interest irrespective of their length of stay
in the dwelling unit. Landlords will argue that these interest payments will
be so small as to be inconsequential when compared to the amount of
administrative time and costs these payments will require. Further criti-
cisms of this security deposit section will center around the absence of a
provision prohibiting the landlord from commingling the security deposit
funds with his personal funds. Thus, landlords will continue to draw inter-
est on tenant's deposits if in a savings account or continue to invest these
funds in personal business ventures.
It is also arguable that the damages available to an aggrieved tenant
under the Act are not sufficient to insure landlord compliance. If a landlord
has wrongfully withheld a portion of the security deposit, there is little
monetary incentive for the tenant to bring a court action. To most tenants,
the amount of a security deposit is not worth fighting for when weighed
against the payment of attorney's fees in an unsuccessful action. This
possibility of an unsuccessful action will sufficiently discourage many ten-
ants initiatives. Other jurisdictions have given the tenant greater incentive
to take his case to court by providing for double or triple the amount in
controversy as damages for landlord noncompliance.
2
There is a trend in the regulation of practices surrounding the security
deposit, and this trend seems to follow a pattern. As a state's urban popu-
lation grows, the number of tenants grows, the number of abuses grows,
and the need for regulatory legislation increases. The urban growth in
Virginia, particularly in Tidewater and Northern Virginia, has made secu-
rity deposit regulation desirable even though the majority of landlords
have never abused tenant's rights. Despite the fact that some of the provi-
sions seem to lack punch, the enactment of this section by the General
Assembly might be considered by some to be a bold move. The vast major-
ity of states have no regulatory laws dealing with security deposits. Be-
cause of this legislation, the number of landlord and tenant misunder-
standings surrounding the security deposit in Virginia should be reduced.
II. THE LEASE
Ideally, a lease should mirror the intentions of two parties who occupy
equal bargaining positions and possess the necessary foresight to anticipate
every possible problem and it should set forth their rights and liabilities
72. See note 59 supra.
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relative to these situations in clear and unassailable language. Realisti-
cally, however, one or more of these conditions is not met and disputes
arise. Where litigation results, the court is called upon to interpret or
construct the ambiguous terms and, where the lease is silent on the con-
tested issue, apply rules designed to channel the rights and duties arising
from the relationship.
Many of the interpretive problems relating to the existence or nonexist-
ence of the landlord-tenant relationship arise where a lease has been pre-
pared without the aid of counsel.' While there are no prescribed words
necessary to form a rental agreement in Virginia, 2 the well drafted lease
should include both the rental period and a clear description of the leased
property. However, the former is not an essential element; and any uncer-
tainty in a general description does not void the agreement where extrinsic
evidence can identify the property.3 The threshold question in the exami-
nation of a lease involves the determination as to whether a writing is
required under the Virginia Statute of Frauds. To do this, it is necessary
to distinguish between the executed lease and the executory contract to
enter into a lease. By statute, a lease for more than five years must be by
deed or will.' However, where the instrument is an agreement to enter into
a lease, it must be in writing only if the lease will not be executed within
one year or if the executory contract to lease contemplates a term of more
than one year."5
A. Contract v. Conveyance
The real estate lease has evolved in circular fashion to its present state
of uncertainty., Its early significance was in the area of contract law, but
1. The lease should be distinguished from an assignment of property; the distinction being
that a landlord grants an interest less than his own by a lease and by assignment he parts
with the whole property. 11 M. J., Landlord and Tenant § 7 (1950). The lease must also be
distinguished from the contract for a lease. The determination is a question of intent but, as
a general rule, words of present demise indicate the former. Id. A special problem arises with
regard to farm leases where the lack of legal acumen on the part of the draftsmen present
the question of whether or not a lease was intended as opposed to a cropper or employment
contract. See Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp. v. Meadows, 184 Va. 168, 34 S.E.2d 392 (1945).
2. The General Assembly has codified a suggested model. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-57 (1969).
3. Consol. Coal Co. v. Mineral Coal Co., 147 W. Va. 130, 126 S.E.2d 194 (1962).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (Cum. Supp. 1973). The Code requires that where the landlord is
a corporation, the corporate seal is necessary to bring the lease into existence.
5. Smith v. Payne, 153 Va. 746, 151 S.E. 293 (1930) (dictum). VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2 (1973);
See The Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 51 VA. L. REv. 1657, 1658 (1965). For a criticism of
the Virginia statutes in this area see Virginia Section, 13 VA. L. REv. 418, 428 (1927).
6. See Trends in Landlord-Tenant Law Including Model Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR.
J. 550, 551 (1971). The lease emerged as a contract and was promptly turned into a convey-
ance. As a result of social pressures, courts are now returning to their former position.
[Vol. 8:459
LANDLORD AND TENANT
it soon came to be governed by the law of conveyances which is based on
the premise that a lease is a conveyance of an estate in the demised land
to the tenant. In this century, the circle has begun to close as contract
principles have demanded increasing recognition in the resolution of dis-
putes between the landlord and the tenant.7 Many of the problems dis-
cussed in this note have been precipitated by a failure of our judicial
system to replace common law conveyancing rules which do not fit- the
contemporary landlord-tenant situation with more judicious contract prin-
ciples.8 In today's environment, the theory that rent is paid in exchange
for an interest in land is out of place. For example, the present common
law rule does not relieve the tenant of his obligation to pay rent if the
premises are totally destroyed before the end of the term.' This harsh result
reflects the prevailing view that covenants in a lease are independent and
that a breach of any one by the landlord does not excuse the tenant's duty
to pay rent. In sharp contrast, if contract principles were applied, the
tenant might escape this liability since the lease would be viewed as a true
bilateral agreement and the covenants seen as being mutually dependent.'0
A number of courts have shifted to an application of contract principles
in leases" and many legislatures have enacted statutes in piecemeal fash-
ion to achieve similar results.' 2 The Virginia Supreme Court has not
squarely faced the issue of whether a lease is a contract or conveyance.
Some authorities believe, however, that Virginia recognizes the dual na-
ture of the lease.' 3 Because of this uncertainty, it is speculation to predict
7. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §3.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUC-
TION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 71-73 (1962) (hereinafter cited as MOYNIHAN).
8. See MOYNIHAN at 69. Today the tenant bargains for office or living space and services
rather than a mere interest in land. There is considerable merit in the contention that a part
of this rent is in consideration of these services. The lease as a grant of an estate in land must
give way to the concept of the lease as a business contract. See Bennett, The Modern
Lease-An Estate in Land or a Contract, 16 TEXAS L. REv. 47 (1937).
9. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 7, at 3.103. The reason is that the lease is
primarily a conveyance, the covenants being merely incidental thereto.
10. 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1252 (1951). An application of contract principles would also
prove to be beneficial to the landlord as he could be afforded the privilege of invoking the
doctrine of anticipatory breach allowing an action against the tenant who abandons the lease
without waiting until the term has ended.
11. See, e.g., Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 132 P.2d 457
(1942); Berzito v. Gambino, - N.J. -, 308 A.2d 17 (1973); Glyco v. Schultz, - Ohio
___, 289 N.E.2d 919 (1972).
12. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46: 8-6, 8-7 (1937); TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-702 to 703 (1955);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 234.17 (1957) (statutes abrogating the common law destruction of the
premises rule).
13. Smith v. Payne refers to the lease as both a contract and a conveyance without drawing
a distinction. 153 Va. 746, 151 S.E. 295 (1930).
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how Virginia would hold on the issue if it were to come before the court
today. One advocating the contract theory might succeed if he could con-
vince the court to adopt the approach being taken by a growing minority."
Acceptance of the contractual viewpoint is not improbable in Virginia. The
doctrine of constructive eviction has been a part of our law for some time
and its existence would indicate judicial support for the proposition that
the covenants of a lease are mutually dependent; the breach of one provid-
ing the injured party with a defense to the promisor's suit for performance
of the remaining obligations.' 5 In addition, the legislature has relieved the
tenant of his common law duty to pay rent where the premises are totally
destroyed during the term of the lease; a fact which lends support to the
argument for mutual dependence.'"
The newly enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act re-
sponded to this problem area by providing the tenant with a defense in an
action for rent or possession where the landlord has breached a covenant
in the rental agreement or an obligation imposed by statute. 7 This Act
not only interjects certainty into the Virginia Law surrounding this contro-
versy, but it also moves our courts toward an acceptance of the contract
oriented theory.
B. Exculpatory Provisions
In many cases, particularly in the residential context, the prospective
tenant must agree to a lease that includes an exculpatory provision which
relieves the landlord of liability "for damage to person or property arising
from any cause whatsoever." 8 The Virginia Residential Landlord and Ten-
14. See cases cited note 11 supra.
15. See Section VI, RENT, infra.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-226 (Cum. Supp. 1973). This section does away with the rule
developed by the common law courts which placed liability on the tenant when the premises
were completely destroyed. See National Motels, Inc. v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 373 F.2d 375
(4th Cir. 1967). The rent is reduced where buildings were destroyed without the fault of the
tenant. See Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927). The
section loses most of its potential effectiveness by excepting those cases governed by an
express provision in the contract. Stieffen v. Darling, 158 Va. 375, 163 S.E. 353 (1932). The
tenant in cases decided under section 55-226 bears the burden of proving his freedom from
negligence in the cause of the destruction. See Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Prudential Storage
& Van Corp., 208 Va. 784, 161 S.E.2d 86 (1968).
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.27 (effective July 1, 1974).
18. Taylor v. Va. Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968). In Taylor the validity
of the following exculpatory clause was at issue:
Lessor shall not be liable to Tenant, his family, servants or invitees for any damages
to person or property arising from any cause whatsoever. Tenant agrees for himself,
his family, servants and invitees not to hold Lessor liable in any way. Lessor is not
liable for loss or damage of property stored in company-owned storage buildings. Id.
at 78, 161 S.E.2d at 733.
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ant Act denies the exculpatory clause of its effectiveness by rendering any
attempt to limit the landlord's liability unenforceable.' 9 Additionally, a
landlord who wilfully enforces such a clause against his tenant will subject
himself to liability for actual damages suffered by the tenant as well as
reasonable attorney fees.20 The Act, which specifies the prohibited rental
provisions, does much in the way of reducing the advantages afforded the
landlords through their widespread use of adhesion contracts, but it falls
short of completely eliminating the problem. Because of the limitation
placed on the Act by the General Assembly, the plight of indigent tenants
who must deal with slumlords owning fewer than eleven rental units is still
governed by the applicable case law. This limitation is unfortunate since
it combines with the disparity of bargaining positions at this lowest level
of the landlord-tenant relationship, to produce a situation which increases
the likelihood of the insertion of exculpatory clauses. For this reason, a
discussion of Virginia law surrounding the subject is in order.
Generally, American courts uphold such clauses as effective means of
exempting not only the landlord but his servants from liability for negli-
gent acts.2 ' These courts cling to the remnants of the doctrine of freedom
of contract which still lingers in the law surrounding exculpatory provi-
sions and prevents the casual deletion of portions of a contract freely
entered into by consenting parties.2 2 In effect, these courts have selectively
incorporated contract theory in this context which benefits the landlord
while, as already noted, they are reluctant to apply contract principles
where they might prove helpful to a tenant seeking redress. Other jurisdic-
tions giving effect to such clauses regard the landlord-tenant relationship
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.9 (effective July 1, 1974). This section also eliminates the
effectiveness of any provisions which provide that the tenant waives rights and remedies
granted by the Act, authorizes any person to confess judgment on a claim arising out of the
lease, or agrees to pay the landlord's attorney fees.
20. Id.
21. See Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 321 (1973). The Restatement of Contracts allows a landlord
to contract away liability for future negligence, but does not grant this same right with regard
to willful or wanton misconduct. The pertinent section provides:
A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of negligence not falling
greatly below the standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm is legal except in the cases stated in § 575 RESTATEMENT
OF CoNTRAcTs § 574 (1932).
Through the use of such provisions, a landlord can avoid many of his common law duties,
e.g., the duty to use reasonable care to inspect and repair in common areas. See 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant § 366 (1968); PROSSER, TORTS § 63, at 400 (4th ed. 1971). He may also
avoid the duty to reveal latent defects known to him at the time the lease was executed.
PROSSER, TORTS § 63 (4th ed. 1971).
22. See, e.g., Ragland v. Rooker, 124 Ga. App. 361, 183 S.E.2d 579 (1971); Eastern Ave.
Corp. v. Hughes, 228 Md. 477, 180 A.2d 486 (1962); Midland Carpet Corp. v. Franklin
Associated Properties, 90 N.J. Super. 42, 216 A.2d 231 (1966).
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as essentially a private one, not subject to public policy considerations as
proponents of the minority would have them believe.?
The Virginia Supreme Court has not ruled on whether an exculpatory
clause can limit the landlord's liability to a tenant. However, in Taylor v.
Virginia Construction Corporation, 2the court considered an exculpatory
provision by which a landlord attempted to bar the recovery by a member
of the tenant's family for injuries sustained in a common area. The land-
lord argued that the rights of the plaintiff were derived from his father, the
tenant, who had agreed to exculpation., The court rejected this "tenant's
shoes" argument giving the plaintiff independent rights based on the land-
lord's duty to maintain common areas in a reasonably safe condition." It
appears that the court, by dictum, validated the exculpatory clause as an
effective bar to the recovery of a similarly situated tenant but by no means
removed all doubt; indeed, one could easily interpret the language in the
opinion as leaving the question open.2 7
A landlord not subject to the Virginia Act who desires to exculpate
himself should make certain that something passes to his tenant in return
for the privilege of being relieved of liability for his torts. Generally, courts
have found that a reduced rental payment provides sufficient considera-
23. See Annot., 49 A.L.R. 3d 321, 325 (1973).
24. 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968). This was a case of first impression in Virginia and
represents the only authority on the subject. The tenant's child, an infant plaintiff, was
injured when his hand was caught in a negligently maintained door situated in a common
passageway of the apartment building. The defect had been in existence for a considerable
length of time and the landlord was found to have had actual notice of it.
25. The landlord attempted to use the "tenant's shoes" argument, i.e., "the landlord is
liable to persons on leased premises by right or consent of the tenant only to the same extent
as he is liable to the tenant; and where the tenant has no redress against the landlord, the
members of his family are likewise barred." Id. at 78, 161 S.E.2d at 733.
26. Id. at 79, 161 S.E.2d at 734 citing Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 415-16, 143
S.E.2d 907, 909 (1965); Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 433, 65 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1951).
27. One trying to exculpate a landlord based on the wording of the Taylor decision would
be equipped with, at best, mild dictum:
Since the plaintiff's injury occurred in a common area reserved and controlled by the
defendant, its liability to him was unaffected by the fact that, because of the exculpa-
tory clause, it may not have been liable to the father for some injury occurring to the
latter. 209 Va. at 80, 161 S.E.2d at 735.
The Taylor decision does not respond to a situation where a family member has been
injured while on the premises controlled by the tenant. While the landlord is not normally
liable for injuries occurring in areas beyond his control, a latent defect known to the landlord
and unknown to the tenant would result in liability if an injury occurred. See, e.g., Candill
v. Gibson Fuel Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E.2d 465 (1946); Jacobs v. Carter, 154 Va. 87, 152 S.E.
332 (1930). At least one commentator feels that in the latent defect situation the exculpatory
clause might shield the landlord from liability for injuries to the tenant as well as an invitee
who was not a party to the agreement. See Spies, Property, 54 VA. L. REv. 1244, 1252 at n.
50 (1968) citing 209 Va. at 79, 161 S.E.2d at 734.
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tion for these protective covenants." These holdings suggest that courts
look upon the passing of consideration as evidence of the fact that the
parties have bargained for the clause.
On the other hand, a tenant seeking to avoid the effect of an exculpatory
provision should couch his argument in terms of unequal bargaining posi-
tion, unconscionability and public policy. Other jurisdictions have recog-
nized that the standard form lease drafted by the landlord's attorney in
his client's best interest does not embody the true intentions of both par-
ties. 21 In effect, these leases amount to contracts of adhesion.30 Virginia
courts have recognized the inability of a negligent party to exculpate his
liability where public policy demands that responsibility for fault be
placed on him.3 ' To this end, an injured tenant should stress the increasing
number of Virginians affected by the landlord-tenant relationship as an
indication of the need to move such disputes out of the realm of private
concern into the area of public interest.3 2 If met with the freedom of con-
tract argument, the tenant might proceed into the law of contracts calling
upon the Restatement for assistance. The attorney challenging such a
clause must cross the undefined line into the area of gross negligence. The
Restatement of Contracts declares exculpating provisions void to the ex-
tent that they seek to exonerate the exculpator from gross negligence. 31 In
accordance with this view, courts have refused to exempt a party seeking
to avoid liability where his conduct approached recklessness.
28. Cannon v. Bresch, 307 Pa. 31, 160 A. 595 (1932). For a general discussion of this subject
see Note, 28 U. PTT. L. REv. 85 (1966).
29. McCutcheon v. United Homes Corp., 79 Wash. 2d 443, 486 P.2d 093 (1971). The court
recognized that because residential leasing had become a major enterprise the use of such
clauses was no longer a private matter but was the concern of a large segment of the public.
30. See Weaver v. American Oil Co., - Ind. -, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971) (declaring such
a covenant to be unconscionable under U.C.C. 2-302); Cardona v. Eden Realty Co., 118 N.J.
381, 288 A.2d 34 (1972); Mayfair Fabrics v. Henley, 48 N.J. 483, 226 A.2d 602 (1967).
31. See Richmond v. Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 60, 138 S.E. 503 (1927); Wright v.
Richmond, 146 Va. 835, 132 S.E. 707 (1926).
32. The Virginia Housing Study Commission has determined that some 1.9 million Virgini-
ans now live in rental dwellings. A majority of housing in urban areas is rental units: Alexan-
dria (71%), Arlington (65%), Norfolk (55%), Richmond (48%), Petersburg (47%). See REPORT
OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSING STUDY COMMISSION, November, 1973, p. 5. See case cited note 29
supra.
33. See note 21 supra.
34. See National Motels, Inc. v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 373 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1967). Other
courts distinguish active from passive negligence invalidating the effect of an exculpatory
clause as a bar to recovery for the former type of conduct. See Baker v. Wheeler, Lacey,
Brown, Inc., 272 Ala. 101, 128 So. 2d 721 (1961) (landlord not liable for failure to repair
defective stairway); Armi v. Huckabee, 266 Ala. 91, 94 So. 2d 380 (1957) (landlord liable for
janitor's negligence in shoveling hot ashes onto combustible material).
Many courts try to avoid application of such provisions by a strict construction of the
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 8:459
An additional argument might be based on statutory law. Counsel for
the tenant should always explore the possibility of having the clause voided
where, if enforced, it would nullify the effect of a statute or local ordinance
designed to place an affirmative duty on the landlord. For example, a
Virginia court would most likely invalidate an exculpating provision which
is being asserted to relieve the landlord from liability for an injury caused
by breach of a duty imposed by the Fire Hazards Law. 6
Probably the best tactical approach for the tenant in Virginia would be
to urge the court to construe the rental agreement most harshly against the
landlord who drafted the lease .3 By interpreting the lease in this strict
manner, courts have invalidated an exculpatory provision where a landlord
has covenanted to repair and, at the same time, sought to exculpate him-
self from negligence. 8 As a practical matter, Virginia courts should be
receptive to this approach since it would permit them to hold for the tenant
in an unconscionable situation without barring the use of such provisions
by landlords in the proper case.
C. Rent Acceleration
A landlord may possess the power to compel performance of conditions
in the lease by having reserved the right to accelerate rent. 9 Under the
usual provision, if a tenant is in default on any of the covenants in the
clauses while others prefer judicial interpretation. The two processes have unnecessarily
confused this approach as can be exemplified by the following cases. Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d
305 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Plaza Hotel Corp. v. Fine Prods. Corp., 87 Ga. App. 460, 74 S.E.2d 372
(1953).
35. Compare Swisscroft Novelty Co. v. Alad Realty Corp., 113 N.J. Super., 274 A.2d 59
(1971) with Boyd v. Smith, 372 Pa. 306, 94 A.2d 44 (1953). For a general discussion see 17
C.J.S. Contracts § 262 (1963).
36. Similar cases in other jurisdictions have nullified the effect of the exculpatory clause
where it would exempt the landlord from his duty to comply with a building code or fire
provisions. Virginia has such a Fire Hazards Law which covers apartment buildings in Sec-
tions 27-63 to 85.1 of the Virginia Code. See note 16 supra.
37. Virginia courts construe leases favorably to the tenant and against the landlord. See
Davis v. Wickline, 205 Va. 166, 135 S.E.2d 812 (1964); Parrish v. Robertson, 195 Va. 794, 80
S.E.2d 407 (1954).
38. See Sun Copper & Wire Co. v. White Lamps Inc., 12 N.J.S. 87, 79 A.2d 93 (1951).
39. The typical rent acceleration clause provides that:
Lessor may likewise at lessor's option and in addition to any other remedies which
lessor may have upon such default, failure or neglect, give to lessee written notice of
such default, failure or neglect and advise lessee thereby that, unless all the terms,
covenants and conditions of the lease are fully complied with within thirty (30) days
after giving of said notice, the entire amount of rent herein reserved or agreed to be
paid and then remaining unpaid shall immediately become due and payable upon the
expiration of said thirty days. ..
Richer v. Rombough, 170 Cal. App. 912, 261 P.2d 328 (1953).
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agreement, a landlord may declare that the term of the lease has acceler-
ated and demand payment of the outstanding rent for the remainder of the
rental period. Courts are not in accord on the validity of such provisions.
Many that have upheld them realize the landlord could have required
full payment in advance and should not be precluded from making this
demand upon the occurrence of specified contingencies.4' The jurisdictions
that have invalidated these clauses declare such provisions void as penal-
ties.2 Others void the clause where it is called into operation by the breach
of a multiplicity of insignificant conditions.
3
Although no rent acceleration clause has come before the Supreme Court
of Virginia, one might speculate as to the possible outcome of such a case.
Assuming that the court could be persuaded to interpret the lease in a
contractual setting, the need for the protection afforded the landlord by
acceleration will have been removed.4 He would be allowed, upon an antic-
ipatory repudiation of one of the mutually dependent promises to elect to
(1) rescind the contract (2) treat the repudiation as a breach by immedi-
ately bringing suit or changing his position (3) bring suit after the time of
performance has arrived.'5 Without the aid of this assumption, one is rele-
gated to the law of conveyances where the validity of the clause will be-
come a question of its status as a penalty or provision for liquidated dam-
ages. A party seeking to strike the provision might argue that damages
resulting from breach of a rental agreement are ascertainable and therefore
not the subject of a liquidated damage provision but void as a penalty. 6
40. See, e.g., Maddox v. Hobbie, 228 Ala. 80, 152 So. 222 (1934); Abel v. Paterno, 245 App.
Div. 285, 281 N.Y.S. 58 (1935); Moretti v. Zanfino, 127 Pa. Super. 286, 193 A. 106 (1937).
41. See 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 512 (1968).
42. See, e.g., Richer v. Rombough, 170 Cal. App. 912, 261 P.2d 328 (1953); Gentry v.
Recreation, Inc., 192 S.C. 429, 7 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1940). Several factors are often considered by
courts when determining if a monetary award is for liquidated damages or a penalty: (a) the
reasonableness of the stipulated sum in relation to the damages (b) the difficulty in ascertain-
ing the actual damages (c) the importance of the breaches covered by the same forfeiture.
See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 292, 293 (1937).
43. See, e.g., 884 West End Avenue Corp. v. Pearlman, 201 App. Div. 12, 193 N.Y.S. 670,
673 (1922).
44. Acceleration clauses were designed to circumvent the older rules that prevented the
landlord from treating the tenant's default in rental payments as an anticipatory breach of
the contract (contract v. conveyance argument). 1 AMERCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.74 (Casner
ed. 1952).
45. See Taylor v. Wood, 201 Va. 615, 112 S.E.2d 907 (1960); Simpson v. Scott, 189 Va. 392,
53 S.E.2d 21 (1949).
46. Virginia authority which permits advance agreements for payment in case of breach
limits this right to situations where damages are uncertain or unascertainable when the
contract is made (the final figure being dependent upon extrinsic facts) and where the stipu-
lated amount bears some relation to the probable loss. Crawford v. Heatwole & Hedrick, 110
Va. 358, 360, 66 S.E. 46, 47 (1909). But see Richer v. Rombough, 170 Cal. App. 912, 261 P.2d
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However, a court that wishes to give effect to a rent acceleration clause
might draw support from Gay Manufacturing Company v. Camp which
voided a penalty that was in addition to the amount of rent, but required
that the tenant pay the back rent as well as rent that had accrued since
the time of the breach."
An interesting problem that arises in connection with rent acceleration
clauses is the duty of the landlord to mitigate damages after the breach
has occurred.48 Obviously, if one tenant leaves and another enters under a
comparable lease, the landlord has suffered only minor inconvenience. In
Virginia, the landlord under an executed lease has no such duty to relet to
minimize damages but may allow the rental unit to remain vacant. 9 How-
ever, if he should re-enter and terminate the lease, he is entitled to recover
only the rent then due.59 In light of the rights and duties imposed by the
tenant's breach, a landlord might do well to question the utility of the rent
acceleration clause. If he accepts the rental payments at an accelerated
date, he may not also be entitled to possession and, by doing so, could be
incurring the additional cost of having to restore premises that become
deteriorated during the remainder of the term.51
D. Conclusion
A growing number of courts have begun to mix practicality with law
realizing that the bargaining position of the landlord and tenant has be-
come so imbalanced that the tenant is forced to accept terms most favora-
ble to the landlord.12 Response to pressures demanding changes in residen-
328 (1953) (holding that the rent clause was void since damages could be easily ascertained
and providing a formula to do so).
47. 65 F. 794 (4th Cir. 1895)
And whenever it appears that damages occasioned are easily estimated in money, the
covenant is construed as a penalty. A fortiori is this construction applied to a case like
the present, when the only breach established is the nonpayment of rent within the
stipulated period, accompanied by proof that the rent then due and all rent subse-
quently accruing has been paid to the lessors, and accepted by them. Id. at 799-800.
See Crowder v. Bank of Commerce, 127 Va. 299, 304, 103 S.E. 578, 579
(1920)
a tenant who abandons the demised premises before the expiration of his lease,
without the consent of his landlord, does not thereby exonerate himself from the
payment of rent for the residue of the term . . . Id. at 304, 103 S.E. at 579.
48. See Section VII, THE ASSIGNMENT AND THE SUBLEASE infra.
49. See 127 Va. at 304, 103 S.E. at 579.
50. Id.
51. See generally 38 MARQ. L. REV. 53 (1954-55).
52. See Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act; A Departure
From Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 495, 502 (1973).
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tial urban leases has been twofold. 3 First, landlords have been delegated
additional responsibilities by both the courts and legislatures. Second,
there has been a greater tendency to apply contract principles to disputes
between parties to the lease.54 While this latter approach is needed, one
should be cautioned that a complete and unqualified acceptance of con-
tract theory, while eliminating many of the present hardships, would foster
some inequities of its own. 5 It is submitted that a workable solution will
only be reached when the lease is placed on the continuum between the
law of contracts and conveyances.
IV. POSSESSION AND USE
A lease contains an implied covenant by the lessor that the tenant shall
have peaceable possession and quiet enjoyment of the demised premises.,
This covenant protects the possessory interest of the tenant and is
breached by any act of the landlord which amounts to a deprivation of the
tenant's possession of the premises. Conduct on the part of a landlord
sufficient to constitute a breach can take the form of a failure to deliver
possession or a disturbance of possession after it has been obtained by the
tenant. Virginia has embraced the covenant for quiet enjoyment by case
laW2 and the new Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 3 has made
statutory, many of the duties imposed on the landlord by this covenant.
The new Act also imposes affirmative duties on the tenant in the use and
possession of the leased premises.'
A. Duty To Deliver Possession
As a part of his implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, Virginia case law
has always obligated the lessor to give possession of the premises to
53. Report of Committee on Leases, Trends in Landord-Tenant Law Including Model
Code, 6 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 550, 552 (1971).
54. The commissioners of Uniform State Laws have adopted this concept which underlies
the proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. See note 52 supra.
55. Unqualified acceptance of the contract theory would make it unnecessary for a landlord
to insert a rent acceleration clause in his leases. He would have the same rights as any other
promisee in a contractual setting who finds that the promisor has abandoned the contract. If
this were the case, courts would be unable to protect tenants from the effects of rent accelera-
tion using the public policy and unconscionability arguments that have been developed in
other jurisdictions.
1. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930); 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant
§ 330 (1970); C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 69 (1962).
2. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2, -248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
4. Id. 99 55-248.16, 55-248.17, 55-248.19.
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the lessee upon the commencement of the term.5 However, the word "pos-
session" in the context of this duty has had a limited meaning in Virginia.
Absent an express covenant of quiet enjoyment, the landlord has not been
required by the implied covenant to put the tenant into actual possession
of the premises but merely to acknowledge his right to possess.6 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has reasoned that to imply a convenant to place the
lessee into actual possession would be to make a contract for the parties
in regard to a matter which is equally within the knowledge of both the
lessor and lessee. 7 Essentially, all that is required of the lessor in Virginia
is that neither he nor anyone acting through him interfere with the tenant's
right to possession when the term of the lease begins. The tenant's right
under the covenant of quiet enjoyment is limited to a legally enforceable
right to possess and he has the burden of evicting a holdover tenant or
anyone else in possession of the premises who was not under authority of
the lessor."
Since the landlord has no effective "power or process" to evict a holdover
after he has signed a subsequent lease' and transferred the immediate right
to possession to the new tenant, Virginia has been unwilling to construe
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment as requiring the landlord to de-
5. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
6. Id. In Hannan a landlord leased premises to a lessee for a term of fifteen years which
was to begin on a designated date. When time came for the lessee to take possession, the
property was occupied by former tenants, and the landlord refused to take legal action to oust
them or compel their removal from the property. The lessee brought an action for damages
against the landlord, based on alleged breach of contract. There was no express covenants as
to delivery of premises or for quiet enjoyment. The landlord contended that he was under no
duty to see that the premises were open for entry by lessee. The court agreed and held that
the lessee was the proper party to oust the holdover.
Where the parties expressly covenant for quiet enjoyment the landlord has a duty to deliver
actual possession:
A covenant by a lessor "for the lessee's quiet enjoyment of his term" shall have the
same effect as a covenant that the lessee, his personal representative and lawful as-
signs, paying the rent reserved, and performing his or their covenants, shall peaceably
possess and enjoy the demised premises, for the term granted, without any interruption
or disturbance from any person whatever. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-78 (1972).
7. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). The only previous authority in
Virginia was dictum in McGhee v. Cox, 116 Va. 718, 82 S.E. 701, (1914) where the court held
that the plaintiffs were not bound to put the defendants into actual possession of the leased
premises. They were only bound to put them into legal or constructive possession.
8. Id.
9. The court in Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 364, 153 S.E. 824, 832 (1930) said that:
A lessor, having made a lease to take effect immediately upon termination of an
expiring lease, appears to have been left without power or process to himself evict a
tenant under the expiring lease, who tortiously holds over on the day succeeding the
termination of his lease . . . the power to evict (the tenant) being denied by law to
the lessor. . ..
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liver actual possession.' 0 The Supreme Court of Virginia observed that
such a duty is
a unique exception which stands alone in implying a contract of insurance
on the part of the lessor to save his tenant from the flagrant wrong of another
person. Such an obligation is so unusual and the prevention of such a tort so
impossible as to make it certain . . . that it should always rest upon an
express contract."
Virginia stands among a minority of jurisdictions in following this rule;
most jurisdictions'2 favor the English rule which requires the lessor to place
the new tenant in actual possession of the demised premises.' 3
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act fails to "simplify,
clarify, modernize and revise the law""' governing the issue of whether a
landlord has a duty to deliver possession. The Virginia Act began its legis-
lative history as a diluted version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act which was proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. What emerged after legislative devitalization and compromise is a
model of poor draftsmanship and confusion. The problems of uncertainty
and vagueness in this supposedly comprehensive legislation are com-
pounded by the fact that one cannot be sure whether Virginia case law or
the Uniform Act should "fill the holes" left by our Virginia legislators. Any
analysis of the new Act must necessarily involve a discussion of our case
law and the Uniform Act.
Section 55-248.22 of the new Act deceptively provides that if a landlord
willfully fails to deliver possession (emphasis added), rent abates until
10. The remedy of ejectment is inadequate since it serves primarily to try title. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-799 (1972); and because the landlord no longer has the right of possession, an action
for unlawful entry and detainer also is unavailable. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (1972 Repl. Vol.).
Self-help measures executed by the landlord might violate due process rights of the holdover
tenant, see the section on EvIMCTON: REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASEHOLD, infra.
11. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 363, 153 S.E. 824, 830 (1930).
12. See, e.g., Stewart v. Murphy, 95 Kan. 421, 148 P. 609 (1915); Sloan v. Hart, 150 N.C.
269, 63 S.E. 1037 (1909); Herpolsheimer v. Christopher, 76 Neb. 355, 111 N.W. 359 (1907);
Huntington Easy Payment Co. v. Parsons, 62 W.Va. 26, 57 S.E. 253 (1907); Cohn v. Norton,
57 Conn. 480, 18 A. 595 (1889); King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880). The minority or
American view holds that the landlord has no duty to deliver actual possession to the tenant.
See, e.g., Ward v. Hudson, 199 Miss. 171, 24 So. 2d.329 (1946); Snider v. Deban, 249 Mass.
59, 144 N.E. 69 (1924); Rice v. Biltmore Apts. Co., 141 Md. 507, 119 A. 364 (1922).
13. For example, in King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880) an action brought by the lessee
against the lessor for failure to deliver rented meadow land, the plaintiff alleged that as a
part of the implied covenant for quiet enjoyment the lessor was bound to put him into
possession. The court agreed with the plaintiff and held that there shall be no impediment
to the taking of possession by the lessee.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.3 (effective July 1, 1974).
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possession is delivered and the tenant may: (1) terminate the rental agree-
ment by giving five days written notice and recover all pre-paid rent and
security; or (2) demand performance of the rental agreement, and, if he so
elects, bring an action for possession against the landlord or any person in
possession. In such an action the injured tenant may recover damages and,
where the failure to deliver is willful and not in good faith, reasonable
attorney's fees.
Where the landlord or his agent is "willfully" withholding possession,
the tenant has an alternative which parallels that available under case law.
Thus, the Act's remedy where a landlord willfully fails to deliver posses-
sion is analogous to that afforded after an actual or constructive eviction
at common law which gave the tenant the right to terminate. 5 Also,
previously, the tenant, having the right of possession, could have elected
to proceed against the landlord in a tort action or an action on the covenant
of quiet enjoyment to recover his damages. Significantly, section 55-248.22
of the new Act does not affect our prior law which permitted the new lessee
to bring an action of unlawful entry and detainer against a holdover or
trespasser since in such a case the landlord would not be willfully failing
to deliver possession. Additionally, a new tenant who is faced with a hold-
over or trespasser occupying the premises cannot terminate the rental
agreement under the new Act since a willful withholding by the landlord
is a condition precedent to the remedy in section 55-248.22.16
The greatest shortcoming of the new legislation is that it fails to affirma-
tively obligate the landlord to put the tenant into actual possession.' 7 The
15. MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY §§ 384, 403 (2d ed. 1923) states in § 403:
Upon the eviction of the tenant, three important consequences follow: (1) the lessee
is entitled to sue the landlord upon his covenant of quiet enjoyment; (2) the lessee's
possession is thereby terminated as to the land so taken, and he ceases to be estopped
to deny the landlord's title as to that land; and (3) there is an abatement of the
rent . ..
16. Similiarly, under the Virginia approach to the duty to deliver possession, the new
tenant can not terminate the rental agreement unless the landlord willfully fails to deliver,
that is, an actual or constructive eviction.
17. However, the new Act allows a landlord, after termination of a rental agreement, to
enforce his claim for possession against the tenant "without limitation, by the institution of
an action for unlawful entry or detainer." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.35 (effective July 1, 1974).
Such broad language could be construed as allowing a landlord in Virginia to evict a holdover
even though another tenant has a lease to begin immediately. Previously a landlord had no
power to evict a holdover where a new tenant was entitled to possession. Hannan v. Dusch,
153 Va. 356, 154 S.E. 824 (1930). The Act, by allowing a landlord to enforce his right to
possession "without limitation" may provide such power. In the landmark case in this area
of landlord-tenant law, Hannan v. Dusch, supra, Justice Epes in his concurring opinion
stated:
If at any time the statutes of Virginia be so amended as to permit the lessor after the
moment of the expiration of the prior lease to evict his tenant tortiously holding over
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new Act seems to require only that the landlord transfer the right of posses-
sion to the tenant. Such a construction is supported by the fact that Vir-
ginia failed to adopt a section, found in the Uniform Act,'8 which obligated
the landlord to actually deliver the premises to the tenant at the beginning
of the term.
Unfortunately, there is room for confusion and debate on this point
especially since section 55-248.22 of the new Act provides a remedy for the
tenant where the "landlord willfully fails to deliver possession." This sec-
tion of our Act parallels section 4.102 of the Uniform Act; the principle
difference being the insertion of the condition of willfullness in the Virginia
Act. There is no legislative history which can explain what, if anything,
was going through our legislators' minds in making this adulteration to the
Uniform Act. The original section in the Uniform Act was intended to
supplement the landlord's duty to deliver actual possession by causing an
abatement of the rent and allowing the tenant to recover possession or
terminate the lease without regard to whether the failure to deliver was
willful.' 9
The insertion of the willfullness condition into section 55-248.22 of the
Virginia Act probably reflects a poor job of draftsmanship in an attempt
to "fix up" the legislation after the deletion of the provision for delivery of
actual possession. Thus, the addition of the word "willfully" in our Act
effectively insured that the tenant did not receive a remedy for a right
carefully denied. In conclusion, the new Act does not obligate the landlord
to deliver actual possession of the dwelling unit at the beginning of the
term.
Where there is a holdover tenant prior case law remedies must be pur-
sued. Section 55-248.22 only applies where the landlord or his agent will-
fully deny the tenant access to the dwelling unit. To say that the word
"possession" here, means only the right to possess rather than actual pos-
session is senseless. Such construction amounts to saying that the landlord
did not agree to enter into a lease, that is, the "landlord willfully failed to
under the expiring lease, I am of (the) opinion that the English rule, (requiring delivery
of actual possession) the rule of the common law, will again become the law in Virginia.
Finding support in the words of Justice Epes, the English rule could now be argued to be the
law of Virginia if the words "without limitation" are given a broad construction.
18. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 2.103 (duty to deliver possession).
19. Under the Uniform Act the landlord is obligated to put the tenant into actual posses-
sion and is given the right, not the obligation, to bring an action to oust anyone wrongfully
in possession even though he may have transferred his right to possession to a new tenant. If
the landlord fails to deliver possession rent abates and the tenant may elect to terminate
without regard to the willfullness of the landlord's failure to deliver possession. Thus, under
the scheme of the Uniform Act, the abatement of rent until possession is delivered gives the
landlord a push to evict any trespasser occupying the premises. Id.
1974]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
deliver [the right to possession]." Thus, this section simply codifies pre-
vious law of actual or constructive eviction at the inception of the tenancy.
Section 55-248.22 is contra both to sound reason and justice. A tenant
entering a rental agreement bargains for a place to live not a lawsuit. As
between the landlord and prospective tenant, the former is in a better
position to know whether or not a tenant in possession will holdover or
whether a stranger has entered the premises. It is more practical to put the
burden on the lessor, the one who has knowledge of the facts. The cost
of this problem should rest with the landlord who can spread it among all
his tenants, especially since the Act exempts smaller landords.
B. The Holdover Tenant
One of the most troublesome problems of the landlord-tenant relation-
ship occurs when a tenant, whose term has ended, refuses to vacate prem-
ises which have been let to another tenant who is entitled to immediate
possession. As noted earlier, the new Act appears to have left intact those
remedies previously available to the new tenant against such a holdover.
At common law, prior to the lessee's actual entry onto the premises, the
lessee only had a contract right to an estate for years and thus, without
an actual property right, no action for trespass could be maintained. - In
Hannan v. Dusch, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the new lessee's
property right becomes perfect at the commencement of the term,2' and
therefore the tort action for trespass is appropriate in Virginia to recover
damages from a holdover tenant.
The incoming lessee, who is entitled to immediate possession of the
premises also has available the simple and summary remedy provided by
Virginia's unlawful entry and detainer statute. 22 Proceeding against the
wrongful holdover under this statute is preferable in light of four signifi-
cant characteristics that arise when an action is brought under it: it takes
20. C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 67 (1962).
21. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (1972):
If any forcible or unlawful entry be made upon lands, or if, when the entry is lawful
and peaceable, the tenant shall detain the possession of land after his right has expired,
without the consent of him who is entitled to the possession, the party so turned out
of possession no matter what right or title he had thereto, or the party against whom
such possession in unlawfully detained may, within three years only after such forcible
or unlawful entry or the commencement of such unlawful detainer, file in the clerk's
office of the circuit of the county, or the circuit court or corporation court of the city
in which the land, or some part thereof is, a motion for judgment alleging that the




precedence over all other civil actions on the docket; 21 it settles immedi-
ately the right to possess; it is not a bar to other actions the new lessee
may wish to bring against the holdover; and it has been held that the
statute should be liberally construed in order to favor the person entitled
to possession of the premises. 24 Notwithstanding the adequacy of this rem-
edy, it is advisable, from the lessee's standpoint, to bargain for an express
covenant in the lease that the lessor will deliver actual possession-thereby
shifting the burden of removing the holdover onto the lessor.25
Another situation which presents problems is where a tenant in posses-
sion under a lease continues in possession after the expiration of his term,
but no new tenant has a lease which begins immediately. Since the tenant
is bound to surrender possession at the end of his term,2" holding over by
the tenant without agreement of the landlord puts the tenant in the posi-
tion of being in wrongful possession against the landlord. At common law,
in such a case the landlord is put to an election. He may treat the holdover
as his tenant,27 thus renewing the lease on the same terms as the one which
expired, or he may treat the the holdover as a trespasser.28
23. Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va. 819, 33 S.E.2d 643 (1945) (action under unlawful entry and
detainer statute for wrongful eviction).
24. Allen v. Gibson, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 468 (1826). In this action by a mortgagee using the
1814 detainer statute to oust a mortgagor upon default of payment, the court stated that a
plaintiff need not show he ever did have possession of the premises which he now claims
and that one co-tenant can pursue this remedy against the other. -
25. The statutory remedy of ejectment is not the proper method of gaining possession
because it serves primarily to try title to the property. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-799 (1972). Whether
the new tenant has a right to self-help is questionable since the holdover's duty to surrender
possession at the end of his term inures to the lessor rather than the new lessee. This remedy
may be effectuated if commenced by a peaceable entry because Virginia places the right to
possess in the new lessee as against any third person, including a holdover tenant. See the
section on EVICTION: REPOssESSION OF THE LEASEHOLD, infra.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.20 (effective July 1, 1974).
27. Rubin v. Gochrach, 186 Va. 786, 44 S.E.2d 1 (1947). This was an action by plaintiff to
compel specific performance of an option to purchase land leased to the plaintiffs. The lease
was for a year's term and contained a right of renewal as well as an option to purchase at
any time during the lease or any renewal period. The court held that when a landlord allows
a tenant for a term of years to hold over after his term, there arises a rebuttable presumption
that a renewal of the original lease arises with a continuance of all terms found in the original
lease. Therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to specific performance.
28. Grice v. Todd, 120 Va. 481, 91 S.E. 609 (1917). This was an action by the plaintiff for
rent. The defendant had leased premises with a termination date of August 31. Defendant
gave three months notice that he would vacate on that date. Because he could not get wagons
to move his belongings he held over for three days. The plaintiff attempted to hold the
defendant as a tenant from year to year, thus liable for rent. The court stated that when a
tenant, who had previously rented for a term holds over, without more, the landlord has the
election of treating him as renewing his lease. The court further stated that this contract of
renewal is implied in law from the voluntary acts of the parties. Here the holding over was
not voluntary and therefore the defendant was not held liable for rent.
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The new Act continues the doctrine of election. If a tenant remains in
possession as a holdover, the landlord is entitled to bring an action for
possession.2 1 Where the tenant's holdover is willful and not in good faith,
the landlord may recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees."'
If the landlord consents to the tenant's continued occupancy, a new ten-
ancy is created with the new Act providing guidelines for determining the
term of that tenancy.1
C. Interference With the Tenant's Right to Possess
Absent any express provision in the lease, a tenant is entitled to the
exclusive possession of the leasehold and may use the premises for any
lawful manner consistant with the character of the premises. 32 To protect
the tenants possessory rights the law implies in every landlord-tenant rela-
tionship a covenant of quiet enjoyment. 3 Under this implied covenant the
landlord must refrain from interfering with the tenants use and possession
of the premises. Such interference will occur in Virginia and the majority
of states3 from:
[Any wrongful act of the landlord; either of commission or omission, which
may result in a substantial interference with the tenant's possession or enjoy-
ment, whole or in part. Actual force is not essential. .... 1
Thus, a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment occurs where
there has been a wrongful eviction of the tenant by the landlord; whether
actual or constructive.
When the landlord actually excludes the tenant from possession of the
demised premises there is no question that the tenant has been evicted.",
However, whether a tenant has been "constructively" evicted by some act
or omission by the landlord is often not as clear. Constructive eviction
involves: (1) an intent by the lessor to evict the tenant or to deprive him
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.37 (effective July 1, 1974).
30. Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.7 (effective July 1, 1974).
32. Clark v. Harry, 182 Va. 410, 29 S.E.2d 233 (1944).
33. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
34. See, e.g., Cox v. Hardy, 371 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1963); Lucky v. Fidelity Union Life
Ins. Co., 339 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
35. Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 88 S.E. 52 (1916). The court held that where the
lessor stipulated that she would furnish heat and then refused, that fact constituted a con-
structive eviction when tenant vacated the premises. The tenant was released from paying
rent from the time of his eviction.
36. For a comprehensive discussion of the rights and liabilities of the parties under an
actual eviction situation see EvICTION: REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASEHOLD, infra.
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of the enjoyment of the premises; 37 (2) some act or ommission on the part
of the lessor amounting to a material and substantial deprivation of the
tenant's possession and enjoyment;38 (3) notice by the tenant of the condi-
tion;"2 (4) abandonment of the premises within a reasonable time."
The intent requirement will rarely be found in the form of an express
desire of the landlord, but is usually inferred from the facts.4' This infer-
ence is based upon the rule that every man is presumed to intend the
natural consequences of his actions; therefore it is not necessary to find a
motive on the part of the lessor to oust the tenant.1
2
To justify his vacating the premises under the doctrine of constructive
eviction, a tenant must give the lessor notice of the condition and an
opportunity to remedy it.13 Upon the failure of the landlord to remedy the
condition, the tenant must abandon the premises within a reasonable time
in order to claim a constructive eviction.4 By retaining possession or aban-
doning after undue delay the tenant will be held to have waived his right
to assert a constructive eviction. 5 Just what constitutes a reasonable time
37. Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 517, 88 S.E. 52, 54 (1916). Justice Harrison, who
delivered the opinion, stated:
I am satisfied that under the more modern doctrine in cases of this character, the
intention of the landlord should be held to be a matter of law or of fact, to be inferred
from the acts, so that if the acts of the landlord as a matter of fact resulted in dispos-
sessing the tenant by giving him justifiable cause to vacate the premises, then the law
imputes the intention to the landlord on the general principle that every man must
be held to intend the proximate consequences of his act.
38. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 225 (3) (Rohan ed. 1973); Purvis v. Silva, 94 Ariz. 62, 381
P.2d 596 (1963); Stillman v. Youman, 266 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954). This court held
that conduct of a landlord in repeatedly asking the tenant for accrued rent for a period of
about thirty minutes in the presence of the tenant's customers did not constitute constructive
eviction.
39. Pague v. Petroleum Products, Inc., 461 P.2d 317 (Wash. 1969). This court stated that
in order to claim constructive eviction, the tenant must notify the landlord of the act or
condition complained of, and give him time to correct it.
40. Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures, 4 N.Y.2d 117, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808, 149 N.E.2d 328
(1958). This court held that in an action for damages for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment the tenant must show ouster, or abandonment of the premises where the eviction
is constructive.
41. Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 88 S.E. 52 (1916).
42. MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 384 (2d ed. 1923).
43. Pague v. Petroleum Products, Inc., 461 P.2d 317 (Wash. 1969). In Milheim v. Baxter,
46 Colo. 155, 103 P. 376 (1909) the court held that a notice requirement was unnecessary and
the landlord will be held to have knowledge of the condition where an adjoining apartment
was used for immoral purposes for a long time.
44. Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures, 4 N.Y.2d 117, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808, 149 N.E.2d 328
(1958); Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 88 S.E. 52 (1916).
45. Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C. App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970). In an action by a
tenant against the owner of the rental dwelling to recover the amount paid in rent for premises
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will generally be determined by looking at the facts and circumstances of
each case."
Most importantly, constructive eviction relieves the tenant of the obli-
gation to pay rent for the unexpired term. 7 The evicted tenant may also
bring an action against the lessor for damages either in contract upon the
covenant of quiet enjoyment48 or in tort for the landlord's interference with
his possessory rights.'"
The recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
provides the tenant with comprehensive remedies for interference with his
peaceful use and possession of the demised premises.' Whether the Act is
meant to provide the exclusive remedy displacing the availability of the
doctrine of constructive eviction is unclear. One of the stated purposes of
the Act is "to establish a single body of law relating to the landlord and
tenant throughout the Commonwealth."'" In meeting this goal of uniform-
ity it is arguable that an aggrieved tenant can only utilize the remedies of
the new statute. Such an interpretation would be unfortunate because
even though the tenants' remedies under the Act are extensive, whether
the Act provides the tenant with a remedy for every interference that could
constitute a constructive eviction is open to question.
Under Section 55-248.26 of the new Act a tenant may recover possession
or terminate the rental agreement if the landlord wrongfully ousts or ex-
cludes the tenant from possession. Additionally, where a landlord willfully
diminishes essential services the tenant may terminate the rental agree-
ment. In either case the tenant may also recover damages and reasonable
attorney's fees. Significantly the section requires that the diminution of
that allegedly were substantially unfit for habitation, the plaintiff was held not entitled to
recover rent voluntarily paid where the plaintiff continued to occupy the defendant-owner's
property.
46. Kennedy v. Nelson, 414 P.2d 518 (N. Mex. 1966). This court held that the evidence
presented a jury question as to the reasonableness of the tenant's delay in vacating the
premises after notification to the landlord of untenantable conditions.
47. The defense of constructive eviction is a complete bar to any action brought by the
lessor for rent or otherwise for the enforcement of the lease. 2 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 225
(3) (Rohan ed. 1973); 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 575 (1970); See the section on
RENT, infra.
48. Herstein Co. v. Columbia Pictures, 4 N.Y.2d 117, 172 N.Y.S.2d 808, 149 N.E.2d 328
(1958).
49. 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 323 (1970). In Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588,
208 N.W. 255 (1926), the court granted an injunction to restrain a constructive eviction. The
plaintiff alleged that the defendant-lessor was going to lease an upper apartment for the
purpose of accomodating a college fraternity, thus causing annoyance and inconvenience to
plaintiff's use and occupation of the lower apartment.
50. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.21, .23, .26 (effective July 1, 1974).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.3 (effective July 1, 1974).
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essential services by the landlord must be willful in order to proceed under
this section. Under the doctrine of constructive eviction the interference
by the landlord must be intentional but there is no requirement that the
interference be done with a motive to oust.5 2 Under Section 55-248.26 the
term "willful" may comprehend an intent to evict by diminution of essen-
tial services.
Section 55-248.21 permits the tenant to terminate the rental agreement
where there is a material non-compliance by the landlord of the rental
agreement or those provisions of the Act which affect safety and health.
However, this section will not operate unless the tenant delivers written
notice specifying the non-compliance. The landlord has twenty-one days
after such notice to remedy the condition and if he fails the tenant may
terminate thirty days after notice was delivered.
5 3
The tenant can not terminate the agreement if the defective condition
was created by the tenant or one under his control. This requirement raises
the question of whether the tenant may proceed under this section where
the condition is caused by a fellow tenant. Since the section expressly
precludes a remedy if the tenant or one under his control creates the
condition, by negative implication it would appear that the remedy against
the landlord would be available for the acts of another tenant. This would
be a significant departure from the prior law where under the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment the breach occurs only where the interference
was caused by the landlord or some person acting as his agent.Y
As an alternative to termination of the rental agreement, the new Act
provides the tenant with additional remedies where the landlord wrong-
fully fails to provide essential services in controvention of the rental agree-
ment or the provisions of the Act. Section 55-248.23 provides that where a
landlord fails to correct such a condition within a reasonable time after
written notice the tenant may (1) recover damages based upon the diminu-
tion in the fair rental value of the dwelling unit or (2) procure substitute
housing during the period the condition exists. Where the tenant elects to
procure substitute housing he is excused from the duty to pay rent for
the period. If a tenant chooses to proceed under this section, the Act
provides that he may not terminate the agreement pursuant to Section 55-
248.21.1'
52. In Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 88 S.E. 52 (1916), the Virginia Supreme Court
held that if in fact the tenant was dispossessed because of the acts of the lessor, then the law
would impute the "intention" to the landlord. It is not at all clear whether the addition of
the word "willful" now places a burden on the tenant to actually show a motive to oust.
53. Additionally, a tenant proceeding under this section may pursue injunctive relief.
54. 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 318 (1970).
55. These two sections of the new Act are mutually exclusive. By their wording, proceeding
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The remedy provided by Section 55-248.23 is significant in that it pro-
vides an aggrieved tenant with a viable remedy for diminution of an essen-
tial service where terminating the agreement and relocating is not a realis-
tic alternative.
D. Use of the Premises
The tenant is entitled to the exclusive possession of the entire demised
premises during the term of the lease. '  He has the right and responsibility
to control the premises and put them to any use which does not amount
to waste5 7 or destruction and which is not illegal.5" The tenant must use
the premises in a manner for which they are suited and for purposes consis-
tent with the covenants of his lease.
The tenant in Virginia has always been subject to tort liability for any
misuse of the premises amounting to waste. 9 If an express covenant to
maintain the premises is breached by the tenant, contract liability arises; "
moreover, the landlord may exercise his right to forfeiture where the lease
expressly provides such a right." The new Act expands the rights of the
landlord by delineating certain obligations which the tenant must fulfill
regarding the maintenance of the dwelling unit62 as well as the manner in
which any rules or regulations of the landlord may be enforced.1 The
under one of them bars the tenant from pursuing his remedies under the other.
56. Clark v. Harry, 182 Va. 410, 29 S.E.2d 233 (1944). The court discussed the definition
of a lease in Virginia and the rights of a lessee thereunder. The particular case involved a
determination of the relationship of the parties and the court held it was that of master-
servant or owner-cropper and not that of landlord-tenant.
57. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-211, -216 (1972). As a practical matter, waste can result from
affirmatively doing something to the property such as punching a hole in the wall of the
rented apartment or removing manure from a leased field. Waste can also result from omit-
ting to perform a duty such as allowing a field capable of cultivation to erode away or, in a
residential lease, failure to close a window or door when it rains, resulting in a warped floor
or wall.
58. Davis v. Wickline, 205 Va. 166, 135 S.E.2d 812 (1964) (action for declaratory judgment
construing a lease); Stonegap Colliery Co. v. Kelly, 115 Va. 390, 79 S.E. 341 (1913) (construc-
tion of a mining lease and determination of rights of lessee under such a lease).
59. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-211 (1972).
60. Id. § 55-216. See Kavanaugh v. Donavan, 186 Va. 85, 41 S.E.2d 489 (1947). The
plaintiff-lessor elected to sue defendant-lessee in tort for damages rather than on breach of
covenant to keep in reasonably good condition. The court held that plaintiff-lessor must show
negligence on the part of lessee; lessee would be responsible for his voluntary and willful acts;
double damages could be awarded for wanton waste; and conduct of lessee's servants and
agents can be taken into consideration in determining liability.
61. The only limitation to such a right of the landlord's is found in Davis v. Wickline, 205
Va. 166, 135 S.E.2d 812 (1964) where the court stated that the right to forfeiture will be
strictly construed against the lessor.
62. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.16, -248.19 (effective July 1, 1974).
63. Id. § 55-248.17.
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landlord has adequate measures under the new Act to enforce reasonable
regulations and code obligations. He must give notice to the tenant of any
misuse, and in the absence of any remedial action by the tenant, he can
exercise his right of forfeiture, obtain injunctive relief, and in either case
he may recover damages. 6 For willful breach the landlord may recover
reasonable attorney's fees. 65 Additionally, where the misuse by the tenant
materially affects health and safety the landlord, after written notice and
fourteen days, may enter the premises, repair the condition and charge the
tenant for the cost of repairs. 6 The Act, unfortunately, does not specify
who determines when a situation endangers health and safety. It is submit-
ted that the landlord should not be the one making that determination
because of the very great potential for abuse.
Under Section 55-222 of the Code of Virginia, which remains in effect,
the tenant from month to month must give written notice of his intention
to terminate thirty days prior to the end of the month.67 This statute is a
codification of case law recognizing that termination should occur at the
end of the rental period, and only at such time.6 8 Section 55-248.37 of the
new Act provides that thirty days notice in a month to month tenancy is
required "prior to the termination date specified in the notice." There
appears to be a conflict here in that the new Act allows a tenant to termi-
nate on any date he desires so long as the requisite notice of thirty days
prior to termination is given. 9 The thrust of these notice requirements is
the time frame in which the notice must be given; therefore, the new Act
appears to place the tenant in the favorable position of determining his
own termination date without the necessity of waiting until the rental
period ends.
64. Id. § 55-248.31.
65. Id.
66. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.32 (effective July 1, 1974).
67. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-222 (1972), which states:
A tenancy from year to year may be terminated by either party giving notice, in
writing, prior to the end of any year of the tenancy, for three months of his intention
to terminate the same. A tenancy from month to month may be terminated by either
party giving thirty days notice in writing, prior to the end of the month, of his intention
to terminate the same. When such notice is to the tenant it may be served upon him
or upon anyone holding under him the leased premises, or any part thereof. When it
is by the tenant it may be served upon anyone who, at the time, owns the premises in
whole or in part, or the agent of such owner, or according to the common law. This
section shall not apply when, by special agreement no notice is to be given; nor shall
notice be necessary from or to a tenant whose term is to end at a certain time.
68. 49 Am. JuR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 73 (1970); C. MOYNIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 80 (1962).
69. Inasmuch as the two statutes are in conflict it can be argued that the new Act's notice
requirement should apply to residential leases, while the current Virginia Code notice require-
ment would be applicable in the commercial area.
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V. CONDITION OF THE PREMISES
Although not always reflected in the case law, the physical condition of
residential rental property is a frequent source of controversy in the
landlord-tenant relationship.' It is an area where the early common law
rigidly applied a strict caveat emptor doctrine with predictably harsh re-
sults. As with most other areas of landlord-tenant law, Virginia has consis-
tently adhered to settled common law principles. 2 Increased urbanization,
however, has placed a great burden on the existing Virginia case law to deal
effectively with the modern landlord and tenant. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising that a statutory reform movement has sought to balance the equi-
ties as well as codify an emerging trend in the cases seeking to do the same.
For example, the newly enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act attempts to establish clear criteria for the maintenance of quality
housing, although it may have the perhaps unintended effect of usurping
judicially developed methods which deal with the situation.3
For the practicing attorney, the future has become more complex. The
statutory transformation of Virginia's landlord-tenant law means asserting
new remedies available to the tenant and serving a landlord with increased
responsibilities. However, since the law exempts natural persons owning
ten or less units, the Virginia attorney is still left with a great challenge
regardless of which party he represents. With the exempted landlord, the
attorney must seek either to overturn the caveat emptor doctrine or to
preserve its common law characteristics in the face of the modern trend to
imply a warranty of habitability in the maintenance of rental premises. For
either purpose, an understanding of t.e existing law as well as the implica-
tions of the legislation is a nece'oary starting point.
1. For example, from January 3, 1972, to December 29, 1972, Arlington County's Tenant-
Landlord Commission's staff handled 2,326 calls, 35% of which concerned maintenance prob-
lems, a percentage twice that of any other category.
2. A notable exception is VA. CODE ANN. § 55-226 (Repl. Vol. 1969) which reverses the
common law rule and makes the liability of the tenant for damage to the premises dependent
upon whether or not there was fault or negligence on the part of the lessee.
3. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to-248.40 (effective July 1, 1974) [hereinafter cited as the
Virginia Act]. The Virginia Act is basically an adoption of the UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LAND-
LORD AND TENANT AcT, the text of which can be found at 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY § 260.1[41 (1973). Interestingly enough, criticism of the adoption of a uniform act
at this time eminates from tenant as well as landlord groups. The tenants' interest groups
believe additional and more extensive reforms can be achieved by court decisions than the
proposed Act would include. Report of Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of
Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act 8 REL PROP.,
PROBATE & TRUST J. 104, 123 (1973).
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A. The Requirement of Habitability
Consistent with the vast majority of jurisdictions, Virginia courts hold
that there is no implied warranty or covenant in the lease of an unfurnished
dwelling or apartment house as to its fitness for habitation or suitability
for the purpose the lessee intended.' The general rule is thus stated:
In the absence of warranty, deceit or fraud on the part of a landlord, the rule
of caveat emptor applies to leases of real estate, the control of which passes
to the tenant, and it is the duty of the tenant to make examination of the
demised premises to determine their safety and adaptability to the purposes
for which they are hiredA
A review of the leading Virginia cases indicates that caveat emptor has
been routinely applied since its adoption to leases of real property without
historical analysis of its origin nor question of the principle's adaptability
to the contemporary landlord-tenant relationship.6 Under the doctrine of
caveat emptor the tenant assumes the risk of patent defects in the demised
premises at the time of the lease. In order to avoid application of the
"buyer beware" doctrine, the tenant must show an express warranty, fraud
or duress, or qualify under another limited exception allowed at common
law. Thus, an express warranty or covenant by the lessor can create a duty
in himself to warrent the habitability of the demised premises. To consti-
tute fraud there must have been a fraudulent misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of a material defect which the lessee could not have discovered in the
exercise of due diligence.7 Though never expressly adopted or rejected in
Virginia, some jurisdictions exempt from the operation of the caveat
emptor rule the lease of furnished premises for a temporary purpose.8 The
4. Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 211, 56 S.E.2d 80, 82-83 (1949); Caudill v. Gibson Fuel
Co., 185 Va. 233, 239-40, 38 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1946). See generally 49 AM. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 769 (1970); 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 225[2] (1973); 3A G.
THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1230 (Repl. 1959).
5. Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 354, 138 S.E. 637, 644 (1927) quoting
16 R.C.L. pp. 772, 775, §§ 268, 270.
6. Historically, leases were used to demise land for agrarian purposes and were regarded
as equivalent to a sale of the premises for a term. Inspection of land as to suitability for the
lessee's purposes was far easier than an inspection of an apartment or other dwelling unit for
habitability. Only in rare instances can the tenant be said to have knowledge of all defects
and conditions which a reasonable inspection could reveal. See Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 650
(1971); Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Pro-
posal for Statutory Development, 12 WM. & MARY L. REv. 580, 580-88 (1971).
7. See 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 303 (1968).
8. See, e.g., Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141, 116 A. 26 (1922); Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass.
322, 225 N.E.2d 311 (1967); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77 Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (1912). The
development of the exception is discussed in Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Lease of Furnished Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RICH. L. REv.
322 (1969).
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reasons which have been given for abandoning caveat emptor in this in-
stance are threefold: a) the contemplation by the parties of immediate
occupancy without alteration; b) the difficulty of inspecting a furnished
dwelling prior to leasing; and c) the finding of an implied warranty is
equitable and in line with modern business practices0 Nevertheless, only
a few states have granted this variant to the general rule by case law,
although some states impose a similar statutory relief.'0
Taking a more advanced stance, many other jurisdictions have rejected
the idea of caveat emptor by finding an implied warranty of habitability
in a regular lease by case law development." In some respects, the general
implication of a warranty of habitability by the lessor differs only slightly
from the reasoning supporting an exception to caveat emptor for leases of
furnished premises.' Regardless of possible precedent, the modern trend
is a marked departure from earlier common law rules. The rationale of the
modern cases vary but they all stress the contractual nature of the modern
lease agreement as a basis for their decisions. 3
New Virginia legislation" would place a duty upon the landlord to put
9. Harkrider, Tort Liability of a Landlord, 26 MICH. L. REV. 260, 281-82 (1928).
10. These statutes impose a general obligation to put the premises in a tenantable condi-
tion. For a listing and discussion of the statutes see Lesar, Landlord and Tenant Reform, 35
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1279, 1286 n.43, 1287 nn.50, 53 (1960).
11. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Lund v. MacArthur, 51
Hawaii 473, 462 P.2d 482 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Eskin v.
Freedman, 53 Ill. App. 2d 144, 203 N.E.2d 24 (1964); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970); Henson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 1972).
Practical problems arise when an implied warranty of habitability is recognized which the
practitioner must face without precise guidelines:
A. What constitutes a breach of the implied warranty of habitability?
B. Must the code violations be verified by city code inspectors?
C. What if the landlord claims that compliance with codes would be too expensive
and uneconomical?
D. Will a waiver of the implied warranty be considered valid?
Moskovitz, Rent Withholding and the Implied Warranty of Habitability-Some Neu,
Breakthroughs, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 49, 63-64 (1970).
12. Often a future tenant's inspection of a rental unit is conducted, if at all, when the unit
is still occupied and, therefore, furnished. Likewise, alteration is never contemplated while
the move-in date immediately follows the expiration date of the previous tenancy. Also
mitigating against the narrowness of this exception is the prevalent practice of leasing an
apartment based upon examination of a "model" unit without inspection of the actual prem-
ises leased.
13. The court may emphasize the changing conditions of society or analogize to consumer
protection law or find in the existence of housing codes an implied duty to the tenant to keep
the premises in conformity. See 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 225[21 (1973);
49 N.C. L. REV. 175, 179-87 (1970).
14. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to-248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
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and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition.'5 Where housing
codes place a greater duty upon the landlord than those duties enumer-
ated, the landlord's compliance with the applicable building and housing
codes becomes the standard of habitability. Like the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act, the Virginia Act can be viewed as a codification
of the recent trend requiring the landlord to maintain habitable premises
throughout the term of the lease.'"
However, because of subtle changes and omissions in the Virginia Act,
as well as the original weakness of the Uniform Act, the tenant's protection
clearly rests with his local building and housing codes.'7 The landlord may
contract away by written agreement specified duties enumerated in the
Act leaving only the requirements of compliance with applicable building
and housing codes: the general duty to keep premises in a fit and habit-
able condition, and the specific obligation to keep mechanical and plumb-
ing facilities supplied to the tenant in good and safe working order. The
Virginia Act contains no provision requiring each such agreement to be by
"separate" agreement or to be supported by separate consideration.'8 Of
significant import in the Virginia Act is the provision for transferring the
landlord's responsibility over common areas to the tenant in probable
contradiction of the common law.'9 Without the inclusion of this provision,
the statute's effect would be identical to the Uniform Act. That is, all
maintenance work necessarily connected with the landlord's obligation to
provide habitable premises is specifically prohibited from becoming the
tenant's responsibility, even by agreement." Apparently, the Virginia Act
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (effective July 1, 1974).
16. The section follows the warranty of habitability doctrine now recognized by case law
in the jurisdictions of California, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, Washington D.C., and Wisconsin. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT AcT § 2.104, Comment.
17. The good faith requirement expressed in the Virginia Act can only be as strong as a
particular court wishes to make it; therefore, it is a nebulous standard of protection.
18. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.16(c) (effective July 1, 1974) with UNIFORM
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT §§ 2.104(c), (d), and (e). The Uniform Act would
operate to prevent 1) use of the rental agreement to transfer responsibilities of the landlord
and 2) use of reduced rent as sufficient consideration for such an agreement, in that it
prohibits such a tie-in to the rental agreement. Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant
Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL
PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 104, 112 (1973). This article is reprinted in 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY § 260.1 (1973).
19. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13(c) (effective July 1, 1974) with UNIFORM RESIDEN-
TIAL LANDORD AND TENANT AcT § 2.104(c). The law currently requires a special contract to
transfer the landord's duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining common areas; whereas,
the Virginia Act, unlike the language of § 2.104(c) of the Uniform Act, does not clearly state
that a separate writing is necessary for the transfer of this obligation.
20. Subcommittee on the Model Landlord-Tenant Act of Committee on Leases, Proposed
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seeks to avoid this safeguard and accept the landlord's argument for limi-
tation of his liability. 2'
If relegated by the landlord's use of the landlord-tenant statute to the
protection afforded by local ordinances and state housing code provisions,
the Virginia residential tenant has varying degrees of assurance of habita-
bility, depending upon his locale. 2 The Virginia housing statutes offer but
a single source of reasonable protection, a provision for the maintenance
of toilets.23 However, this housing statute represents a possible answer to
the inadequacies of Virginia landlord-tenant law in the form of a compre-
hensive statewide housing code. Undoubtedly, even under the Virginia
Act, the reliance on local ordinances for standards of habitability will
suffer from much of the same criticism as did case law development in that
results are often obtained in a random and somewhat haphazard manner.
21
For the benefit of the landlord, the Virginia Act includes a provision,
directly adopted from the Uniform Act, for tenant obligations in maintain-
ing the dwelling unit.2- The Act satisfies a previous vacuum in this area of
the law by imposing specific affirmative duties on the tenant. In a way,
this provision corresponds to the landlord's newly enacted warranty of
habitability in that it attempts to insure landlords of "habitable" tenants.
Its basic theme is that the tenant use the premises in a reasonable manner
and comply with applicable housing code provisions primarily imposed
upon tenants. The purpose is to establish minimum duties of tenants,
Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, 8 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 104, 112
(1973).
21. The reason for such a limitation is:
In any sensible and equitable method of ensuring the maintenance of habitable
dwelling units, there must be some limitation on the liability of the landlord if the
ownership, construction and maintenance of these dwelling units are to be encouraged.
Strum, Proposed Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act: A Departure from
Traditional Concepts, 8 REAL PROP. PROBATE & TRUST J. 495, 500 (1973).
22. Virginia localities have taken various approaches to landlord-tenant conflicts, such as
establishment of a quasi-judicial commission or a Certificate of Compliance program. For a
discussion of these methods of seeking quality housing see THE INDIGENT TENANT, Section X.
infra.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-64 (Repl. Vol. 1969). Under this provision the landlord must
provide a sanitary privy or closet or the tenant shall supply the same and deduct the cost
from his rent.
24. A detailed statewide housing code with adequate remedy and notice provisions is one
suggested solution. Such a code would not be subject to disclaimer, but incorporated into the
lease agreement by operation of law. Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability in
Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Proposal for Statutory Development, 12 WNI. & MARY L. REV.
580, 600-01 (1971).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.16 (effective July 1, 1974); UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND
TENANT ACT § 3.101.
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although some think the common law is well suited in its present state to
deal with irresponsible tenants.26
Virginia formerly recognized the right of a landlord to transfer many of
his duties to the tenant by express covenants. However, as to responsibility
for common areas, a landlord could not contract away his implied duty of
ordinary care at least with respect to third persons.2 7 Courts of other juris-
dictions have not always allowed these exculpatory clauses to take effect
when public policy would be violated, the public policy involved being the
applicable housing code which is made a part of the lease by an implied
warranty.2 Basically, the public policy argument depends on the court's
responsibility to protect the general welfare, which includes the avoidance
of caveat emptor where it results in poor rental housing that fosters urban
blight. 9 Formerly, Virginia appeared to uphold the idea of freedom of
contract between the landlord and the tenant when dealing with exculpa-
tory clauses.
The new Act appears to continue the policy of freedom of contract with
respect to an exculpatory agreement between a landlord and tenant. Sec-
tion 55-248.9 of the Act prohibits any provisions whereby a tenant "agrees
to the exculpation or limitation of any liability of the landlord to the tenant
arising under law." However, Section 55-248.13, which, among other
things, obligates a landlord to maintain the common area in a clean and
safe condition, permits a landlord and tenant to agree in writing that the
tenant perform certain of the landlord's duties imposed therein. These
sections are not necessarily inconsistent and a court in construing the Act
can harmonize them. The former section forbids exculpation from a
liability arising under law, while the latter imposes a duty on the landlord
26. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 3.101, Comment. This is not to say
tenants should be relieved of such obligation; rather, heretofore landlords have had sufficient
remedies to use against destructive tenants. The indigent tenant is an exception by virtue of
being judgment proof and unable to compensate his landlord for damages to the premises.
27. In Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E. 2d 732 (1968), the court held
a landlord liable where a tenant's child was injured in a common area despite a broad
exculpatory clause in the tenant's lease. The opinion is not conclusive as to whether the
exculpatory clause would have effectively barred recovery by the tenant. See Section III,
LEASE supra.
28. Note, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Housing Leases, 21 DRAKE L. REv. 300, 312
(1972).
29. The test of whether a landlord can shift his liability would rest on the relative bargain-
ing positions of the parties; that is, the lessee must be shown to have had some bargaining
power. A shortage of good housing, racial or class discrimination, or a standardized form lease
all show a lack of bargaining power. Id. at 312-13.
30. 11 M.J., Landlord and Tenant § 37 (1950). However, the tenant cannot contract away
the right of a member of his family to recover for personal injuries in a common area. Taylor
v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 80, 161 S.E.2d 732, 735 (1968).
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except where the landlord and tenant otherwise agree. Thus, such an
agreement is not an exculpatory provision which transfers a landlord's
"liability . . . arising under law" since the Act permits the landlord to
shift the underlying duty which would give rise to that liability to the
tenant by agreement.
Section 55-248.13 limits the scope of these exculpatory provisions by
permitting only those entered into in good faith which do not affect the
landlord's obligation to other tenants in the premises. 3 Therefore, an
agreement between a landlord and tenant that the tenant keep a common
area in a clean and safe condition would be binding between the immediate
parties but could not diminish the landlord's obligation or responsibility
to other tenants or strangers using the common area.
Interestingly, the Virginia Act altered the Uniform Act in two significant
passages. First, Virginia limited the landlord's duty to "common areas
shared by two or more dwelling units." Second, under the Uniform Act a
landlord could not transfer his statutory duty with respect to a common
area to the tenant.32 Unfortunately, this departure from the substance of
the Uniform Act creates a loophole in an area in which reform was needed-
especially since Virginia also failed to enact the "unconscionability" provi-
sion found in the Uniform Act. 33
B. Maintenance of the Premises
1. Repair of the Demised Premises
Virginia adheres to the common law rule that, absent a covenant to the
contrary, the lessor is under no obligation to keep the demised premises
in repair. 4 On the other hand, the lessee's duty, unless there is a covenant
to repair, extends only to those ordinary repairs necessitated by his own
fault or negligence5.3 Even though the tenant has this duty, it is the land-
lord who is the guardian of his own premises and it is his responsibility to
keep the premises fit, either by utilizing common law sanctions or enforc-
ing the lease provisions.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (c) (effective July 1, 1974).
32. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 with UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT
AcT § 2.104.
33. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT § 1.303.
Much of the landlord-tenant litigation in Virginia courts concerns injuries arising
from defective conditions in common areas, and the law in this area has been quite
favorable to the landlord. See 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1973).
34. National Motels, Inc. v. Howard Johnson, Inc., 373 F.2d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 1967);
Schurman v. American Stores Co., 145 F.2d 721, 722 (4th Cir. 1944); Adams Grain & Provi-
sion Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 118 Va. 500, 502, 88 S.E. 171, 172 (1916).
35. Willis v. Wrenn's Ex'x, 141 Va. 385, 389, 127 S.E. 312, 313 (1925).
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Where the tenant has undertaken an express obligation to repair, Vir-
ginia still requires a showing of the tenant's negligence before the landlord
can recover, in sharp contrast to the older common law view,36 although
the burden is somewhat surprisingly on the lessee to prove the absence of
negligence."' Thus, by statute, destruction of the premises by a fire of
unknown origin would not obligate the tenant to rebuild the premises,
despite the existence of a covenant to repair or to leave in good repair. For
a covenant to have a greater effect requires a clear and express intention
by the parties."'
Where the terms of the lease require the tenant to erect buildings, the
improvement becomes a part of the freehold unless there is an agreement
allowing the tenant to remove such improvement.3 9 In general then, the
intention of the parties governs the removal of property within the contrac-
tual classification set forth in the agreement." Such problems seldom face
the typical residential tenant, although long-term renters of apartment
units are perhaps likely to make significant alterations and additions to
their apartments over a period of time.
Occupancy of a rental unit imposes a duty on the tenant not to commit
waste, unless he has a license to do so.4' This obligation has generated only
a few cases which have reached the Virginia Supreme Court; although, to
the landlord, utilization of the waste statutes seems to be an attractive
alternative to retaining the tenant's security deposit for damage to the
premises. By statute, the wanton wasting of the leased premises subjects
36. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Prudential Storage & Van Corp., 208 Va. 784, 789, 161
S.E.2d 86, 90 (1968); Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 354, 355, 138 S.E.
637, 645 (1927). VA. CODE ANN. § 55-226 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
37. In contrast West Virginia imposes a burden on the landlord to show the damage was
the result of the fault or negligence of the tenant. McKenzie v. Western Greenbrier Bank,
146 W.Va. 971, 124 S.E.2d 234 (1962). See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-4-13 (1966).
38. Nothing should be left to vague inferences or doubtful construction. Willis v. Wrenn's
Ex'x, 141 Va. 385, 393, 127 S.E 312, 314 (1925) quoting Maggort v. Harnsbarger, 35 Va. (8
Leigh) 532, 538 (1837). Where an obligation to rebuild is found, the measure of damages is,
"Ithe cost of replacing upon the lot a building of equal size, character and construction,
deducting therefrom a proper and just amount for the age and depreciation of the destroyed
building, and any amount which the plaintiff has received or should receive from the sale of
the material salvaged from the building less such expense as the plaintiff has been put to in
producing such salvage." Vaughan v. Mayo Milking Co., 127 Va. 148, 161, 102 S.E. 597, 601
(1920).
39. Prince William County v. Thomason Park, Inc., 197 Va. 861, 866, 91 S.E. 2d 441, 445
(1956).
40. Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatre, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 722, 167 S.E.2d 334, 337 (1969);
Bolin v. Laderberg, 207 Va. 795, 801, 153 S.E.2d 251, 255 (1967).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-211 (1969) applied in Fleenor v. Sproles, 148 Va. 503, 139 S.E. 286
(1972).
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the lessee in possession to liability for double damages. 2 It should be noted
that an injunction against waste may be obtained while a suit is pending,
even though the statutes provide for a remedy at law.43
By case law the Virginia landlord has no responsibility to maintain in
safe condition any part of the leased premises under the tenant's control.
An exception exists to this general rule when an injury results from the
existence of some latent defect in the premises known only to the lessor
and not reasonably discoverable by the tenant. In such situations a duty
arises for the lessor to disclose the existence of the defective condition; the
failure of any notice constitutes negligence should an injury result."
The new Act increases the landlord's potential for liability by obligating
him to maintain the premises in a fit condition; specifically, the landlord
must comply with building and housing codes materially affecting health
and safety, keep the premises in a habitable condition, and maintain in
safe condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating, and
air conditioning facilities supplied by him."'
The presence of a covenant by the lessor to repair the leased premises
does not affect the case law rule of caveat emptor. Even though an un-
known defect in the premises is attributable to a failure to repair, the
existence of a covenant to repair does not impose tort liability upon the
lessor. 6 However, once repairs are undertaken on the demised premises,
the lessor must use reasonable care in making the repairs whether he enters
by virtue of a covenant to repair or voluntarily.47
2. The Common Area
A lessor is liable in tort for his negligence in caring for common areas, a
subject which accounts for a substantial percentage of Virginia's appellate
cases. Here the court deals with the double objective of biolding the person
who has exclusive control of the property responsible for its condition and
42. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that waste has been committed to his injury and
the amount of damage. Whether the waste amounts to wanton waste is a jury question. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-214 (1969); See Kavanaugh v. Donovan, 186 Va. 85, 91, 94, 41 S.E.2d 489,
492, 494 (1947).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-216 (1969).
44. Smith v. Wolsiefer, 119 Va. 247, 253, 89 S.E. 115, 117 (1916).
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (effective July 1, 1974).
46. Paytan v. Rowland, 208 Va. 24, 27, 155 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1967); Caudill v. Gibson Fuel
Co., 185 Va. 233, 240, 38 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1946). However, the landlord is liable for property
repair cost.
47. Oden v. Redevelopment & Housing Authority, 203 Va. 638, 640, 125 S.E.2d 843, 845
(1962); Oliver v. Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 543-44, 65 S.E.2d 571, 573 (1951); Leudtke v. Phillips,
190 Va. 207, 212, 56 S.E.2d 80,83 (1949).
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preventing the landlord from being the insurer of the tenant's safety. To
this end the court defines the landlord's obligation as an implied duty to
use ordinary care to keep the common areas in a reasonably safe condi-
tion. " In order to recover damages the tenant must show either that the
lessor had knowledge of an existing defect or that the premises had been
in an unsafe condition for such a length of time that he should have known
of the hazardous status of the property.49 The parameters of the reasonable
care obligation upon the landlord as to common areas are not clear in
Virginia case law, although the Virginia Supreme Court states that the
obligation encompasses the duty to make reasonable inspections to deter-
mine when and if repairs are needed 0 Conversely, a careful inspection by
the landlord or his agent which fails to disclose a defect will relieve the
landlord from liability.
A landlord's duty under the new legislation is to "keep all common areas
shared by two or more dwelling units of the premises in a clean and safe
condition." 5' At first glance this obligation does not differ in any significant
way from a landlord's common law duty. It is safe to assume that the court
will construe the Act as requiring the landlord to maintain the common
area in a "reasonably" clean and safe condition and as requiring knowledge
or notice on the part of the landlord before liability could attach. Addition-
ally, it appears likely that the court will continue to impose the common
law duty where a common area is not shared by two or more units. How-
ever, it is arguable that the new Act has materially altered the state of the
law with respect to the landlord's liability for patent defects existing at the
time-of the letting.
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Aragona Enterprises v. Miller, held
that the landlord is not liable to the tenant or the tenant's family for
injuries from an open and obvious dangerous condition on the land which
the tenant knew or should have known existed at the beginning of the
tenancy. 52 A broad principle limits the lessor's duty to maintain common
areas at that point in which the court believes the landlord is being an
insurer of the tenant's safety, including the safety of the tenant's children.
This rationale underlies the harsh decision in Aragona Enterprises v.
48. Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 433, 65 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1951). See Gumenick v. United
States, 213 Va. 510, 193 S.E2d. 788 (1973); Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp., 209 Va. 76, 161
S.E.2d 732 (1968); Wagman v. Boccheciampe, 206 Va. 412, 143 S.E.2d 907 (1965).
49. Revell v. Deegan, 192 Va. 428, 433, 65 S.E.2d 543, 546 (1951).
50. Gumenick v. United States, 213 Va. 510, 518, 193 S.E.2d 788, 793 (1973).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (effective July 1, 1974).
52. Aragona Enterprises, Inc. v. Miller, 213 Va. 298, 299-300, 191 S.E.2d 804, 805 (1972);
Berlin v. Wall, 122 Va. 425, 437-38, 95 S.E. 394, 398 (1918).
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Miller 5 3 and exemplifies the difficulty the Virginia court has had in settling
on a rule reasonable enough to fall within its stated objectives. The rule
which emerged from Aragona is increasingly difficult to rationalize in view
of the popularity of the large rental complex. The landlord in such a situa-
tion can correct the defect and spread the cost among a large number of
tenants through increased rent. A more reasonable view shared by a large
number of jurisdictions removes any distinction as to when the defect
occurred which would alter the landlord's duty of reasonable care in main-
taining areas under his control. 5
It is contended that the new Act adopts the view that the landlord can
be liable for injury caused by an unsafe condition in the common areas
irrespective of the fact that it existed at the time of the letting. Such an
approach avoids the harsh result of Aragona without taking away the land-
lord's defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.
Thus, it would take more affirmative conduct on the part of the tenant
than the mere leasing of the premises to constitute an assumption of the
risk on his part. This construction seems to complement the provision in
§55-248.13 which allows the landlord and tenant to agree in writing that
the tenant will perform the landlord's duty to keep the common area clean
and safe. Absent an agreement by the tenant to assume the landlord's duty
to keep a safe common area, a tenant could still be held to have been
contributorily negligent or to have assumed the risk of a dangerous condi-
tion because of affirmative conduct that goes beyond the mere leasing of
the dwelling unit."', Finally, 55-248.13(b) provides that where the require-
ments of applicable building and housing codes materially affecting health
and safety impose a greater duty than that of keeping the common area
clean and safe, that higher duty shall control. To hold that a tenant as-
sumes the risk of a patent defect existing in a common area at the incep-
tion of the tenancy by the mere letting of the dwelling unit, would amount
to a denial of protection to a member of the class an applicable housing
code intended to protect.
When the defect in the common area is the result of natural forces, such
53. 213 Va. 298, 191 S.E.2d 804 (1972). The dissent noted that the effect of the ruling would
place the bar of the assumption of the risk upon children who are incapable of knowing or
appreciating the risk. Therefore, the duty of the landlord to his tenant's children for unreason-
ably dangerous conditions should reflect the degree of foreseeability of danger to the children.
Id. at 305-06. For a discussion of the case see 7 U. RIcH. L. REv. 557 (1973).
54. See 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 811 (1970).
55. For example, a tenant who leases a unit in a garden type apartment complex that has
a common swimming pool under construction would not automatically assume the risk of any
open excavation. However, he could be held to be guilty of contributory negligence or to have
assumed the risk by conduct on his part which manifests a willful and knowing disregard of
any safety warning or barriers erected by the landlord for the tenant's safety.
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as the accumulation of snow, the courts have sometimes had difficulty in
finding a duty in the landlord to remedy the situation. However, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court in Langhorne Rd. Apartments v. Bisson"6 found no
difficulty in the logical extension of the landlord's duty of reasonable care
to the removal of a natural accumulation of snow and ice. The landlord is
required to remove the snow and ice from walkways reserved for the com-
mon use of his tenants within a reasonable time after the storm ceases.
5 7
In such a situation the contributory negligence of the tenant is usually
pleaded. In most cases it cannot be said as a matter of law that a tenant
will be contributorily negligent or have assumed the risk in traversing a
snow-covered walkway; rather, such a finding is for the jury." A similar
situation should exist under the new Act.
The landlord's liability for personal injury as well as the tenant's respon-
sibility for his own safety have been clouded by the historic landlord-
tenant relationship. Less rigidity in applying these standards cannot be
easily drawn from the Virginia Supreme Court in a short period of time.
Therefore, the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act by its revi-
sion and clarification of the rights and obligations of the landlord and the
tenant denotes an important demarcation from the existing legal structure.
What the Virginia Act may accomplish in its present form is necessarily
unknown; the minimum should be legislative recognition of the present-
day, landlord-tenant relationship founded on the principles of contract and
sale of services rather than the feudal concept of land rental.
VI. RENT
The landlord-tenant relationship consists of two parties with opposing
interests. The landlord is a businessman interested in making a profit on
his rental property and protecting his investment; the residential tenant
is a consumer interested in a decent place to live at the lowest possible cost.
Joining these opposing parties is that magical fist full of dollars which
makes the whole relationship possible-rent.
Rent- is defined as the return made by the tenant to the landlord for the
use and occupation of the demised premises. It can be in either money,
56. 207 Va. 474, 150 S.E.2d 540 (1966).
57. Id. at 478, 150 S.E.2d at 542.
58. However, if offered a choice of two ways, one of which is safe, the plaintiff may be held
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Ward v. Clark, 163 Va. 770, 776, 177 S.E.
212, 214 (1935).
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service, or specific property.' Rent usually relates to real property, but it
may also relate to personalty on the premises. 2
A. Theory of Liability for Rent and The Landlord's Lien
The tenant's liability to the landlord for the payment of rent can arise
by express agreement or by implication due to the tenant's use and occupa-
tion of the premises. A lease usually contains an express covenant to pay
rent which binds the tenant when signed 3 thereby contractually obligating
him for the payment of rent.' Where the tenant has expressly covenanted
to pay rent and has entered into possession of the premises, his liability is
based upon privity of contract and privity of estate. Due to his privity of
contract the tenant's liability for rent continues until discharged even
though he parts with the premises, thus terminating his privity of estate.
1. 49 AM. JuR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 514 (1970); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 462
(1968). See Newton v. Wilson, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 470, 483 (1808). A modern definition of
rent is: ". . . [Tihe total amount charged to the tenant under a rental agreement . . .",
FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA. CODE § 15E-1(G.) (1973). The Uniform Act defines rent as ". . . [A]ll
payments to be made to the landlord under the rental agreement..."; UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL
LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT § 1.301 (10) (1972) (found in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 210 (1972)). The Uniform Act was
adopted by Arizona in 1972, ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 33-1301 et seq. (Supp. 1973). This definition
was adopted by the drafters of the recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act, VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4 (i) (effective July 1, 1974).
2. Wickham & Northrop v. Richmond Standard Steel, Spike & Iron Co., 107 Va. 44, 57
S.E. 647 (1907). The lessee leased a mill site and sufficient water to operate the mill, and
although different values were fixed for the use of the land and the use of the water the
covenants for their use were held to be interdependent and the whole was recoverable by
distress. Minor says:
A rent can only issue out of lands and tenements corporeal, or from the personal
property necessary for their proper enjoyment, as for example where a house or lodging
is let already furnished. 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 82 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928).
3. The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act provides:
[Aicceptance of rent without reservation by the landlord gives the rental agreement
the same effect as if it had been signed and delivered by the landlord ...
[Aicceptance of possession or payment of rent without reservation gives the rental
agreement the same effect as if it had been signed and delivered by the tenant. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.8 (effective July 1, 1974).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-76 (1969) (which provides a definition of "lessee's covenant to pay
rent"). The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act adopts this view:
A landlord and tenant may include in a rental agreement, terms and conditions not
prohibited by this chapter or other rule of law, including rent. . . . VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.7 (a) (effective July 1, 1974).
See Eason v. Rose, 183 Va. 359, 32 S.E.2d 66 (1944) (the tenant is liable for rent in accordance
with the intent and agreement of the parties).
See generally 11 M.J. Landlord and Tenant § 13 (1950) (liability for rent); 1 MINOR ON REAL
PROPERTY § 397 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928) (covenant of rent).
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An express covenant to pay rent runs with the land.'
Where the tenant's agreement to pay rent is not by deed under seal but
is by parol or other written memorandum, the landlord's remedy is statu-
tory, and he may recover from the tenant a reasonable compensation with
interest for the use and occupation of the premises.The landlord may use
this parol agreement or written memorandum as evidence of the amount
of rent owed.6 This statute has been held to presuppose the relationship of
landlord and tenant.7
At common law and in Virginia, where a lease contains no covenant to
pay rent, a tenant may be held liable on an implied obligation to pay a
reasonable sum for the use and occupation of the premises, and where such
a promise is implied the courts will allow a reasonable recovery.' The
recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act adopts this
view. This implied obligation to pay rent can arise from the mere relation
of landlord and tenant;'0 in fact, usually there will be no implied obligation
to pay rent absent a relation of landlord and tenant existing between the
parties." Absent an express covenant, the tenant's liability for the pay-
ment of rent is based on privity of estate and if he parts with the estate,
with the lessor's consent, his obligation to pay rent ceases since the termi-
nation of the privity of estate leaves nothing upon which to base an obliga-
tion to pay rent.'
2
In Virginia the implied obligation to pay for the use and occupation of
5. 11 M.J. Landlord and Tenant § 13 (1950) (liability for rent). See 1 MINOR ON REAL
PROPERTY § 397 (2d ed. F. Ribble (1928) (covenant of rent).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-227 (1969) (remedy for rent and for use and occupation). This
statute appears to be based in part on the case of Eppes v. Cole, 14 Va. (4 Hen.&M.) 161
(1809) which held that assumpsit for use and occupation would lie where the defendant was
on the premises by permission of the plaintiff and there was an express promise to pay by
parol or memorandum in writing other than a deed under seal. As to interest on rent due see
Johnson v. Johnsoh, 183 Va. 892, 33 S.E.2d 784 (1945) which cited the code section supra
and held that the tenant should be charged with interest on the rent found to be due from
him for the use and occupation of an apartment and storeroom, the interest to be charged
from the last day of each calendar year on the rent due for that year.
7. Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946). "This entire section
presupposes the relation of landlord and tenant." Id. at 540, 39 S.E.2d at 234.
8. Sutton v. Mandeville, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 407 (1810) held that assumpsit for use and
occupation of the premises by permission of the plaintiff lies on an implied as well as an
express promise to pay.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.7 (b) (effective July 1, 1974). "In the absence of agreement, the
tenant shall pay as rent the fair rental value for the use and occupancy of the dwelling unit."
10. See 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 397 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928) (covenants for rent).
11. 3 H. TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 914 (3d ed. 1939).
12. 11 M.J. Landlord and Tenant § 13 (1950) (liability for rent); 1 MINOR ON REAL
PROPERTY § 397 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928) (covenants for rent).
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the premises has been carried even further. It has been held that there is
an implied obligation to pay for the use and occupation of the premises
on the part of a trespasser where he has received some benefit from the
landlord's property.13
The tenant's liability for rent is personal to the extent that the landlord
can recover a money judgment in per3onam in an action at law for the
rent in arrears.' 4 Additionally, while at common law the landlord had no
lien prior to levy of distress or attachment, the Virginia Supreme Court has
held that the Virginia Code gives a landlord a fixed and specific lien on
the tenant's personal property found on the rental premises to the extent
of the rent due. This lien is choate and not inchoate as was previously
thought. 5 It extends only to the extent of the tenant's equity in goods that
13. Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946). Herein the Virginia
Supreme Court quotes with approval De Camp v. Bullard, 159 N.Y. 450, 54 N.E. 26, 28
(1899):
If a man's house is vacant with no prospect of a tenant and no intention on his part of
occupying it himself, and a trespasser occupies it, he must pay as damages for the
trespass the value of the use and occupation, for this would be the duty of a tenant
contracting upon a quantum meruit for the use, by consent, of that which the tres-
passer uses without consent. Id. at 549, 550, 39 S.E.2d at 239.
Accord, Winborne v. Doyle, 190 Va. 867, 59 S.E.2d 90 (1950). In finding from the undisputed
facts an implied contract to pay rent by a wrongful user or an easement the court quotes
Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, supra: ". . . the gist of the action is to prevent the unjust
enrichment of a wrongdoer from the illegal use of another's property, such wrongdoer should
be held on an implied promise .... " Id. at 874, 59 S.E.2d at 94.
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-227 (1969) (landlord may recover rent by action or distress).
VA. SuP. CT. R. 3:1 et seq. (1950) found in VA. CODE ANN. vol. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1973) abolished
the common law forms of action previously used to recover rent in courts of record and
provides: "These Rules apply to all civil actions at law in a court of record seeking a judgment
in personam for money only . . . . actions for . . . unlawful detainer .. " An action for
rent can be brought in a court not of record. VA. CODE ANN. 16.1-77 (Cum. Supp. 1973). The
language pertaining to common law forms of action abolished by the Rules of Court were
removed from this section in 1954.
15. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944)
while recognizing that at common law the landlord had no lien on any of his tenant's property
as security for rent prior to the levy of a distress warrant, the Virginia Supreme Court held
that VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-227, 231 & 233 combine to give the landlord a fixed and specific
lien on the tenant's personalty found on the premises stating:
We agree . . . that the Virginia statutes, by clear implication, give the landlord a lien
which is fixed and specific, and not one which is merely inchoate, and that such a lien
exists independent of the right of distress or attachment, which are merely remedies
for enforcing it. Id. at 363, 28 S.E.2d at 746.
This holding repudiates that portion of the holding in American Exch. Bank v. Goodlee
Realty Corp., 135 Va. 204, 216, 116 S.E. 505, 509 (1923) to the effect that these Code sections
do not give the landlord a lien for rent until his right had been perfected by the levy of a
distress warrant and that until that time his lien is merely inchoate.
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are brought upon the premises with a prior lien on them.'" However, with
a few exceptions, 7 where the personalty is subjected to a lien after it is
brought onto the premises or within thirty days after its removal there-
from, the landlord's lien has priority over these other liens to the extent
necessary to satisfy the rent obligation.'
B. Who Is Liable For and Who May Recover Rent
The Virginia Code expressly provides that: "[R]ent may be recovered
from the lessee or other person owing it .. .*"I This includes any assignee
of the lessee or the personal representative of either. The heirs or devisees
are liable for rent owed by their ancestors or devisors to the same extent
that they are liable for other debts of the decedent."0
By statute any person to whom rent or compensation is due, whether he
has the reversion or not, may recover rent regardless of the estate or inter-
est of the person owing the rent, and whether or not the lessee's estate has
terminated. The Code also allows the lessor's assignee or personal repre-
sentative to recover rent.2' The provisions for the amount of rent to be paid,
when it is due and where it is to be paid are generally set out in the rental
agreement, 2 but if not, the landlord can recover a reasonable rent on
implied promise.Y
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969) (on what goods levied; to what extent goods liable;
priority between landlord and other lienors).
17. Tax liens of the United States have been held entitled to priority over a lien asserted
under state law. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353 (1945), rev'g
United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 28 S.E.2d 741 (1944) (as to the
superiority of federal tax liens). Accord, United States v. Melchione, 292 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.
Va. 1968); United States v. Smith, 209 Va. 5, 161 S.E.2d 709 (1968) (held that the federal
tax lien's priority over the landlord's lien for rent also subordinated the landlord's marshalling
claim); United States v. New Rose Dev. Corp., 205 Va. 697, 139 S.E.2d 64 (1964); United
States v. Lawler, 201 Va. 686, 112 S.E.2d 921 (1960).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969) (priorities between landlord and other lienors).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-229 (1969) (who liable for rent).
20. Id.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-228 (1969) (who may recover rent).
22. See note 4 supra. The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.7 (c) (effective July 1, 1974) provides:
Rent shall be payable without demand or notice at the time and place agreed upon by
the parties. Unless otherwise agreed, rent is payable at the place designated by the
landlord and periodic rent is payable at the beginning of any term of one month or
less and otherwise in equal installments at the beginning of each term.
See generally 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 389 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928) (place and time for
payment of rent).
23. See notes 8 & 9 supra.
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C. The Landlord's Remedies For The Nonpayment of Rent
1. Distress and Attachment: Prejudgment Remedies
Distress is the taking of personal property out of the possession of a
wrongdoer into the custody of an injured party to procure a satisfaction for
the wrong committed. 24 Originally, distress was a self-help method of re-
covering rent in arrears, whereby a landlord or his servant by warrant from
him would distrain the tenant's personalty as satisfaction for the rent
due.25
Today, in Virginia, distress is a wholly statutory remedy. 26 It presup-
poses the relation of landlord and tenant and is dependent on it,27 except
in the case of a subtenant whose liability is fixed totally by statute;28 and
the rent must be reserved by contract. 29 In the case of a residential dwelling
it can be used to recover a maximum of six months' rent" due at or after
the time when the landlord's lien is asserted. The statute of limitations for
distress is five years from the time the rent is due, regardless of whether
or not the lease has terminated.2 ' Distress, like attachment, does not de-
24. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 6. General treatment of distress as it relates to
Virginia may be found in C. BERRY, CIVIL PRACTICE IN MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY COURTS §§ 323-
24 (1961) (hereinafter cited as BERRY); BURKS COMMON LAW & STATUTORY PLEADING AND
PRACTICE 9H 397-409 (4th ed. 1952) (hereinafter cited as BURKS); 11 M.J. Landlord and
Tenant § 21-25 (1950); THE VIRGINIA LAWYER 6.5 (1969). See generally 49 Am. JUR. 2d
Landlord and Tenant §§ 726-760 (1970); 52 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant §§ 674-715 (1968).
25. Wickham & Northrop v. Richmond Standard Steel, Spike & Iron Co., 107 Va. 44, 57
S.E. 647 (1907).
26. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-227, 231, 233 (1969). See Wickham & Northrop v. Richmond
Standard Steel, Spike & Iron Co., supra note 25.
27. Church v. Goshen Iron Co., 112 Va. 694, 72 S.E. 685 (1911). "The principle is elemen-
tary that distress for rent will not lie unless the relation of landlord and tenant exists between
the parties. The right is not only incident to that relation, but is dependent upon it." Id. at
695, 72 S.E. at 685.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969).
The distress may be levied on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee, or undertenant,
found on the premises, or which may have been removed therefrom not more than
thirty days. . . . [Nior shall the goods of the undertenant be liable to a greater
amount than such undertenant owed the tenant at the time the distress was levied.
Id. (emphasis added).
Property of a third person is not liable to distress even if found on the premises. Davis v.
Payne's Adm'r, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 332 (1826).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-230 (1969). ". .. [T]he amount of money or other thing to be
distrained for . . . is justly due to the claimant for rent reserved upon contract from the
person of whom it is claimed." Id. See generally BURKS § 399.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969). ". . . [Flor not more than six months' rent if the
premises are in a city or town, . . .or of premises anywhere used for residential pur-
poses. ... Id.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-230 (1969). "Rent may be distrained for within five years from the
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pend on a pending action at law for rent, but can be brought independent
of or in conjunction with such action.2 For the landlord it is a relatively
simple and inexpensive method for recovering rent in arrears.
To institute the distress procedure" a landlord must present a signed
affidavit to a magistrate or the clerk or judge of the general district court
stating that his tenant owes him a certain amount for rent reserved upon
a contract for certain premises. Upon receipt of this affidavit, the magis-
trate, clerk or judge issues a distress warrant for rent to the sheriff or
time it becomes due, and not afterwards, whether the lease be ended or not." Id.
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-227 (1969). "Rent of every kind may be recovered by distress or
action." (emphasis added). Id. See Bernard v. McClanahan, 115 Va. 453, 79 S.E. 1059 (1913).
(no pending action necessary for attachment). See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and
Tenant § 758 (1970).
33. Although distress is a wholly statutory remedy in Virginia, the procedure is not alto-
gether clear, and consequently is subject to some degree to local variation. An example of
local variation in distress procedure can be found in Chesterfield County, Virginia.
An indemnification bond is provided for by statute but normally it is not a condition
precedent to instituting distress procedure. However, in view of the drastic nature of distress
with its potential for abuse, the landlord in instituting distress procedure in Chesterfield
County is required to post an indemnifying bond to protect the levying sheriff in the event of
a wrongful distress action.
In Chesterfield County in levying the distress the sheriff merely goes to the premises and
lists the property levied upon, and he may use words such as "I hereby levy on this property."
If the landlord wants the property physically removed he is required to provide a truck and
movers or some other method of moving the property to the court house or wherever else it is
to be held. It would be economically infeasible and an undue burden upon the Sheriffs
Department to require it to provide a moving service for the benefit of landlords.
In Chesterfield County distress warrants, forthcoming bonds or affidavits of valid defense
are not returned to the Circuit Court (which only has a session every two months) as provided
for in the Code. They are returned to the General District Court. Civil warrants are returned
in not less than five days nor more than thirty days from the date of issuance. The Clerk of
the General District Court sets the date for the court hearing if there is to be one.
While under the. Code the tenant's property can be sold without judgment in favor of the
landlord or even a hearing, Chesterfield County usually will not allow the tenant's property
to be sold without a judgment first being given in favor of the landlord even if it is only a
default judgment.
It is advisable before dealing with distress procedure to check with the local clerk of the
general district court to find out the exact distress procedure used in your locality. The
preciseness of the distress procedure may tend to vary with the volume of distress warrants
issued in a given locality-the more warrants issued the more settled the procedure. Chester-
field County has averaged issuing about six to eight distress warrants a year over the past
ten years; however the volume would probably be much greater in a more urban area, such
as the city of Richmond. The procedure used most often in Chesterfield County to recover
rent due is the unlawful detainer procedure which utilizes the five day pay or quit notice.
(Interview with Mr. Richard M. Crump, Jr., Clerk of the General District Court of Chester-
field County, Virginia, March 8, 1974) (Note: During this interview a distress warrant was in
the process of being contested by a tenant, the first to be contested in Chesterfield County
in the past ten years).
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sergeant of the situs of the rented premises or wherever the goods liable to
distress may be found, and pursuant thereto the officer levies the distress.
This levy is made without prior notice being given to the tenant or any
prior judicial proceeding. 4 In levying distress the officer takes legal posses-
sion of the distrainable property, either by actual levy or constructively by
listing the distrained property. 5 If the tenant does not contest the dis-
tress, the officer will post at least a ten day notice in a conspicuous place
advertising the time and place for sale of the tenant's property to satisfy
the rent, and he will sell it by auction pursuant thereto. 6 After the officer
makes a return of the proceeds to the clerk of court and his expenses and
commission are deducted, he will turn over a sufficient amount of the
remaining proceeds to the landlord in satisfaction of the rent due.3 7 Any
excess is given to the tenant."' If after levying the distress, the officer
returns the uncontested distress warrant to the clerk of the court and the
goods remain unsold, the clerk may issue a writ of vendition exponas,
requiring the officer to sell the property.39
The tenant can contest the distress by posting a forthcoming bond with
the officer making the distress and thus he can retain possession of his
property." Where a tenant is unable to post bond he can achieve the same
results by presenting the levying officer with an affidavit stating that he
cannot post bond but that he has a valid defense' to the landlord's claim
for rent. 2 The sheriff will return the warrant and the tenant's forthcoming
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-230 (1969) (when and by whom distress made). See generally
BURKS § 400. By statute in Virginia, an officer with a distress warrant or an attachment for
rent, if necessary, may enter by force during the daytime wherever the goods liable to distress
or attachment may be found, and if the goods have been fradulently or clandestinely removed
from the rented premises he may enter the place the goods are to be found by force during
the night or day. He may also levy on property found in the personal possession of the tenant
liable for rent. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-235 (1969).
35. See note 33 supra. See generally BERRY § 257 (the levy); BURKS § 400. Distress cannot
be levied upon property which has been removed from the rented premises more than thirty
days. Dime Deposit & Discount Bank v. Wescott, 113 Va. 567, 75 S.E. 179 (1912).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-422.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (sale of property). For an example of an
uncontested distress warrant see Babbitt v. Miller, 192 Va. 372, 64 S.E.2d 718 (1951).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-429 (1957) (officer receiving money to make return thereof and pay
net proceeds).
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-424 (1957) (when money received by officer under execution to be
repaid to debtor).
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-237 (1969) (return of distress warrants; process of sale thereun-
der).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-450 (1957) (when forthcoming bond taken; property then remains
in debtor's possession).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-453 (1957) (when taken under distress warrant, what defense may
be made).
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-232 (1969) (procedure when distress levied and tenant unable to
give forthcoming bond). For a discussion of this procedure see Hancock v. Whitehall Tobacco
LANDLORD AND TENANT
bond or affidavit of valid defense to the circuit court on the first day of
the next session. Thereafter, the landlord, after first giving the tenant ten
days' written notice, may file a motion for judgment on the bond or for rent
due. Where the tenant has posted a forthcoming bond the landlord is
usually satisfied to await the adjudication of the matter; however, if the
tenant has merely filed an affidavit of valid defense the landlord may still
want to have the tenant's property distrained. He can do so by posting a
double indemnifying bond, in which case the sheriff will return to the
premises and again make a levy on the tenant's property. The property will
remain in the possession of the sheriff until the matter has been adjudi-
cated at which time it will be either sold or returned to the tenant."
If the tenant's liability for rent is based on an express covenant there is
privity of contract, and the tenant is liable for rent due on that contract
until it is discharged. This means that he can be held presently liable for
future rent. Where a landlord is apprehensive about recovering future rent
because he reasonably believes that the tenant is about to "skip town,"
taking his property with him without paying this rent, he can resort to
what appears to him to be a simple and inexpensive remedy-attachment
for rent." This statutory remedy is treated differently from other forms of
attachment and is procedurally similar to distress.45 Like distress, it is not
dependent on a pending action at law for rent, but is a wholly independent
remedy for recovering rent.4"
To initiate attachment for rent, a landlord must present an affidavit to
the clerk or judge of the district court, or the clerk of the circuit court stat-
ing that he believes the complaint to the effect that a person liable to him
for rent accruing in the future has removed within thirty days, is removing,
or intends to remove his personalty from the rented premises, is true; that
the rent is reserved by contract and will be payable within one year (setting
forth the times it is payable); and that if the attachment is not issued there
will be insufficient property liable to distress left on the premises with
Warehouse Co., 100 Va. 443, 447, 41 S.E. 860, 861 (1902). See also, Babbitt v. Miller, 192
Va. 372, 375, 64 S.E.2d 718, 719, 720 (1951).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-232 (1969). See generally BURKS § 404 (delivery or forthcoming
bond and proceedings thereon).
44. A general treatment of attachment for rent as it relates to Virginia may be found in
BURKS §§ 393-96.
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-566 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (attachment for rent against a tenant
removing his effects from leased premises).
46. Bernard v. McClanahan, 115 Va. 453, 79 S.E. 1059 (1913)
. . . [A]ttachment was good as a remedy for the collection of rent to become due
under a contract, whether there was an action at law to recover it or not, since the right
to sue out an attachment for rent is not dependent upon a pending action at law to
recover the same. Id. at 460, 79 S.E. at 1061.
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which to satisfy the rent. Once the landlord has filed this affidavit the clerk
will issue a writ of attachment for the rent against those goods which would
be subject to distress if the rent was presently due and against any other
property of the tenant who is liable for the rent. The attachment for rent
is levied by the sheriff or sergeant the same as in distress, and the attach-
ment acts as a summons requiring the tenant to appear to answer the
attachment.17 The officer will levy the attachment on the tenant's prop-
erty, however he will not take actual possession of it unless the landlord
posts a double indemnifying bond." Where the tentant files an affidavit
of substantial defense, the clerk will notify the landlord that unless he
posts this bond within ten days of the service of such notice the attachment
will be dismissed ipso facto. 9 However, the tenant can retain possession
of his property thus reversing the effect of the landlord's bond by posting
a double forthcoming bond of his own. 0 An attachment is returnable
within thirty days of its issuance to the court that has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, and thereafter it is proceeded upon as any other attach-
ment.5 '
While distress and attachment seem to be completely landlord oriented
the tenant in Virginia is afforded some protection where the distress or
attachment is wrongful or excessive. The right to distrain or attach for rent
is regarded by the courts as a most drastic one; fortunately, the Virginia
Code provides the tenant with an action for damages in the event the
distress or attachment was wrongful or excessive.2
47. See note 45 supra.
48. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-538 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (when bond given officer to take possession
of property). See Harris v. Lipson, 167 Va. 365, 189 S.E. 349 (1937).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-539 (1957) (bond is required of the plaintiff when defendant makes
affidavit of substantial defense).
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-540 (1957) (bonds for retention of property or release of attach-
ment).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-567 (1957) applies if the attachment for rent is for twenty dollars
or more. If the attachment for rent is less than twenty dollars it is returnable before a judge
of a general district court not more than ninety days from the date of issue. VA. CODE
ANN. § 8-568 (1957).
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-651 (1957). An action for wrongful distress or attachment lies
against the party suing out the warrant of distress or attachment where the tenant's person-
alty is distrained for rent not due or for more than is due, or the attachment is for rent when
none is accruing or for more than is accruing. Gurfein v. Howell, 142 Va. 197, 128 S.E. 644
(1925).
The manifest intention of the statute is to prevent the landlord from oppressing his
tenant. The right to sue in damages for an illegal distress was recognized at common
law and the enactment of the statute was in furtherance of the right so recog-
nized. . . The right to distrain or attach for rent has always been regarded by the
courts as a most drastic one, and in order to restrain the landlord from a too free use
of this power, he must exercise the same at his peril. The law presumes that he knows
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In some cases distress and attachment for rent are the landlord's only
effective remedies for recovering rent, especially where the tenant is a
scoundrel and has either skipped out only leaving a few clothes on the
premises or is otherwise judgment proof. However, even in these situa-
tions the effectiveness of these remedies is doubtful since such a tenant
usually has little of value which the landlord could distrain or attach.
Another reason for advising against the use of distress or attachment for
rent is the fact that the constitutionality of these prejudgment remedies is
presently under attack, and the landlord who uses them may be subjecting
himself to more time and expense than he would have incurred had he
utilized a summary proceeding such as unlawful entry and detainer.
Both the Model Code and the Uniform Act abolish the common law right
to distress for rent,53 however, Virginia's recently enacted Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act specifically includes distress for rent as an action
available to the landlord.-" The Act does not, however, otherwise effect
Virginia's distress statute.
2. Constitutionality of Distress and Attachment for Rent
Distress and attachment for rent are prejudgment remedies that can be
initiated without regard to any corresponding action at law pending for the
recovery of rent.5 These remedies can be used by the landlord to deprive
the tenant of his personal property without notice or a hearing before an
appropriate court. This is the very reason that similar prejudgment reme-
dies in other jurisdictions have been successfully attacked as violative of
the fourteenth amendment by failing to afford procedural due process."
the amount of his tenant's indebtedness and ignorance on his part will not relieve him
from compensatory damages for a mistake committed by him. Id. at 204, 205, 128 S.E.
at 646.
53. MODEL LANDLORD AND TENANT CODE § 3-403; UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TEN-
ANT ACT § 4-205 (1972) found in the HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSION-
ERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1972).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4(a) (effective July 1, 1974).
55. See notes 32 & 46 supra.
56. Diitress has been held unconstitutional in Hall v. Garson, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972)
(declaring the Texas distress statute unconstitutional); Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355
F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (accord with Gross); Barber v. Roder, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.
Fla. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (declaring Pennsylvania's distress
statute unconstitutional on its face); Shaffer v. Hollbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va.
1972); Dieler v. Levine, 344 F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Collins v. Vicroy Hotel Corp., 338
F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971); MacQueen v.
Lambert, 318 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Blocker v. Blackburn, 228 Ga. 285, 185 S.E.2d
56 (1971); State ex rel Payne v. Walden, 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972). Attachment has been
held unconstitutional in Ethredge v. Bradley, 502 P.2d 146 (Alas. 1972); Randone v. Appellate
Dept. of Sup. Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d 13, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1971); Damazo v. MacIntyre,
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Procedural due process requires that no person be deprived of property by
government action without notice and a hearing.5 7
Several recent Supreme Court cases have paved the way for this assault
on the constitutionality of distress and attachment. In the landmark case
of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation,51 Wisconsin's prejudgment
garnishment procedure was held unconstitutional. More recently in
Fuentes v. Shevin,5 prejudgment replevin statutes in Florida and Pennsyl-
vania were held unconstitutional. In Fuentes the Court said that due pro-
cess demanded an opportunity for a hearing before state agents can seize
property in the possession of a person upon the mere application of
another."
Since Fuentes all of the distress statutes, as well as a number of attach-
ment statutes, which have been challenged have been held unconstitu-
tional." West Virginia's distress statute was declared unconstitutional first
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in State ex rel Payne
v. Walden12 and one day later by a three judge federal court in Shaffer v.
Hollbrook" in which the court stated:
The complete absence of an opportunity to be heard prior to seizure deprives
the West Virginia tenant of his property without due process of law as re-
quired by the Fourteenth Amendment, and any post-seizure remedies avail-
able to an aggrieved tenant can in no way be a substitute for a prior meaning-
ful hearing.64
The Virginia and West Virginia distress statutes are inseparably wed by
heritage, growing out of the same statute; they remain substantively simi-
lar and virtually unchanged today from what they were in 1863 when West
26 Cal. App. 3d 18, 102 Cal. Rptr. 609 (1972); Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. 1970);
Credit Bureau v. Hibbitt, 7 Wash. App. 219, 499 P.2d 92 (1972); Lucas v. Stapp, 6 Wash.
App. 971, 497 P.2d 250 (1972).
57. "No State shall ... deprive any person of . . .property, without due process of
law..." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72 n.5 (1972).
58. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
59. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
60. 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972).
61. See note 34 supra.
62. 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972). The court held that the distress:
... [Pirocedure constitutes only a legitimized form of harassment to bring the ten-
ant to the landlord's outstretched hand .... [S]uch a procedure is unnecessary in
that landlords have other adequate statutory remedies .... [S]uch procedure is
unwarranted in that the tenant is denied his basic right to protest or defense before
his property is taken. No special state interest of overriding significance can be demon-
strated which will protect and preserve the statutory defect. Id. at 778.
63. 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
64. Id. at 766.
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Virginia seceded from Virginia. In fact, the present distress statutes of each
state are so strikingly similar that with the exception of a difference in
statute of limitations and some minor wording, they are completely inter-
changeable." In Virginia as in West Virginia, a distress warrant is in the
nature of an execution against the goods of the tenant and is issued without
judgment or other judicial investigiation into the liability of the tenant for
the amount claimed." Consequently, if West Virginia's distress statute
cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny it seems doubtful that our dis-
tress statute will withstand a similar constitutional attack. In fact, Vir-
ginia will not have a long wait to find out, because the unconstitutionality
of her distress statute will soon be put to the test. 7
3. Actions at Law To Recover Rent
Historically, certain common law actions were available to a landlord
faced with a tenant who refused or was unable to pay rent. In Virginia the
landlord's right to recover rent by an action at law is wholly statutory. The
Code merely provides that a landlord may recover rent by distress or
action8 (emphasis added). The common law forms of action previously
used in Virginia for the recovery of rent were debt, covenant, and assump-
sit.19 These common law forms of action have been abolished in Virginia,
and now the landlord can recover rent in arrears by a civil warrant or by
motion for judgment. 0
At common law, the landlord wishing to recover rent was left solely to
65. Compare VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-227, 230 & 231 with W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-6-9, 12
& 13. For an early history of the two statutes see Shaffer v. Hollbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.
W. Va. 1972).
66. See BURKS § 400 (issuance of distress warrants in Virginia-levy by officer).
67. Interview with Mr. Ronald Tweel, Esq., chief attorney for the Charlottesville-
Albermarle Legal Aid Society, who is representing a plaintiff in a suit not yet docketed
alleging the Virginia distress statute, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-227, 31, 33, is unconstitutional
as violative of the fourteenth amendment due process clause because it allows the tenant's
personal property to be seized without notice or any hearing. (Interview January 24, 1974 in
Charlottesville).
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-227 (1969).
69. For a discussion of recovering rent by the action of debt see 3 TIFFANY § 911;
BURKS § 74. See also 1 MINOR § 397 (covenant for rent); BERRY § 107. As to covenant see 3
TIFFANY § 912; BURKS § 80. See also 1 MINOR § 397; BERRY § 121. As to assumpsit see Raven
Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946). See generally 3 TIFFANY § 913;
BURKS § 89. See also MINOR § 397; BERRY § 121.
70. The common law forms of action were abolished by the Rules of Court of the Virginia
Supreme Court adopted in 1950 which provides that all actions for the recovery of judgments
in personam for money only are now controlled by the Rules of Court. VA. Sup. CT. R. 3:1
(Cum. Supp. 1973). An action can be brought in a court not of record by a civil warrant or
motion for judgment. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-77 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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an action for money damages absent reservation of the right of re-entry.7 '
In Virginia, a landlord of residential premises has the right to re-enter and
terminate the tenant's estate for failure to pay rent either by the terms of
the lease or by statute. By express stipulation in the lease the landlord may
acquire the right to re-enter when the tenant defaults in paying rent.
7 2
However, such covenant has been divested of its importance as to residen-
tial premises by a statute which provided, independent of any covenant,
that a residential tenant in default of the payment of rent shall forfeit his
right to possession if he remains in default for five days after notice in
writing to pay or quit the premises.7
3
The landlord's remedy where the tenant abandons the premises owing
rent as distinguished from unlawful detainer, is also dictated by statute. 4
Where the tenant deserts without paying the rent due and without leaving
sufficient goods upon the premises liable to distress (both being conditions
precedent) the landlord may post a written notice in some conspicuous
place on the premises requiring the tenant to pay the rent due within thirty
days75 or forfeit his right to possession. Where the tenant fails to pay the
rent due within the thirty days his right to possession of the premises is
terminated, and the landlord is entitled to enter and take possession of the
premises. However, the landlord may still recover any rent due from the
71. See generally 49 AM. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 1029 (1970). See also 1
MINOR § 401.
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79 (1969) (effect of provision for reentry by lessor). In Johnston
v. Hargrove, 81 Va. 118 (1885) the Supreme Court states:
A stipulation in a deed of lease of re-entry for default in the payment of rent for a given
period, is made by statute equivalent to an agreement that upon the happening of such
event, the lessor may reenter '. . . and the same may again have, repossess and enjoy
as of his former estate.' Id. at 120. (emphasis added) (this wording of the statute is
the same today).
A condition precedent to the exercise of this right is that the landlord make an actual demand
upon the tenant for the rent. Id. at 121. An exception is found in VA. CODE ANN. § 55-239
(1969) dealing with ejectment which states ". . . [S]hall be in lieu of a demand and re-
entry .... " In ejectment the tenant can prevent forfeiture by paying all rent in arrears,
interest and costs before the trial date. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-243. After forfeiture for nonpay-
ment of rent the tenant has a one year statute of limitations within which he can be restored
to possession by paying all rent in arrears, interest and expenses. Va. Code Ann. § 55-247
(1969).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-225 (1969) (failure to pay certain rents after five days' notice
forfeits right of possession). See 1 MINOR §§ 391 & 401.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-224 (1969) (when the tenant deserts premises, how the landlord
may enter).
75. Where a tenant abandons the premises the landlord in order to terminate the tenant's
right to possession must post (1) if the tenancy is from year to year, thirty days notice to pay
or forfeit the right to possession or (2) if the tenancy is from month to month, ten days notice
to pay or forfeit the right to possession. Id.
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tenant up to the date of his re-entry.6
Virginia's newly enacted Residential Landlord and Tenant Act provides
that where a tenant abandons, the landlord may elect to accept the
abandonment as a surrender. Such an acceptance by the landlord termi-
nates the rental agreement as of the date the landlord has notice of the
abandonment. Additionally an unexpired rental agreement is terminated
where the landlord rents the abandoned premises to a new tenant, the date
of the termination being the date the new tenancy begins."
Where a residential tenant in possession has defaulted in the payment
of rent unlawful detainer is available to the landlord as a relatively quick
and inexpensive remedy for recovery of both the rent in arrears and posses-
sion. To institute this procedure the landlord must serve or have served
by a sheriff or sergeant upon the tenant a notice in writing to pay or quit
within five days. If the tenant remains in possession and fails to pay within
five days he will have forfeited his right to possession. In that case the
landlord at his option may deem the tenant's possession unlawful and
proceed to recover possession, rent and damages." The statute of limita-
tions for bringing this action is three years from the time the possession is
deemed unlawful. 9 The recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord
and Tenant Act adopts this procedure."0
If a tenant's possession was indeed wrongful the landlord can obtain an
affirmative judgment or verdict for possession of the premises, any dam-
ages shown, and any rent owed to him at the time the action was
instituted.8 '
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act provides the landlord
with several additional statutory remedies in the area of rent. First, at the
termination of the tenancy the landlord may apply the security deposit
towards the payment of accrued rent.82 Second, where the tenant has
76. ". . . the lessor may enter thereon and the right of such tenant thereto shall thence-
forth be at an end; but the landlord may recover the rent up to that time." Id.
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.33 (effective July 1, 1974).
78. See note 74 supra. Where the lease does not exceed two years or the jurisdictional
amount does not exceed five thousand dollars the unlawful detainer action may be brought
in a general district court by summons or by motion for judgment. Otherwise the action can
brought in the circuit court. There a jury may be empanelled to try the case, and the action
will be given precedence over all other civil cases on the docket of the circuit court. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-791 & 792 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-793 (1957).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (effective July 1, 1974) adopts the pay or quit notice. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.35 (effective July 1, 1974) provides for the use of unlawful entry or
detainer after the rental agreement is terminated.
81. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-793 (1957).
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.11(a) (effective July 1, 1974) (security deposits).
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breached his statutory obligation to maintain the dwelling unit or a provi-
sion of the rental agreement which materially affects health and safety
(and he fails to remedy the situation within the required time) the landlord
may remedy the situation himself and charge the cost or value thereof to
the tenant's rent.83 Finally, if a tenant fails to vacate after termination of
the term ". . . leaving the premises in good and clean order, reasonable
wear and tear expected . . . the landlord may bring an action for posses-
sion and damages, including reasonable attorney's fees."84
D. The Tenant's Defenses for Nonpayment of Rent
1. Defenses Recognized in Virginia: Equitable Defenses
Historically, the residential tenant has had few defenses against a land-
lord demanding his rent. Virginia allows the defendant in an action at law
on a contract to plead any defense which would entitle him to relief in
equity against an obligation on that contract. This includes any condition
existing before the contract is executed, any mistake in the execution of
the contract, or in the contents of the contract itself, or any matter which
would entitle him to relief in equity. This equitable recoupment allows the
tenant to recover affirmatively from the landlord if the amount which he
is entitled to by virtue of his defense exceeds the amount of the landlord's
claim.85 Such an equitable defense is allowed where the landlord has
breached an express covenant to make repairs. Thus, in an early case it
was held that a tenant could set-off the damages accured by the failure
of the lessor to make repairs when he had covenanted to do so.86 It should
be noted however, that set-off is allowed only where a landlord had ex-
pressly covenanted to make repairs.
The recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
greatly expands the tenant's defenses. It allows the landlord's noncompli-
ance with the statutory warranty of habitability, express rental agree-
ments, or other provisions of law affecting health and safety to be used by
the tenant as a defense to an action for rent and for possession due to non-
payment of rent. Further, the Act permits the tenant to bring his own
action for material noncompliance by the landlord.8 7
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.32 (effective July 1, 1974) (failure to maintain). See VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248.16 (effective July 1, 1974) (tenant to maintain dwelling unit).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.20 (effective July 1, 1974) (tenant to surrender possession of
dwelling unit).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-241 (1957). See generally BURKS § 249.
86. Newport News & Old Point Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Bickford, 105 Va. 182, 52 S.E. 1011
(1906).
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.25 (effective July 1, 1974) (landlord's noncompliance as a
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2. Eviction and Constructive Eviction
At common law a lease unless otherwise expressed contained an implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment which promised that the landlord or anyone
acting through or under claim of paramount title would not materially
interfere with the tenant's possession of the leased premises.8 Normally
unless the parties expressly intended otherwise, a landlord's covenants are
independent of the tenant's covenant to pay rent. 9 However, in Virginia
as at common law, a breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment
which amounts to an eviction relieves the tenant of his duty to pay rent."
Where the landlord without justification physically evicts the lessee, there
is no question that the lessee's obligation to pay rent is discharged.9
Virginia also recognizes the doctrine of constructive eviction which al-
lows a similar defense to the landlord's action for rent. To constitute a
constructive eviction there must be: (1) an act or omission by the landlord,
(2) which results in a substantial interference with the tenant's possession
or enjoyment, and (3) the tenant must vacate the premises within a reason-
able time after such interference. Where these elements are present, a
tenant is relieved of his duty to pay rent coming due after the premises
are vacated.92 Note however, that this is a defense to an action for rent due
in the future and not a defense to any action for rent past due.
Virginia's newly enacted Residential Landlord and Tenant Act codifies
defense to action for possession of rent) VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.21 (effective July 1, 1974)
allows the tenant to bring an action for the landlord's noncompliance.
88. See Stott v. Rutherford, 92 U.S. 107 (1975). See generally 51C C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant § 323 (1968).
89. 1 MINOR § 404. "Normally ... the covenants in the lease are considered independent
promises, so that the tenant cannot escape the payment of rent because of a breach by the
landlord." Id.
90. M.M. Rowe Co. v. Wallerstein, 145 Va. 191, 133 S.E. 669 (1926) (held that to discharge
the tenant from payment of rent, the tenant must have been evicted from part or all of the
premises for which he pays rent, or have been deprived of enjoyment of the demised prem-
ises).
Upon the eviction of the tenant, three important consequences follow: (1) The lessee
is entitled to sue the landlord upon his covenant of quiet enjoyment, (2) The lessee's
possession is thereby terminated as to the land so taken, and he ceases to be estopped
to deny the landlord's title as to that land; and (3) There is an abatement of the rent.
1 MINOR § 403.
91. Id.
92. In Buchanan v. Orange, 118 Va. 511, 514, 88 S.E. 52 (1916) (the landmark constructive
eviction case in Virginia) the Supreme Court held that the landlord does not have to use
actual force to constitute a wrongful eviction nor does he have to intend to drive the tenant
from the premises by his acts; any wrongful act or omission which renders the premises unfit
for occupancy for the purposes for which they were leased is sufficient to constitute an
eviction.
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and expands the present remedies available to the tenant who is evicted
or constructively evicted by the landlord. In either case the tenant may
recover actual damages and reasonable attorneys fees, and recover posses-
sion of the premises or terminate the rental agreement.93 The tenant may
also obtain injunctive relief or terminate the rental agreement if the land-
lord demands or makes unlawful or unreasonable entry upon the
premises."
3. Destruction of the Premises
At common law the tenant remained liable for the whole rent where the
demised premises were destroyed or partially destroyed2. 5 The harshness
of this common law rule has been eased in Virginia by statute. The Code
provides that where the premises are destroyed through no fault or negli-
gence of the tenant, or where the tenant is deprived of possession of the
premises by the public enemy, rent will be reasonably reduced in propor-
tion to the extent of the tenant's deprivation, and the rent abatement will
last as long as the deprivation lasts.", Destruction or partial destruction of
the premises vitiates any convenant to repair or pay rent made by the
tenant unless there is an express intention of the parties to the contrary.97
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act also adopts and ex-
pands the above mentioned statute, by giving the tenant the option to
terminate the rental agreement when the enjoyment of the dwelling unit
is substantially impaired by fire or casualty damage. There are two condi-
tions precedent to termination. First, the tenant must immediately vacate
the premises and second he must give written notice to the landlord within
fourteen days informing him of his intention to terminate. Where these two
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.26 (effective July 1, 1974) (tenant's remedies for landlord's
unlawful ouster, exclusion or dimunition of service).
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.38 (effective July 1, 1974) (landlord and tenant remedies for
abuse of access).
95. Vaughan v. Mayo Milling Co., 127 Va. 148, 102 S.E. 597 (1920)
[A]t common law a covenant to pay the rent and leave the premises in good repair,
natural wear and tear excepted, imposes upon the tenant, in the absence of a stipula-
tion to the contrary, the duty of paying the rent and rebuilding the structures on the
leased premises even though they be destroyed without fault on his part. Id. at 154,
102 S.E. at 599.
96. Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-226 (1969). See Warehouse Distributors, Inc. v. Prudential
Storage & Van Corp., 208 Va. 784, 161 S.E.2d 86 (1968); Kavanaugh v. Donovan, 186 Va. 85,
41 S.E.2d 489 (1947); Richmond Ice Co. v. Crystal Ice Co., 99 Va. 239, 37 S.E. 851 (1901).
97. Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 58 S.E.2d 306 (1950); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-226 (1969). See Steiffen v. Darling, 158 Va. 375, 163 S.E. 353 (1932).
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conditions are fulfilled the rental agreement will terminate as of the date
of vacating. 8
4. Other Defenses
Another statutory defense in Virginia to the payment of rent is an ob-
scure health statute requiring a landlord of residential premises to provide
an adequate sanitary privy or closet. Upon his failure to do so, the tenant
is required to supply the same and may deduct the cost from any sum due
the landlord for rent." Unfortunately this is the only provision in the Code
which allows a tenant to repair and deduct. The Virginia Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act fails to add any repair and deduct provisions to this
lone statute.
Other situations may arise which relieve the tenant of the liability to pay
rent. For example, in Brookman v. Cavalier Court, Inc.,' 0 the Virginia
Supreme Court held that where the landlord breached a covenant binding
him not to use the other premises in a specified way, the tenant could
rescind the contract and surrender possession of the premises, without
further liability for rent.
5. Defenses Not Previously Recognized in Virginia: Implied Warranty of
Habitability
Until recently Virginia had remained under the spell of caveat emptor
and the view that a covenant to pay rent was independent of any covenant
made by the landlord. Additionally, Virginia had not recognized the doc-
trine of implied warranty of habitability as it applies to residential dwell-
ings.10' Jurisdictions that have rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor and
the rule of independent covenants have recognized that an implied war-
ranty of habitability and the covenant to pay rent are mutally dependent
and consequently a breach by the landlord will relieve the tenant of liabil-
ity on his covenant to pay rent.' 2 The Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act codifies the implied warranty of habitability doctrine, and also
adopts the doctrine of dependent covenants.53
In a number of other jurisdictions, statutes create a warranty of habita-
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.24 (effective July 1, 1974) (fire or casualty damage).
99. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-64 & 66 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
100. 198 Va. 183, 93 S.E.2d 318 (1956).
101. Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927).
102. An excellent example of the modem view of landlord-tenant relations which views the
landlord's implied warranty of habitability and the tenant's covenant to pay rent as mutually
dependent is Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831 (Mass. 1973).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (effective July 1, 1974) (landlord to maintain fit premises)
codifies the implied warranty of habitability.
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bility in all residential leases, while in others the statutes place upon the
landlord the duty to put and maintain the premises in a habitable condi-
tion, the difference being the tenant's remedies available under each. The
statutes can generally be placed in three categories. First is the rent abate-
ment type of statute which relieves the tenant of the obligation to pay rent
for the duration of the breach.104 Second, are the statutes which authorize
a tenant to make repairs when the landlord breaches his duty to do so and
to deduct the cost of such repairs from the rent.0 5
The third type of statute allows the tenant to withhold the rent by
depositing it in a judicial escrow until the landlord remedies the breach.10i
The Virginia Legislature was aware of the deficiency in this area of Vir-
ginia's landlord-tenant law, and in response it included a rent escrow pro-
vision in the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. 07 This provi-
sion permits a tenant to pay his rent into a district court as escrow when
a landlord allows conditions to exist which constitute a breach of his duty
under the rental agreement, under provisions of law, or when conditions
constitute a fire hazard or a serious threat to the life, health, or safety of
the occupants. 0 8 However, there are conditions precedent which must be
met before this rent escrow provision is available to the tenant. First, the
tenant must notify the landlord of the condition by certified mail or the
landlord must have otherwise been notified by a violation or condemnation
notice, and he must have failed to remedy the condition within a reasona-
ble time.0 9 Second, the tenant must pay into court within five days of due
date the amount of rent due under the lease unless abated."' Third, the
tenant must show that he has not received more than three pay or quit
notices or civil warrants or a combination thereof for unpaid rent within a
year from that time."' The Act also gives the court broad remedial powers
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-24(a) to (c) (Supp. 1969); MASS. LAWS ANN. ch.
239, § 8A (Cum. Supp. 1972).
105. See CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941-42 (Cum. Supp. 1973) (also authorizes termination of the
rental agreement); DEL. CODE ANN. H9 5301-11 (Cum. Supp. 1970) (also authorizes termina-
tion of the rental agreement); HAWAII REV. STATS. §§ 521-42 & 62-66 (Supp. 1972) (also
authorizes termination of the rental agreement); LA. CIv. CODE 2692-95 (1952); MONT. REV.
CODES §§ 42-201, 202 (1947) (also authorizes termination of the rental agreement by vacat-
ing); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-16-12, 13 (1960) (also authorizes termination of the rental
agreement by vacating); OKLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 31, 32 (1954). Virginia has one very limited
repair and deduct statute. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 32-64, 66 (1969).
106. Mo. STAT. ANN. §§ 441,570- .580 (Cum. Supp. 1973); N.J.S.A. H9 2A:42-85 to 97
(Cum. Supp. 1972); N.Y. REAL PROP. AcT & PROC. LAW §§ 769-82 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.27 (effective July 1, 1974).
108. Id.
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.28(a) (effective July 1, 1974).
110. Id. § 55-248.28(b).
111. Id. § 55-248.28(c).
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to fashion appropriate relief for aggrieved tenants such as rent abate-
ment."
2
6. Other Defenses Not Previously Recognized: Landlord's Duty to De-
liver Possession
Where a landlord fails to deliver possession to the tenant most jurisdic-
tions allow the tenant to raise this as a defense to an action for rent."'
These jurisdictions adhere to the English rule which maintains there is an
implied covenant in the lease which requires the landlord to put the tenant
in actual possession of the premises on the first day of the term. ", However,
under the minority view which Virginia had followed, the landlord was not
bound to put the tenant in actual possession but only into legal posses-
sion." Consequently, under this view the tenant had no such defense to
an action for rent.
As was observed in the section on Possession and Use, it is arguable that
the recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
changes Virginia's position and gives the landlord a duty to deliver actual
possession to the tenant. Where the landlord breaches this duty the rent
abates and the tenant may terminate the rental agreement or demand
specific performance. He may also maintain an action for possession
against anyone wrongfully in possession."'
7. Relief From Liability For Rent: Mitigation of Damages
Generally, it is held that a non-breaching party to a contract must
mitigate damages when he can do so at small expense or with reasonable
exertion."1 7 However, in Virginia this argument cannot be used by a de-
faulting tenant as a defense to his liability for rent when he has abandoned
the premises. The rule in Virginia is that the landlord is under no duty to
mitigate his damages by releting when a tenant has abandoned the prem-
ises."' The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act does not change
112. Id. § 55-248.29.
113. Lalekos v. Manset, 47 A.2d 617 (Mun. App. D.C. 1946). See generally 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant § 314 (1968).
114. King v. Reynolds, 67 Ala. 229 (1880).
115. Hannan v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930).
116. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.22 (effective July 1, 1974) (failure to deliver possession).
117. Crowder v. Virginia Bank of Commerce, 127 Va. 299, 103 S.E. 578 (1920).
118. Id. See 51C C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 125(7) (1968) (the fact that the landlord
attempts to relet the premises after an abandonment does not of itself amount to acceptance
of surrender).
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
existing law.'19
E. Conclusion
The recently enacted Virginia Landlord and Tenant Act provides the
landlord with several new remedies in the area of rent and it clarifies some
others. However, it does not address the two most drastic and somewhat
dubious remedies of distress and attachment. It will be left to courts to
deal with them.
The area where the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
makes the most changes is the tenant's defenses for the nonpayment of
rent. Of these changes one of the most important is the interdependence
of the tenant's covenant to pay rent with the landlord's covenants, espe-
cially the landlord's implied warranty of habitability.
Hopefully this Act will help propel Virginia out of antiquity in the law
of landlord and tenant and into a more contemporary position of greater
equality not only in rights and bargaining position but liabilities as well.
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is a step in the right
direction.
VII. THE ASSIGNMENT AND SUBLEASE
Much of the substantive law involving assignments and subleases has
been surplanted by express covenants between the lessor and lessee. The
typical lease in Virginia today provides that "the lessee will not sublet,
rent or assign the said lease or transfer possession of the premises or any
portion thereof to any person or persons without written consent of the
lessor or lessor's agent." If and when consent is given by the lessor, a new
agreement known as a tripartite is generally entered into by the three
parties (the lessor, the lessee and asignee or sublessee) which determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties involved.
There are still, notwithstanding the customary practice of including
such provisions, cases where a return to the substantive law of assignments
and subleases is necessary. The small urban landlord may not provide for
the covenants prohibiting assignments or subleasing. Further, provisions
restricting the right to assign or sublease are the subject of strict construc-




tion' and a court may refuse to recognize the covenant in full or in part.2
Even where the court recognizes the covenant, unless a tripartite is entered
into, the substantive law of assignments and subleases will be applicable
to establish the rights and liabilities of the parties.
3
A. Assignment and Sublease Distinguished
The pivotal question in distinguishing an assignment from a sublease is
whether the lessee has demised all of his interest in the term.4 If the lessee
has demised his entire interest in the term, the transferee is regarded as
an assignee of the lease. 5 On the other hand, where the lessee retains a
reversionary interest, the transferee is a sublessee.6 The test is one of qual-
ity of the term demised and not the extent of the premises transferred.
Therefore, a transfer of the lessee's interest for the entire term of part of
the premises is considered an assignment.
7
While this test appears to be simple, sometimes difficulty is encountered
1. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Bankers' Loan & Inv. Co., 112 Va. 630, 72 S.E. 129 (1911). See
generally 11 M. J. Landlord and Tenant § 57 (1950).
2. See Wainwright v. Banker's Loan & Inv. Co., 112 Va. 630, 72 S.E. 129 (1911). The court
would not allow the lessor to prohibit the lessee from assigning the lease where the covenant
in the lease only mentioned that the lessee may not sublease without the consent of the lessor.
3. See Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927).
4. National Shawmut Bank v. Correal Mining Corp., 140 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. W.Va. 1956);
Parks v. Emory, 68 A.2d 677 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1949); Groth v. Continental Oil Co., 84
Idaho 409, 373 P.2d 548 (1962); J.F. Auderer Laboratories, Inc. v. Deas, 223 La. 923, 67 So.
2d 179 (1953); Employees Consumer Organization, Inc. v. Gorman's, Inc., 395 S.W.2d 162
(Mo. 1965); Morrisville Shopping Center, Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 381 Pa. 576, 112 A.2d
183 (1955); Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912); Bowlby-Harmann Lumber Co.
v. Commodore Servs., Inc., 144 W. Va. 239, 107 S.E.2d 602 (1959). See generally 49 Am. JUR.
2d Landlord and Tenant § 392 (1970); 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant § 37(1) (1968); 11 M.J.
Landlord and Tenant § 57 (1950); 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 405 (2d ed. Ribble 1928).
In the construction of a lease such as the one under consideration, the polar star is, Has the
lessee parted with his entire interest in the premises? Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va.
702, 706, 177 S.E. 109, 110 (1934).
5. See Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934). Accord, Parks v.
Emory, 68 A.2d 677 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1949); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Taylor, 242 Ky. 157,
45 S.W.2d 1039 (1932); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E.
512 (1922).
6. J.F. Auderer Laboratories, Inc. v. Deas, 223 La. 923, 67 So. 2d 179 (1953); Employees
Consumer Organization, Inc. v. Gorman's, Inc., 395 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1965); Morrisville
Shopping Center, Inc. v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 381 Pa. 576, 112 A.2d 183 (1955); Davis v. Vidal,
105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912); Bowlby-Harmann Lumber Co. v. Commodore Servs., Inc.,
144 W. Va. 239, 107 S.E.2d 602 (1959).
7. Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Taylor, 242 Ky. 157, 45 S.W.2d 1039 (1932); Marcelle, Inc. v. Sol
& S. Marcus Co., 274 Mass. 469, 175 N.E. 83 (1931); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. National
Union Fire Ins. Co., 266 N.Y. 254, 194 N.E. 745 (1935); Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163
Va. 702, 177 S.E. 163 (1934). See generally 49 AM. JuR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 393 (1970).
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in its application. In Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols8 the lessor brought an
action to recover rent due against the assignee of a lease. The question
presented was whether the fact that additional rent was contracted for and
a right of re-entry was reserved by the original lessee in the event that the
additional rent was not paid prevented the transfer from becoming an
assignment. The Virginia Supreme Court held that neither the reservation
of additional rent nor the right of re-entry prevented the demise from being
an assignment.9
B. Lessee's Right to Assign or Sublease
1. In the Absence of a Provision Prohibiting Assignment or SubleasingIO
The common law rule is well established in Virginia that, in the absence
of an express covenant to the contrary, all leases are assignable without
the consent of the lessor as a right incidental to the leasehold estate."
Transfer of the leasehold is sufficient consideration for the assignment to
be valid. 12 Generally, no particular form is required to constitute a valid
assignment or sublease; 13 but if the term transferred is five years or more,
8. 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934).
9. Id. at 705-06, 177 S.E. at 110.
The fact that the lessee, in making the transfer to another, reserves a rent greater or
less than he himself has stipulated to pay the landlord for the premises, or that he
reserves a right of re-entry for breach of new conditions imposed by him, does not
prevent the transfer from being treated as an assignment, at least so far as concerns
the original landlord, if the interest transferred by the lessee is his whole interest in
either the entire land or in part thereof. Id. quoting 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 405
(2d ed. Ribble 1928).
Accord, Sexton v. Chicago Storage Co., 129 I1. 318, 21 N.E. 920 (1889); Craig v. Summers,
47 Minn. 189, 49 N.W. 742 (1891); Behr v. Hurwitz, 90 N.J.Eq. 110, 105 A. 486 (1918); Stewart
v. Long Island Ry., 102 N.Y. 601, 8 N.E. 200 (1886); Weander v. Claussen Brewing Ass'n, 42
Wash. 226, 84 P. 735 (1906). This position is based on the theory that a right of re-entry is
not an estate in land but merely a chose in action. Contra, Dunlap v. Bullard, 131 Mass. 161
(1881); Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 144, 151 S.W. 290 (1912). This position is based on the idea
that a right of re-entry is a contingent reversionary interest. See generally 49 AI. JuR. 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 395 (1970).
10. For an annotation concerning the right of the lessee in the absence of a covenant not
to assign or sublease, see Annot., 23 A.L.R. 135 (1923), supplemented in 70 A.L.R. 486 (1931).
See also 49 AM. JR. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 398-401 (1970); 51C C.J.S. Landlord and
Tenant § 31 (1968).
11. "In the absence of express prohibition all leases are assignable." Taylor v. King Cole
Theatres, 183 Va. 117, 120, 31 S.E.2d 260, 261 (1944). Accord, Wainwright v. Bankers' Loan
& Inv. Co., 112 Va. 630, 72 S.E. 129 (1911); Rees v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 88 W. Va. 4,
106 S.E. 247 (1921). As discussed in the preface this is not the usual case and most leases
contain provisions which prohibit the assignment or subleasing of the premises without the
express consent of the lessor.
12. 2 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 1137 (2d ed. Ribble 1928).
13. This was the common law approach until the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries, 29 Car.
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it must be embodied in a deed.'"
Whenever a lessee transfers his interest in the leasehold, the threshold
question is whether the transfer is an assignment or sublease. Where the
transfer is an assignment, privity of estate exists between the lessor and
assignee;'5 while if it is a sublease, no such privity exists.'" Privity of estate
is an important factor in establishing the rights and liabilities of all parties
concerned, because such privity gives the parties a right of action against
each other for the breach of any covenant that runs with the land.'7 The
rights and liabilities imposed by privity of estate do not, however, extin-
guish those created by privity of contract.'8
II, c. 3, §§ 1-3. See 2 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 1137 (2d ed. Ribble 1928). Many jurisdic-
tions follow this early rule today. See 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 402 (1970).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2 (1969). "No estate of inheritance or freehold or for a term of
more than five years in land shall be conveyed unless by deed. .. ." It would seem that a
sublease for less than five years would not have to be in writing. See Smith v. Payne, 153
Va. 746, 151 S.E. 295 (1930). "In Virginia, . . . leases for more than five years must be by
deed, but there is no statutory provisions in this state which in terms declares that other
actual leases be in writing." Id. at 756, 151 S.E. at 298. But see Cooke v. Wise, 13 Va. (3
Hen. & M.) 463, 469 (1809) stating that a writing appears necessary to properly assign a lease.
15. See Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934). See generally 1
MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 405 (2d ed. Ribble 1928).
16. Davis v. Vidal, 105 Tex. 444, 151 S.W. 290 (1912); Cato v. Silling, 137 W. Va. 694, 73
S.E.2d 731 (1952).
17. See, e.g., Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934). It becomes
a necessary prerequisite, to determine whether the assignee is liable upon the covenant, to
ascertain whether the covenant runs with the land. There are generally four requirements
which must co-exist:
(1) There must be a covenant in the original lease.
(2) The covenant must touch and concern the land or affect the nature, quality or value
of the land. See Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 57 S.E.2d 904
(1950).
(3) There must be privity of estate. This is always present between a lessor and an
assignee of the lease once possession has been taken.
(4) There must be an intention that the covenant run with the land. In Virginia this is
automatic if in the lease the covenant provides that the lessee covenants that _. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-67 (1969).
When a deed uses the words "the said. . . . covenants," such covenant shall have the
same effect as if it were expressed to be by the covenantor, for himself, his heirs,
personal representatives and assigns and shall be deemed to be with the covenantee,
his heirs, personal representatives and assigns. Id. (emphasis supplied).
It would appear, at least in Virginia, that the only requirement for the covenant to run with
the land under an assignment is for it to touch and concern the land. See, e.g., Burton v.
Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 57 S.E.2d 904 (1950) (holding that a covenant
to purchase insurance on the property was personal and did not run with the land because
there was no counter provision applying the proceeds of the insurance to restore the premises);
Taylor v. King Cole Theatres, 183 Va. 117, 31 S.E.2d 260 (1944) (holding that a covenant
containing the right to renew the lease runs with the land).
18. See Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927) which held
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2. Where an Express Provision Prohibits Assignment or Subleasing
Without the Lessor's Consent
Despite the fact that a prohibition against assignment and subleasing
is a restraint on alienation, courts will enforce such a provision against the
lessee. 9 However, because the law favors free alienation of estates in land,
these provisions are not favored and are strictly construed. To be enforced
the covenant must be phrased in special and precise language, and the
courts will not infer anything."0 The Virginia Supreme Court in Wain-
wright v. Bankers' Loan & Investment Co.2' held that a covenant which
prohibited the subleasing of the premises without the consent of the lessor
did not prevent the lessee from assigning his interest. While there is no
Virginia case on the matter, the converse is recognized; and a lease which
contains a provision against assignment may be subleased.22
If the lessee attempts to assign or sublease in violation of the covenant,
the lessor has several remedies available. A court of equity will enjoin the
lessee from violating this negative covenant against assigning or subleas-
ing. 23 Where the lease provides for a forfeiture of the leasehold for breach
of covenant, the lessor may recover possession after giving proper notice.
Finally, the lessor may elect to bring an action at law for damages sus-
tained as a result of the breach..2 5
Once the lessor becomes aware that the covenant has been violated, he
must act seasonably. If he accepts rent from the assignee or sublessee with
knowledge of the breach, he will no longer be permitted to enforce the
covenant. The court considers such action as conclusive evidence of con-
sent or a waiver of the covenant because it amounts to a recognition of the
the lessee liable on a covenant to leave the premises in good repair after assignment.
19. Parks v. Emory, 68 A.2d 677 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1949). It is reasonable that the lessor
should be permitted to select to whom he will entrust his premises. Gruman v. Investors
Diversified Serv., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956). See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2d
Landlord and Tenant § 405 (1970).
20. Wainwright v. Bankers' Loan & Inv. Co., 112 Va. 630, 72 S.E. 129 (1911). See 1 MINOR
ON REAL PROPERTY § 400 (2d ed. Ribble 1928); 2 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 1137 (2d ed.
Ribble 1928).
21. 112 Va. 630, 72 S.E. 129 (1911). Accord, Goldman v. Daniel Feder & Co., 84 W. Va.
600, 100 S.E. 400, (1919).
22. See J.D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 148 S.E. 26 (1929);
Miller v. Fredeking, 101 W.Va. 643, 133 S.E. 375 (1926).
23. Sheff v. Candy Box, 274 Mass. 402, 174 N.E. 466 (1931).
An injunction will be granted to prevent a threatened breach of a covenant not to
assign. McFacharan v. Colton, [1902] A.C. 104.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 et. seq. (1950).
25. Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. Consumers Rock & Cement Co., 123 P.2d 872, 50 Cal.
App.2d 721 (1942). The measure of damages is the amount lost for rent. Package-Bamberger
& Co. v. Maloof, 83 N.J. 273, 199 A.2d 400 (1964).
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assignee or sublessee. 26 The right to enforce the covenant is also lost as to
subsequent assignments when the lessor consents to an assignment with-
out expressly imposing restrictions as to future assignments. This doctrine
was first espoused in Dumpor's Case,21 and the rule is followed today in
Virginia" and in most jurisdictions.29
The right of the lessor to withhold consent of a proffered sublessee or
assignee has been recognized almost universally by the courts. 0 The mo-
tives of the lessor are immaterial, and he may withhold consent on purely
arbitrary or unreasonable grounds. 31 Many courts which have adopted this
position have done so without justification other than the fact that the law
has been long settled.3 2 A few courts have questioned the soundness of the
rule but have refused to abrogate it.? Even where the lease contains a
provision that the lessor will not unreasonably withold consent, there have
been a few courts which have allowed the lessor to do so.
31
While this position has been the subject of severe criticism,3 only a few
26. See Franklin Plant Farm, Inc. v. Nash, 118 Va. 98, 86 S.E. 836 (1915); McGhee & Co.
v. Cox, 116 Va. 718, 82 S.E. 701 (1914); McKildoe's Ex'rs v. Darracott, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.)
278 (1856). See generally 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 421 (1970). Cf. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-248-34 (effective July 1, 1974).
27. 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.).
28. See, e.g., Reid v. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 A. 877 (1898); Aste v.
Putnam's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923).
29. See Franklin Plant Farm, Inc. v. Nash, 118 Va. 98, 86 S.E. 836 (1915).
30. See generally Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 831 (1953) (sublease-consent-arbitrary refusal);
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1974) (lessor's consent to subletting).
31. Manley v. Kellar, 47 De. (8 Terry) 511, 94 A.2d 219 (1952); Friedman v. Thomas J.
Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952); Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs.,
247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Zuker v. Dhem, 128 N.J.L. 435, 26 A.2d 564 (1942);
Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinque Associates, 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239
N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963); Alwen v. Tramontin, 131 Wash. 78, 228 P. 851 (1924).
32. Manley v. Kellar, 47 Del. (8 Terry) 511, 94 A.2d 219 (1952); Friedman v. Thomas J.
Fisher & Co., 88 A.2d 321 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1952); Zuker v. Dehm, 128 N.J.L. 435, 26
A.2d 564 (1942); Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Hotel Martinque Associates, 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190
N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963).
33. Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956). "We feel
that we must adhere to the majority rule." The court based this on the fact that many leases
were carefully prepared by competent counsel in reliance on the rule.
34. The threshold question is whether this provision is a covenant of the lessor or merely a
qualification of the lessee's covenant. While most courts have concluded it is a covenant made
by the lessor, there is authority to the contrary. See Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 246
N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957); Hedgecock v. Meddel, 146 Wash. 404, 263 P. 543 (1928). See
generally Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 679 (1974).
35. McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord upon Abandonment of the Premises by the
Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REV. 211, 219 (1925); 44 HARv. L. REV. 933 (1931); 34 I-Rv. L. REV. 217
(1920); Note, Effect of Leasehold Provision Requiring the Lessor's Consent to Assignment,
21 HAST. L. J. 516 (1970).
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courts have been bold enough to abrogate this feudal concept and adopt a
rule which conforms to the realities of modern life. 6 There have been a few
courts which have in dictum indicated their discontent with the rule.7
It is generally recognized that the right of the lessor to consent to an
assignment or sublease is valuable and necessary. The lessor may control
occupancy of his premises, and he can insure himself of the general and
financial responsibility of the new tenant. However, while a valuable right,
the present state of the law lends itself to abuse. It provides the lessor with
a means to drive an unconscionable bargain. For this reason it is believed
that when the lessor refuses to accept the lessee's offered sublessee or
assignee, the lessor should be prepared to state a reasonable basis for his
decision.
An example of the lessor's ability to drive an unconscionable bargain is
Dress Shirt Sales, Inc. v. Martinque Associates.8 The tenant under a ten
year lease was unable to continue his business. He presented a prospective
assignee to the lessor for his consent in accordance with his lease. The
lessor refused to consent to the assignment. After several attempts, all of
which had been unsuccessful, the lessee was desparate; and the lessor
agreed to allow the lessee to be discharged from his obligations by the
payment of $30,000. Shortly thereafter the lessor rented the premises to the
original party offered by the lessee. The court denied recovery on the
grounds that the lessor may rightfully refuse or withhold consent even if
his actions are deemed unreasonable.
What Virginia's position is, is uncertain. The Supreme Court of Virginia
has not been confronted with the precise issue, and for this reason one
should analyze the reasons and policies for and against such a rule.
The majority bases its position on the following syllogism-a lease is a
conveyance, and as such there is no contractual duty on the lessor to
mitigate his damages. 39 There being no duty on the lessor to mitigate his
36. See Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135 (7th Cir. 1967); Scheinfeld
v. Muntz T.V., Inc. 67 Ill. App. 2d 8, 214 N.E.2d 506 (1966); Shaker Building Co. v. Federal
Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (1971). Cf. Marmont v. Axe, 135 Kan.
368, 10 P.2d 826 (1932).
37. Granite Trust Bldg. Corp. v. Great Atl. & P. Tea Co., 36 F. Supp. 77 (D.C. Mass. 1940);
Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965).
38. 12 N.Y.2d 339, 190 N.E.2d 10, 239 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1963). While it is recognized that this
case involves a commercial lease, it is used to illustrate the harshness of the rule and the
extreme to which courts have carried it.
39. Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956).
Accord, Davidson v. Minnesota Loan & Trust Co., 158 Minn. 411, 197 N.W. 833 (1924). Cf.
W.C. Hines Co. v. Angell, 188 Minn. 387, 247 N.W. 387 (1933). While this statement is true,
it does not bolster the conclusion that the lessor may unreasonably withhold consent.
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damages, he is at liberty to unreasonably and arbitrarily refuse a proffered
assignee or sublessee.4 0 While the reasons are sometimes phrased slightly
differently, in substance they follow the above rationale.' It is sometimes
said that the lessor, having personally selected the tenant and expressly
prohibited an assignment or subleasing, has no obligation to look to anyone
but the lessee for the rent.12 This statement while true is a nonsequitur
because even if the lessor consents, he does not relieve the original lessee
from his contractual liablility; and the lessor may if he desires look only
to the original lessee for rent if it is not paid.4 3
Is this approach logical? Is a lease a conveyance of an interest in real
property, or is the estate incidental to the lease? Assuming a lease is a
conveyance, should this conclusion alone override the social policies be-
hind the duty to mitigate damages? Does the fact that the lessor has no
duty to mitigate damages allow him to become unreasonable and not act
in "good faith"? These are but some of the questions that should be an-
swered before the courts continue to follow a common law rule established
during an era of feudal tenure.
The prevailing view is founded on the premise that a lease is a convey-
ance. Therefore, the lessor has parted with his right to control the land.
While the loss of control may affect ones ability to mitigate damages, how
does it warrant the right to unreasonably refuse a proffered assignee or
sublessee? Has the lessor really given up completely his right to control the
leasehold when he can prevent its free alienation? While the necessities of
feudal tenure may have required this approach, under modern circumstan-
ces it is an anachronism." This criticism of the majority has been adopted
40. Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 379-80
(1956).
41. The lessor's right to re-enter the premises upon the lessee's default or abandonment is
at the lessor's option and not the lessee's. Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 247
Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956). Accord, Haycock v. Johnston, 81 Minn. 49, 83 N.W.
494 (1900). The lessee's unilateral action in abandoning the premises does not terminate or
forfeit the estate conveyed, nor the lessee's right to use and possess the premises, nor his
obligation to pay rent. Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d
377, 380 (1956). Accord, Kulawitz v. Pacific Woodenware & Paper Co., 25 Cal. 2d 664, 155
P.2d 24 (1944); Rau v. Baker, 118 Ill. App. 150 (1905).
42. Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., Inc., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377, 380 (1956).
Accord, Stern v. Thayer, 56 Minn. 93, 57 N.W. 329 (1894); White v. Huber Drug Co., 190
Mich. 212, 157 N.W. 60 (1916).
43. See Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927). The effect
of this is that the lessor may still look only to the lessee for the rent if it is not paid.
44. McCormick, The Rights of the Landlord Upon Abandonment of the Premises by the
Tenant, 23 MICH. L. REv. 211 (1925).
Long after the realities of feudal tenure have vanished and a new system based upon
a theory of contractual obligations has in general taken its place, the old theory of
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by several courts45 and the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act. "
Approaching the problem from a realistic viewpoint and recognizing that
a lease is both a contract and a conveyance, the question arises: Which is
predominant under the given facts? At early common law a covenant not
to assign or sublease without the consent of the lessor was thought to be a
personal covenant. In Dumpor's Case,47 which is followed in Virginia,", the
lessor's consent to an assignment, required by a provision in the lease, once
given waives his right to subsequently enforce the covenant. This would
appear to indicate that the covenant does not run with the land and is
personal in nature. Therefore, the principles of contract law should apply.
in a case involving such a covenant; and the lessor should have a duty to
mitigate damages.
Focusing on the issue of whether the lessor has a duty to mitigate dam-
ages, the judicial clevage is deep. 9 The majority, based upon the general
obligations springing from the relation of lord and tenant survives. The courts here
have neglected the caution of Mr. Justice Holmes, "that continuity with the past is
only a necessity and not a duty." If one turns from a decision upon the conditions im-
plied upon a contract for the sale of goods in installments, to one upon the obligation
of the parties to a lease, one changes from the terms and ideas of the twentieth century
to those of the sixteenth. Id. at 221.
45. See, e.g., Weinstein v. Griffith, 241 N.C. 161, 84 S.E.2d 549 (1954); Wright V. Bau-
mann, 239 Ore 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965); United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231
S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956).
46. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT (1972), found in HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1972).
Existing landlord-tenant law in the United States, save as modified by statute or
judicial interpretation, is a product of English common law developed within an agri-
cultural society at a time when doctrines of promissory contract were unrecognized.
Thus, the landlord-tenant relationship was viewed as a conveyance of a leasehold
estate and the covenants of the parties generally independent. These doctrines are
inappropriate to modern urban conditions and inexpressive of vital interest of the
parties and the public which the law must protect.
This Act recognizes the modern tendency to treat performance of certain obligations
of the parties as interdependent. Id. comment to § 1.102 (emphasis added).
47. 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (K.B.).
48. See Franklin Plant Farm v. Nash, 118 Va. 98, 86 S.E. 836 (1915).
49. Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.E.2d 640 (1934); Manley v. Kellar, 47 Del. (8
Terry) 511, 94 A.2d 219 (1952); Cohen v. Food Town, Inc., 207 A.2d 122 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App.
1965); Love v. McDevitt, 114 Ga. App. 734, 152 S.E.2d 705 (1966); Jordon v. Nickell, 253
S.W.2d 237 (Ky. 1952); Gruman v. Investor Diversified Servs., 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377
(1956); Whitehorn v. Dickerson, 419 S.W.2d 713 (Mo. App. 1967); Sancourt Realty Corp. v.
Dowling, 220 App. Div. 660, 222 N.Y.S. 288 (1927). Contra, Friedman v. Colonial Oil Co.,
236 Iowa 140, 18 N.W.2d 196 (1945); Gordon v. Consolidated Sun Ray, Inc., 195 Kan. 341,
404 P.2d 949 (1965); Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119 (1965); United States
Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956); Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash.
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theory that a lease is a conveyance, holds that the lessor has no duty to
mitigate damages. 0 The tenant has purchased a vested interest in realty,
the contract has been executed and the tenant's obligation to pay rent is
absolute.51 Furthermore, the tenant should not be permitted to impose a
duty on the lessor through his own wrongdoing. 52
The minority has countered these arguments and added others which
strongly urge the abandonment of the majority rule. First, they reject the
view that a lease is predominantly a conveyance and hold that it is an
exchange of promises, to which a sale of an estate is incidental. 3 While the
tenant is not to be permitted to impose a duty on the landlord through his
own wrongdoing, the courts are able to impose such a duty under the
general concept of mitigation of damages. The burden imposed does not
seem to be any greater than that imposed on the promisee of any other
contract.5 ' Such a rule is simply just and reasonable. 5 Finally, public
policy dictates that it would be better for the parties, as well as for the
public, to have the property put to some beneficial use rather than be
vacant." This policy should be given careful consideration in view of the
present housing shortage.
Virginia has taken a unique position on the question of mitigation of
damages and straddles the majority and minority rules. In James v. Kib-
bler's Administrator," the Virginia Supreme Court held the lessor under a
duty to mitigate damages. Some twenty years later in Crowder v. Bank of
Commerce,5 the Virginia Supreme Court noted that the lessee never took
683, 212 P. 1057 (1923); St. Regis Apartment Corp. v. Sweitzer, 32 Wis. 2d 426, 145 N.W.2d
711 (1966). See generally Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 534 (1968).
50. See note 102 infra.
51. Gruman v. Investors Diversified Servs. 247 Minn. 502, 78 N.W.2d 377 (1956); Sancourt
Realty Corp. v. Dowling, 220 App. Div. 660, 220 N.Y.S. 288 (1927).
52. Browne v. Dugan, 189 Ark. 551, 74 S.W.2d 640 (1934); Jordan v. Nickell, 253 S.W.2d
237 (Ky. 1952).
53. Wright v. Baumann, 239 Ore. 410, 398 P.2d 119, 120 (1965).
54. Id. at -, 398 P.2d at 121.
55. Id. at -, 398 P.2d at 122. Accord, Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 212 P. 1057
(1923)..
56. Martin v. Siegley, 123 Wash. 683, 212 P. 1057 (1923).
57. 94 Va. 165, 26 S.E. 417 (1896). Accord, Branning Mfg. Co. v. Norfolk S.R.R., 138 Va.
43, 121 S.E. 74 (1924).
58. 127 Va. 299, 103 S.E. 578 (1920).
The case of James v. Kibler's Admir . is cited as sustaining a different view. In
that case, however, while the contract had been signed, the tenant had refused to take
possession, so that the relation of landlord and tenant never existed. The rule is
certainly different where the tenant has been put in possession and abandons the
premises in violation of his contract without justification or excuse. Id. at 304, 103 S.E.
at 579.
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possession in James while in the instant case the premises were abandoned
after the lessee had taken possession. The fact that possession was not
taken prevented the relationship of landlord and tenant from existing in
James. Therefore, the principles of contract law applied; and the duty to
mitigate damages imposed. But where, as in Crowder, the premises are
abandoned after the tenant has once taken possession, there is no duty to
mitigate. This distinction has not been followed in other jurisdictions.
Returning to the initial question: May the lessor unreasonably and arbi-
trarily refuse to accept a proffered subtenant; it would appear that in the
minority jurisdictions which require the lessor to mitigate damages, he
may not. Several other arguments have also been successful.
One court has applied the universally recognized principle of contract
law that where a contract is ambiguous, it is construed against the drafting
party." 9 Because the lease does not state that the lessor may on arbitrary
grounds withhold his consent, an inherent ambiguity exists. Therefore,
reasonableness should be implied in the absence of express language to the
contrary2' While this argument does not directly confront the foundation
of the rule, it is appealing. It is peculiar that the courts have universally
looked upon covenants restricting the right to assign or sublease with disfa-
vor and have strictly construed them, but have not applied this rule of
construction. In Granite Trust Building Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co.,"1 the court said:
It is settled law that unless restricted by the terms of the lease, a lessee may
assign or sublet. A covenant permitting such assignment with the consent of
the lessor, therefore is a covenant for his benefit and is to be construed more
strongly against him. . . . It would seem to be the better law that when a
lease restricts a lessee's rights by requiring consent before these rights can
be exercised, it must have been in the contemplation of the parties that the
lessor be required to give some reason for withholding consent.12
Under strict construction and the rule requiring that ambiguities be con-
strued against the drafting party, should not reasonableness be implied in
the absence of express language to the contrary?
59. Shaker Building Co. v. Federal Lime & Stone Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E. 2d 584
(1971).
60. 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584 (1971). For Virginia cases applying this rule of
construction in contract cases, see Lipscombe v. Security Ins. Co., 213 Va. 81, 189 S.E.2d 320
(1972); -Jackson v. North America Assurance Soc'y, 212 Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 160 (1971). This
rule is based upon the principle that where a contract is unclear and subject to different
interpretations, it should be construed against the one who had it within his power to make
the meaning clear.
61. 28 Ohio Misc. 246, 277 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1971).
62. 36 F. Supp. 77, 78 (D.C. Mass. 1940).
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A final basis for abrogation of the rule is that while the provision is a
restraint on alienation which the courts will enforce, where consent is
unreasonably withheld, the restraint on alienation becomes unreasonable
and, therefore, void as a matter of public policy."
C. Rights, Liabilities and Remedies
1. Rights and Liabilities Between Lessor and Lessee64
The obligations of the original lessee are not extinguished by an assign-
ment of the lease or a sublease of the premises." While an assignment of
the lease extinguishes privity of estate between the lessor and lessee, priv-
ity of contract remains. 6 If the transfer is a sublease, both privity of estate
and privity of contract remain between the lessor and original lessee. The
effect of this is that the lessor may still consider the original lessee as his
tenant and look solely to him for compliance with the lease.6
The lessor may relieve the lessee from his obligation under the lease by
novation, implication or waiver of a right. 8 Furthermore, where the lessor
and assignee make a modification of the lease, the original lessee will not
be liable thereunder because the modification creates a new tenancy. 9
Where liability is based solely upon privity of contract, the lessee is dis-
charged from liability which arises by implication from the relationship of
landlord and tenant. 0 However, where the covenant is express, the lessee
63. Mowatt v. 1540 Lake Shore Drive Corp., 385 F.2d 135, 137 (7th Cir. 1967).
64. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 437-46 (1970); 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant §§ 45(2), 47 (1968); 11 M.J. Landlord and Tenant § 58 (1950).
65. See Farmers Bank v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 73 (1832); Cooke v.
Wise, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 463 (1809). This also applies to a sublease. See Dixie Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965). This is also true when
the assignment was by operation of law and against the lessee's consent. Powell v. John E.
Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927). There is also authority that the lessee
will remain liable for rent subsequently accruing to an extension or renewal of the lease by
the assignee. See Kornblum v. Henry E. Mangles Co., 167 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1964); Annot., 10
A.L.R.3d 818 (1966).
66. Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927).
67. Emerick v. Travener, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 220 (1852); Ferguson v. Moore, 2 Va. (2 Wash.)
54 (1795).
68. Fifty Ass'n v. Grace, 125 Mass. 161 (1878); Mayer v. Dwiggins, 114 Neb. 184, 206 N.W.
744 (1925); Jamison v. Reilly, 92 Wash. 538, 159 P. 699 (1916); Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke
Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914). The burden is on the lessee to show that he
was released from his covenants, but this may be inferred from the acts of the parties or the
circumstances. See Seeburger v. Cohen, 215 Iowa 1088, 247 N.W. 292 (1933).
69. See generally 49 Ait. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 444 (1970).
70. See Farmers Bank v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 73 (1832). This applies
equally to an implied covenant to pay rent. National Bank of Commerce v. Dunn, 194 Wash.
472, 78 P.2d 535 (1938); Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E.
781 (1914).
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is not discharged by the lessor's acceptance of the assignee or acceptance
of rent from the assignee.7' Even the institution of an action by the lessor
against the assignee does not constitute an election, and the original lessee
is not discharged from his liability until there is satisfaction.7 1
In Virginia, the lessor has various remedies available to enforce his rights
against the lessee. Where there is a breach of the covenant to pay rent, he
may proceed at law for damages.73 Such action does not terminate the
lease, and the lessor would still have the problem of regaining possession.
Also, the lessor may select unlawful detainer, 7 which provides the lessor
with a means of recovering possession as well as the collection of rent. 7'
Since in most cases the lessee has moved from the premises, distress and
attachment would probably be unavailing.7
If the breach is of a general restrictive covenant, the lessor may maintain
an action for the damages sustained or bring a suit in equity to enjoin the
lessee from further breaching the covenant. In most cases the lease will
provide that upon a breach of any covenant contained therein, the lessee
will forfeit his interest in the leasehold. The lessor derives still another
remedy from this provision. After giving the proper legal notice,77 he may
maintain the action of unlawful detainer.7 1
71. See Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927); Kimbel v.
Wetzel Natural Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 761, 61 S.E.2d 728 (1950).
72. Kanawha-Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914).
73. Powell v. John E. Hughes Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927).
74. See generally BURKES, PLEADING AND PAcrICE (4th Ed. T. Boyd 1952). See VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-225 (1969), which requires that a notice in writing be given requesting the payment
of rent (pay or quit). After five days and the rent not having been paid, the lessor may proceed
to recover possession. For the procedure to recover possession and damages see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-789 (1950) and the section on Forcible Entry and Detainer infra.
75. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-793 (1950) (verdict and judgment; damages). See also section
on Forcible Entry and Detainer, infra.
76. To distrain the chattels of the lessee, the lessor must do so within thirty days after the
removal of such from the premises. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969). The same require-
ment is applicable to attachment. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-566 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See also
Dime Deposit & Discount Bank v. Wescott, 113 Va. 567, 75 S.E. 179 (1912).
77. Notice to quit must be given. Johnson v. Goldberg, 207 Va. 487, 151 S.E.2d 368 (1966);
Pettit v. Cowherd, 83 Va. 20, 1 S.E. 392 (1887). Under the recently enacted Virginia Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act, the landlord is required to give notice of the breach to the
tenant. He must wait 30 days before he may maintain a possessary action. The lease termi-
nates only if the breach has not been remedied within 21 days of notice of the breach. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (effective July 1, 1974). Since this Act is not applicable to natural
persons who own 10 single family dwellings or less, the old law, which merely requires notice
without imposing a time limit, is applicable in such cases. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.5 (10)
(effective July 1, 1974).




The lessee may enforce the covenants contained in the original lease
against the lessor after an assignment or sublease is made. While the lessee
would not generally be desirous of maintaining an action because he has
not personally suffered, the right to maintain such an action is present. If
the lessee is inclined to bring an action, an injunction would seem to be
the best remedy. Where, however, the lessee has previously been subjected
to a judgment by his sublessee, then an action at law would be appropriate.
2. Rights and Liabilities Between Lessor and Assignee"9
The assignee of a lease succeeds to all the interest of the lessee in the
leasehold and to the benefits of all covenants which run with the land. 0
He may maintain an action at law to recover damages sustained as a result
of a breach by the lessor' or possibly enjoin the lessor from violating a
covenant. In many jurisdictions an assignee may not sue for a breach which
occurred prior to the assignment because the cause of action is a choses in
action which is not assignable.82 In Virginia, by statute, such a cause of
action is assignable.83
While the assignee succeeds to all the benefits that run with the land,
he is obligated to assume all burdens of the lease which run with the land,"4
but not personal covenants, unless he expressly promises to undertake
them."0
79. See generally 49 AMt. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 447-48 (1970); 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant §§ 44(1)-(5) (1968).
80. Hyman v. 230 So. Franklin Corp., 7 Ill. App. 2d 15, 128 N.E. Q29 (1955); 68 Beacon
St., Inc. v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N.E. 303 (1935); Taylor v. King Cole Theatres, 183
Va. 117, 31 S.E.2d 260 (1944); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112
S.E. 512 (1922).
81. Mclenahan v. Gwynn, 17 Va. (3 Munf.) 556 (1811).
82. See, e.g., Roberts v. Lehl, 27 Colo. App. 351, 149 P. 851 (1915).
83. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-6 (1969). "Any interest in or claim to real estate, .... may be
disposed of by deed or will. .. ."
84. Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 57 S.E.2d 904 (1950); Taylor
v. King Cole Theatres, 183 Va. 117, 31 S.E.2d 260 (1944); Gauley Coal & Coke Co. v. Sharp.
73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914). He is liable to pay rent notwithstanding the fact that the
lease was assigned in violation of covenant. McGhee & Co. v. Cox, 116 Va. 718, 82 S.E. 701
(1914).
85. Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 765, 57 S.E.2d 904 (1950)
(holding that a covenant by original lessee to insure, without provision for proceeds to be used
to restore the property, was personal and did not run with the land).
86. S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Virginia Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146 S.E.2d 205
(1966).
That the words "subject to all the terms and conditions of said lease" do not impose
contractual liability on an assignee under a lease seems to be the well supported rule.
Id. at 679, 146 S.E.2d at 209.
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The lessor generally has all the remedies available to enforce his rights
against the assignee that he would have had against the original lessee. If
rent is not paid he may distrain the personal property of the assignee."
Alternatively, he may choose to recover possession by an action for unlaw-
ful detainer after giving proper notice to pay or quit.8" If he is fearful that
the assignee is not going to pay the rent and will remove his personal
property, he may have the chattels of the assignee attached.89 If the lessor
desires, he may maintain an action at law for damages.90 Where there is a
breach of covenant other than to pay rent, the lessor may avail himself of
the common remedies of an action at law9' or a suit to enjoin the assignee
from breaching a covenant.
3. Rights and Liabilities Between Lessor and Sublessee92
At common law a sublease created an estate separate and distinct from
the original leasehold.13 The relation of landlord and tenant did not exist
between the lessor and sublessee, 9' and as a consequence all rights and
liabilities of the sublessee were derived from the lease executed with the
lessee/sublessor. These rights could rise no higher than those of the original
lease. 5 The lessor could maintain an action for unlawful detainer if the
sublessee held over after the lessee's estate had terminated. 9 As a general
rule the sublessee may not look to the lessor personally for a breach of
See 83 C.J.S. Subject p. 555 (1953). "The expression 'subject to' ... normally connotes, in
legal usage, an absence of personal obligation, and as ordinarily used does not create affirma-
tive rights."
87. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969). This section provides, "the distress may be levied
on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee, or undertenant, found on the premises.
(emphasis supplied).
88. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-789 to -795 (1950).
89. There appears to be no case in Virginia directly on point, however, it seems clear that
the Virginia Supreme Court would so hold. In Bernard v. McClanahan, 115 Va. 453, 79 S.E.
1059 (1913), the court held that attachment was a proper remedy against an undertenant
because § 55-231 expressly made him liable for distress and under the court's interpretation
of § 55-566 any property which was the proper subject for distress was the proper subject of
attachment. Applying the same reasoning, the property of the assignee would be subjected
to attachment since it is expressly the subject of distress under § 55-231. See note 110 infra.
90. Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934).
91. See Burton v. Chesapeake Box & Lumber Corp., 190 Va. 755, 57 S.E.2d 904 (1950);
Moskin Stores Inc., v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934).
92. See generally 49 Am. JUR. 2d Landlord and Tenant 88 508-12 (1970); 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant § 48(1) (1968).
93. J.D. Cornell Millinery Co. v. Little Long Co., 197 N.C. 168, 148 S.E. 26 (1929).
94. Cato v. Silling, 137 W. Va. 694, 73 S.E.2d 731 (1953); Hawley Corp. v. West Virginia
Broadcasting Corp., 120 W. Va. 184, 197 S.E. 628 (1938).
95. German-American Sav. Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Cal. 683, 102 P. 932 (1909).
96. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (1950).
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covenant," nor may the lessor look to the sublessee for violations of the
original lease."' There is authority in other jurisdictions to the effect that
the lessor may in equity enjoin the sublessee from violating any covenant
of which the sublessee has notice.99
Virginia has retained the common law approach with respect to cove-
nants other than for the payment of rent.'0 The covenant to pay rent while
not enforceable as a covenant may be enforced by the statutory remedy of
distress.'0 ' Furthermore, in Bernard v. McClanahan'2 the Virginia Su-
preme Court held that the chattels of the sublessee behind in his rental
payments were the proper subject for attachment.' 3
97. Employees Consumer Organization, Inc. v. Gorman's, Inc., 395 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1965);
Bowlby-Harmann Lumber Co. v. Commodore Servs., Inc., 144 W. Va. 239, 107 S.E.2d (1959).
98. Cato v. Silling, 137 W. Va. 694, 73 S.E.2d 731 (1953).
99. See 1 MINOR ON REAL PROPERTY § 407 n. 6 (2d ed. Ribble 1928). This position would
appear to be based on the concept that a person who takes with notice of a restriction cannot
in good conscience be permitted to violate it.
100. Moskin Stores, Inc. v. Nichols, 163 Va. 702, 177 S.E. 109 (1934).
[Ilf the lessee sublets the premises, reserving or retaining any such reversion, however
small, the privity of the estate is not established and the original landlord has no right
of action against the sublessee, there being neither privity of contract nor of estate
between them. Id. at 707, 177 S.E. at 111 citing Stewart v. Long Island R.R., 102 N.Y.
601, 8 N.E. 200 (1886).
101. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-231 (1969). This section of the code provides: "the distress
may be levied on any goods of the lessee, or his assignee, or undertenant, found on the
premises .. " (emphasis supplied). See also Bernard v. McClanahan, 115 Va. 453, 79 S.E.
1059 (1913).
The liability of an undertenant of leased premises, as in this case, does not arise out
of contractual relations between him and the lessor, but by virtie of statute, whereby
he, upon entering the leased premises as undertenant subjects his property carried
thereon to liability for the rent contracted to be paid by the lessee of the premises ...
Id. at 457-58, 79 S.E. 1060.
102. 115 Va. 453, 79 S.E. 1059 (1913).
103. The court interpreted § 8-566 and § 55-231 of the Virginia Code together and con-
cluded that: "[tihe statute (sec. 2791 supra) [now § 55-231] plainly makes the goods of
the undertenant liable for the rent, just as though they were the goods of the tenant himself;
and by section 2962 [now § 8-566] it is provided that if the goods are liable to be distrained,
they may be attached." Id. at 458, 79 S.E. at 1060.
To obtain a writ of attachment, the lessor must file an affidavit which states:
(1) The truthfulness of the complaint;
(2) The rent which is reserved and payable within one year; and
(3) Grounds for a belief that unless the property is attached there will not be sufficient
property for distress.
See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-566 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See generally BURKES, PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 393 (4th ed. T. Boyd 1952). Prior to 1919 revision of the code, the undertenant was liable
for all rent owed the lessor. With the 1919 revision the undertenant's liability was limited to
the amount he personally owed. See BURKES, PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 401 (4th ed. T. Boyd
1952).
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4. Rights and Liabilities Between Assignor and Assignee'1
Any express covenant contained in the instrument creating the assign-
ment may be enforced against the assignor.' 5 This is generally the extent
of his liability because no covenants are implied against him.' 6 Exceptions
to this rule include the accountability of the assignor to the assignee for
misrepresentations to the lessor's consent to assign,0 7 or where a forfeiture
of the leasehold results due to a previous breach by the lessee/assignor of
which the assignee has no notice.0 When either situation occurs, the as-
signee may maintain an action to recover damages or bring a suit to rescind
the assignment.' An assignment which is violative of a provision against
assignment is not void but merely voidable at the election of the lessor." 0
Therefore, the assignee should not be permitted to maintain an action for
misrepresentations unless the lessor exercises his election and makes the
assignment void.
The relationship between the assignor and assignee is basically that of
a surety. The law implies a promise on the part of the assignee to fulfill
the duties imposed by the original lease. If the lessor at his election main-
tains an action against the lessee/assignor, for the assignee's breach, the
assignor may indemnify his losses by bringing an action against the as-
signee."'
5. Rights and Liabilities Between Sublessor and Sublessee ' 2
The relationship between the sublessee and the sublessor is basically
that of landlord and tenant. The rights and liabilities of that relationship
attach.'"
104. See generally 49 Am. Jura. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 425-36 (1970); 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant § 45(3) (1968).
105. Taylor v. King Cole Theatres, 183 Va. 117, 31 S.E.2d 260 (1944).
106. Miles v. United Oil Co., 192 Ky. 542, 234 S.W. 209 (1921).
107. See Harmon v. Dickerson, 184 S.W. 139 (Mo. App. 1916); Graham v. Zellers, 205 Wis.
542, 238 N.W. 385 (1931). See also Annot., 78 A.L.R. 359 (1932).
108. Powell v. Mohr, 68 Cal. App. 639, 230 P. 27 (1924).
109. Harmon v. Dickerson, 184 S.W. 139 (Mo. App. 1916) (recission); Branner v. Kaplan,
138 Va. 614, 123 S.E. 668 (1924) (recission); Graham v. Zellers, 205 Wis. 542, 238 N.W. 385
(1931) (damages).
I10. J.S. Potts Drug Co. v. Benedict, 156 Cal. 322, 104 P. 432 (1909); Kewanee Boiler Corp.
v. American Laundry Mach. Co., 289 Ill. App. 482, 7 N.E.2d 461 (1937).
111. Howard v. Lovegrove, L.R. 6 Ex. 43.
112. See generally 49 AM. JuaR. 2d Landlord and Tenant §§ 503-07 (1970); 51C C.J.S.
Landlord and Tenant §§ 48(2), 49 (1968).
113. Garbutt & Donovan v. Barksdale-Pruitt Junk Co., 37 Ga. App. 210, 139 S.E. 357
(1927). He may bring an action for unlawful detainer. Spandorfer v. Cooper, 141 Va. 792, 126
S.E. 558 (1925). See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-231, 8-566 (1950). The language seems sufficiently
broad enough to permit the sublessor to maintain distress or attachment.
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D. Conclusion
The Virginia General Assembly has enacted a Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act."' Unfortunately the Act does not address any of the problems
of assignments and subleases heretofore discussed. Under the new legisla-
tion a landlord still has no duty to mitigate damages."' He may continue
to arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to recognize a sublessee or assignee.
This area needs serious re-evaluation and reform.
England in 1927, decided that it could no longer tolerate the judicial
interpretation that a lessor could withhold his consent to an assignment
on unreasonable grounds and by statute incorporated into every lease the
condition of reasonableness."6 Included in the 1969 American Bar Founda-
tion Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code is a provision requiring the
landlord to act reasonably in regard to subleases but not to assignments." 7
Under this provision the tenant is required to notify the landlord in writing
of his intention to sublease and to identify the sublessee. If the tenant is
not notified within ten days or the landlord gives no grounds for rejecting
the sublessee, the tenant may terminate his lease by giving thirty days
notice."" If a legal proceeding arises, the burden of establishing the reason-
114. VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT Acr, VA. HOUSE BILL 220 (enacted Mar.
9, 1974), codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2 to 248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
115. Id. § 55-248.33.
. . . If the landlord rents an abandoned dwelling unit for a term beginning prior to
the expiration of the rental agreement, it is deemed to be terminated as of the date
the new tenancy begins. The rental agreement is deemed to be terminated by the
landlord as of the date the landlord has notice of the abandonment if the landlord
elects to accept the abandonment as a surrender. . . . (emphasis supplied).
116. Landlord-Tenant Act of 1927, 17 & 18 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 19, sched. 1.
In all leases whether made before or after the commencement of this Act containing a
covenant, condition or agreement against assigning, underletting, changing or parting
with the possession of demised premises or any part thereof without license or consent,
such covenant condition or agreement shall, notwithstanding any express provision to
the contrary, be deemed to be subject-
(a) to a provision to the effect that such license or consent is not to be unreasonably
withheld, but this provision does not preclude the right of the landlord to require
payment of a reasonable sum in respect to any legal or other expenses incurred in
connection with such license or consent ...
117. AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-403
(Tent. Draft 1969).
A written rental agreement may restrict the tenant's right to assign the rental
agreement in any manner. The tenant's right to sublease the premises may be condi-
tioned on obtaining the landlord's consent, which shall be withheld upon reasonable
grounds as specified in subsection (5); no further restriction on sublease shall be
effective. Id. § 2-403 (2).
118. Id. at § 2-403 (4)
Within [101 days . . .the landlord may reject the prospective subtenant by deliver-
ing or mailing [by certified mail] to the tenant a written reply signed by the landlord
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ableness of the rejection is on the lessor." 9 Under the Uniform Residential
Landlord and Tenant Act' 2 there is a duty to mitigate damages upon the
aggrieved party.'2'
There is no reason for a distinction between assignments and subleases.
Under either, the original lessee remains personally liable.' 2 By placing the
burden of proof on the lessor, it might subject him to harassment suits.23
It is hoped that the Virginia Legislature in its next session will amend the
Virginia Law and include a provision similar to that of the American Bar
Foundations' but which does not exclude assignments.
VIII. EVICTION: REPOSSESSION OF THE LEASEHOLD
The following treatment of eviction does include some treatment of the
notice to quit requirements for termination of the lease by the landlord.
The bulk of this discussion presupposes that for one reason or another the
landlord has a right to possession of the premises-a right which the tenant
is abridging by wrongfully holding over. Faced with this familiar landlord-
tenant confrontation, what is the Virginia landlord to do; what procedural
guarantees does the tenant have? Like his counterpart in most jurisdic-
tions, the landlord is presented with three alternatives: he may invoke the
statutory version of that age-old relic, ejectment; he may avail himself of
the summary remedy explicitly fashioned for his use, unlawful entry and
detainer; or he may turn to what is certainly the oldest of landlord reme-
dies, and one that looms as something of a bogeyman to the loyal advocate
of tenants' rights-self-help.
which shall contain one or more specific grounds for the rejection.
If the landlord fails to reply within the [101 days, or if his written reply fails to give
reasonable grounds for rejecting the prospective tenant, the tenant may, at his option,
terminate the rental agreement by giving written notice to the landlord....
IThirtyl days after such notice is delivered or mailed [by registered mail] to the
landlord, the rental agreement shall terminate....
119. Id. at § 2-403 (6).
In any proceeding in which the reasonableness of the landlord's rejection be in issue,
the burden of showing reasonableness shall be on the landlord.
120. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT (1972), found in HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1972).
121. Id. at § 1.105(a).
The remedies provided by this Act shall be so administered that an aggrieved party
may recover appropriate damages. The aggrieved party has a duty to mitigate
damages. (emphasis added).
122. See note 74 supra.
123. Note, Effect of Leasehold Provisions Requiring the Lessor's Consent to Assignments,




The Virginia Code provides, "the [common law] action of ejectment is
retained,"' yet an examination of the fifty-eight odd provisions dealing
with this action2 reveals that today it is almost entirely a statutory remedy.
While at one point in its early history the action's main object was the
recovery of the possession of land, it now serves primarily as a method to
try title.3 According to the Virginia Code, it is the action whereby one
asserts "a subsisting interest in the premises claimed and the right to re-
cover the same"4 from another.
The chief requisities for a successful action of ejectment and also those
which render it more expensive than unlawful entry and detainer are: (1)
ejectment must be brought in a court of record;5 (2) the plaintiff must
recover on the strength of his own title-thus requiring not only proof of
the superiority of his own claim to the defendant's claim, but as to the
whole world;' (3) the plaintiff must trace his chain of title to the Common-
wealth.7 The burden imposed by the last two requirements on the landlord
is muted by the fact that the tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's
title.' This suggests that ejectment in the landlord-tenant context may be
less complicated and expensive than in the classic adverse possession situ-
ation. However, because proceedings in a circuit court usually require
retention of counsel, ejectment is seldom used when attempting to repos-
sess the residential tenement at the termination of the lease. Usually the
more expeditious remedy of unlawful entry and detainer more adequately
meets the landlords' needs.'
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-796 (1957).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-796 to -856 (1957), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1973).
3. BLAcK's LAW DIcrioNaRY 606 (rev. 4th ed. 1968); BURKS PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 111
(4th ed. T. Boyd 1952).
4. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-799 (1957).
5. Id. § 8-798.
6. Davis v. Bostic, 125 Va. 698, 100 S.E. 463 (1919) (not involving landlord-tenant relation-
ship); Merryman v. Hoover, 107 Va. 485, 59 S.E. 483 (1907) (not involving landlord-tenant
relationship); McKinney v. Daniel, 90 Va. 702, 19 S.E. 880 (1894) (not involving landlord-
tenant relationship).
7. Spriggs v. Jamerson, 115 Va. 250, 78 S.E. 571 (1913); Bugg v. Seay, 107 Va. 648, 60 S.E.
89 (1908). See Sulphur Mines Co. v. Thompson, 93 Va. 293, 309, 25 S.E. 232, 234 (1896).
8. Suttle v. R.F. & P.R.R., 76 Va. 284 (1882) (dictum); Miller v. Williams, 56 Va. 213 (1859)
(dictum); Alderson v. Miller, 56 Va. 279 (1859) (dictum). While none of the foregoing cases
specifically decide the point, their dictum appears to establish the principle in Virginia that
the tenant may not deny the landlord's title.
9. It must be pointed out that where the tenant has been unlawfully detaining against the
landlord for three years or more, the action of unlawful entry and detainer will be unavailable
to the landlord. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (1957). Consequently he will have no choice but to
use ejectment.
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The only time that ejectment appears to be profitable, if not prescribed,
would be where the leasehold involved substantial value, as in commercial
property. An unlawful entry and detainer action only settles the question
of immediate right to possession.'" Its finding is not res judicata, I" and the
winner in such an action remains open to another suit to test his rights,
that is, ejectment.' 2 This unsettled state of affairs is of little consequence
to the typical residential landlord who can usually assume that his ousted
tenant has found quarters elsewhere; however, this is not acceptable to the
owner of commercial property, particularly where the lease in question is
long or the dollar amounts involved are substantial. In such a case, the
landlord will want to settle his right to possession with finality, thus insur-
ing future marketability of a lease interest or the land itself.
B. Unlawful Entry and Detainer13
Unlawful entry and detainer, unlike its more formal counterpart eject-
ment, is an action of wholly statutory origin. It was first enacted in Eng-
land as a criminal statute aimed directly at preventing the use of self-help
as a method to recover land.14 As such it made no provision for damages
or the return of possession of the tenement, but instead, provided only for
punishment of the wrongful entrant. 5 Ultimately the English law devel-
oped to the point that the tenant could get limited civil redress by being
put back into possession.' 6 It was at this level of development of the unlaw-
ful entry and detainer action that Virginia in 1789 virtually adopted the
English statutes. 7 Virginia's statutory action has since developed into a
10. Davis v. Mayo, 82 Va. 97 (1886); Power v. Tazewells,66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 786 (1875).
Usually evidence of title will not even be admissible into evidence. E.g., Emerick v. Tavener,
50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 220 (1852).
11. See generally cases cited note 10 supra.
12. See generally cases cited note 10 supra.
13. The action is known equally well under the alias "forcible entry and detainer" (the
Virginia Code refers to it as unlawful entry and detainer). The statutory provisions for unlaw-
ful entry and detainer are: VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-789 to -795 (1957), as amended, (1973 Cum.
Supp.). General treatment of the action of unlawful entry and detainer as it relates to Virginia
may be found in: C. BERRY, CIVIL PRACTICE IN MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY COURTS 88 231-45
(1961); BURKS PLEADING AND PRACTICE §§ 103-10 (4th ed. T. Boyd 1952); 8 M.J. Forcible
Entry and Detainer 8§ 1-28 (1949); VIRGINIA STATE BAR & VIRGINIA STATE BAR AssOCIATION,
THE VIRGINIA LAWYER 6.5.6, 6.14 (1969); A. PHELPS, HANDBOOK OF THE VIRGINIA RULEs OF
PROCEDURE IN ACTIONS AT LAW 21-26 (2d ed. 1961).
14. 5 Rich. 2, stat. 1, c. 7 (1381).
15. Id.
16. For a historical sketch of the action of unlawful entry and detainer see Barnett, When
the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law in Florida, 19 FLA. L.
REV. 238 (1966).
17. 13 Hen. Stat. at Large p. 5 (1789).
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remedy whereby a residential landlord can expeditiously recover the rental
unit, back rent, and damages from the holdover tenant. 8
In order for this action to lie the landlord must be entitled to possession.
The conditions which give the landlord this right generally fall into three
categories; (1) the tenant has heldover beyond the termination date of the
lease without the consent of the landlord; (2) the tenant is in arrears for
rent and the landlord has given the tenant five days notice to quit or pay
as required by statute; 2 (3) the tenant has broken some covenant of the
lease, and the landlord has exercised his right of forfeiture thereunder by
giving a notice to quit.
The third category mentioned above has been a source of some contro-
versy and is one of the areas that has been signficantly altered by the
recently enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. 21 Virtually
every residential rental agreement contains a provision for forfeiture at the
discretion of the landlord for a breach of any of the tenant's covenants. By
case law it is clear that in order for the landlord to exercise the right of re-
entry, he must give the tenant notice to quit.Y However, unlike the statu-
tory provisions concerning forfeiture for arrearage in rent,2 there is no
grace period in which the tenant may make repair for breach of covenant.
Where rent is in arrears the landlord must give the tenant at least five days
notice to pay before he brings action. But before passage of the new Act
he could bring an unlawful entry and detainer action the instant the notice
to quit was given, no matter how inconsequential the breached covenant.
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act attempts to remedy
what was in effect a harsh inconsistency by providing:
[tihe landlord may deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts
and omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement will
terminate upon a date not less than thirty days after receipt of the notice if
the breach is not remedied in twenty-one days, and the rental agreement
shall terminate as provided in the notice. 2
18. This action also serves as the method by which the tenant who has been forcibly ousted
recovers .his possession of the land-the purpose for which unlawful entry and detainer was
originally designed.
19. An example of a possible format of such a quit or pay notice may be seen in VIRGINIA
STATE BAR & VIRGINIA STATE BAR AsSOCIATION, THE VIRGINIA LAWYER 16.1 (1969).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-225 (1969). A more detailed treatment of this code section may
be found in the section of this note dealing with rent.
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (effective July 1, 1974).
22. Johnson v. Goldberg, 207 Va. 487, 151 S.E.2d 368 (1966); Pettit v. Cowherd, 83 Va. 20,
1 S.E. 392 (1887); Williamson v. Paxton, 59 Va. (18 Gratt.) 475 (1868).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-225 (1969).
24. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.31 (effective July 1, 1974).
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No doubt, there will be complaints that standing alone this provision
confers upon the tenant the power to breach the rental agreement at will;
so long as the tenant remedies each breach within twenty-one days after
complaint by the landlord. Presumably he could remain until the lease
expires. If this is an accurate reading of the statute, the landlord is at an
unfair disadvantage relative to an undesirable tenant who, through such
abuse of the notice-grace period requirement, could negate the force be-
hind valid covenants in the lease. However this section somewhat lessens
such a possibility by providing that a court can enjoin the tenant's non-
compliance with the rental agreement and award the landlord damages,
and where the breach is willful, reasonable attorney fees.
Virginia's unlawful entry and detainer statute, apart from possible hard-
ship in the forfeiture itself, is fair and equitable to both the landlord and
tenant. The typical eviction problem is handled quickly, with no real paper
work problems, and no need for retention of counsel. The landlord's first
task is to give notice to quit or notice to pay or quit to the tenant. This
failing, the landlord must swear out an affidavit25 (generally before a clerk
of a district court).26 This affidavit results in a summons being issued to
the sheriff (or appropriate officer) for service on the tenant. Depending
upon the locality, the summons is issued by either the local magistrate or
the district court judge.
Generally where the landlord's action is justified, service of the sum-
mons is enough to prod the reluctant tenant into leaving or remedying the
breach. Even where the appearance of the officer does not produce this
result, the Code provides that an unlawful entry and detainer action is
placed at the head of the docket . 2 This at least insures the landlord speedy
action. In most instances the case will be disposed of before the district
court judge immediately upon the return of the summons either by entry
of judgment upon the tenant's failure to appear or by trial should he
contest the eviction. In either case judgment for possession of the premises
in a justified claim by a landlord is speedy. 28
The action of unlawful entry and detainer further facilitates the needs
of the landlord in that he can recover past due rent as well as any damages
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-791 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
26. While VA. CODE ANN. § 8-789 (1957), alternatively provides for institution of the action
by filing a motion for judgment in a circuit court, such a motion for judgment will be required
only where the original lease exceeds two years. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-791 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-792 (Cum. Supp. 1973). This provision is applicable when the
unlawful entry and detainer action has been commenced by a motion for judgment, since
the trial in district court usually occurs on the return date of the summons.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-791 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
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suffered because of the wrongful holdover.2" However, the landlord must
include his claims in the affidavit and show them on the summons. 3 The
amounts involved must not exceed the jurisdictional amount of the court.31
Even though a judgment in the district court is subject to an appeal to a
court of record, the landlord is insulated against spurious appeals by a
requirement that the tenant first post security to cover rent and damages. 3
Does the unlawful entry and detainer statute provide adequate protec-
tion to the tenant who has been wrongfully evicted? The answer apparently
is yes. Similar statutes, more stringent and summary in nature, have re-
cently been held to pass the muster of constitutional standards of due
process.Y In Virginia the summary nature of the proceeding does not pre-
clude a hearing of all material evidence directly bearing upon the tenant's
right to possession. 4 Additionally, the tenant is provided with minimum
procedural safeguards. He is afforded at least five days in which to vacate
or appeal since the return day must be at least five days after service; 3 and
where there is an arrearage of rent, he must be given five days notice
(additional time in which to make good the back rent) before his possession
is deemed unlawful 6
Should the tenant fail at the district court level, he has a right to a trial
de novo in a court of record if he acts within ten days after judgment. 37 In
the circuit court the tenant can have a jury trial38 by posting appeal secu-
rity to cover any rent and damages.39 While this may pose a burden to the
indigent tenant, it does not seem inequitable since the security is for no
more than the amount for which the tenant was found liable in the district
court.
In short, unlawful entry and detainer more than adequately protects the
tenant during the eviction process. Not only is he given a chance to tell
his side of the story to the district court judge, but he is given a ready
29. Id. § 8-793 (1957).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 8-794.
33. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); this case was extensively discussed in Note,
New Tenets in Old Houses: Changing Concepts of Equal Protection in Lindsay v. Normet,
58 VA. L. REV. 930 (1972); 25 VAND. L. REV. 654 (1972).
34. See, e.g., Olinger v. Shepherd, 53 Va. (12 Gratt.) 462 (1855), where the court even
allowed evidence of title which is not normally admissible in an unlawful entry and detainer
action.
35. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-791 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
36. Id. § 55-225 (1969).
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appeal to a circuit court with the usual right to trial by jury. Thus, even if
the tenant does suffer in certain substantive areas of the law in Virginia,
he is given ample procedural protection of whatever substantive rights he
does have.
Besides the notice to quit provision previously discussed, the newly en-
acted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act enlarges the bounds
of judicial inquiry in an unlawful entry and detainer action. Heretofore,
the tenant was unable to set up a breach of covenant by the landlord as a
defense in an unlawful entry and detainer proceeding; generally, the court
was confined to the narrow issue of right to possession0 which, under the
typical lease, necessarily devolved upon a question of whether the tenant
had paid rent or had broken a covenant, resulting in forfeiture. Because
the new landlord-tenant act allows just about any landlord failure to be
brought into question,4' the court's potential scope of inquiry is greatly
broadened. With this widening of the scope of permissible inquiry, much
of the summary nature of the unlawful entry and detainer action will
probably be lost.
C. Self-Help
There are certainly occasions when a landlord is tempted to take matters
into his own hands, particularly where the local official responsible for
serving the summons and expelling the tenant is less than enthusiastic in
the exercise of his duty. And frequently there are bound to arise situations
where the landlord will go beyond a simple notice to quit and possibly push
into those uncharted grounds .of self-help. At the risk of some informality
one might conceive of a confrontation something like the following dia-
logue:
LANDLORD. All right, I told you a week ago to pay up or get out; besides you
know good and well you're not allowed animals in here. On top of that I told
you I was renting this place to you, your wife, and kids not half the city. Now
you and the rest of this crew get your stuff and move! Now!
TENANT. Now? We can't go right this second. Where'll we go?
LANDLORD. You've got friends, right?
TENANT. Sure I have friends...
LANDLORD. Well, move in with them like these deadbeats moved in with you.
TENANT. I've got no way to move all this stuff now.
LANDLORD. I'll move it for you. (Motioning to some strongarms close by).
Start loading this junk up boys, and when it's all out, I want you to dump it
40. See Davis v. Mayo, 82 Va. 97 (1886); Pannill v. Coles, 81 Va. 380 (1886); Power v.
Tazewells, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 786 (1875).
41. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.21-.30 (effective July 1, 1974).
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wherever he tells you (motioning to tenant).
TENANT. Man, I don't wanna...
LANDLORD. You, shut up and get a move on it!
(With nothing else said the eviction proceeds to completion).
Has there been a forcible entry? If yes, what remedies does the tenant
have, and to what extent is the landlord liable? If this is not a forcible
entry, and only a voluntary removal, how much further would the landlord
had to have gone to have committed the extralegal sin of self-help?
The question of whether there has been sufficient "force" to constitute
a forcible entry is difficult. While actually pushing in a door,4" removing a
lock, 3 or moving of tenant's possessions without permission44 all amount
to a forcible entry,4 5 it is not clear when, as posed in our dialogue, acquiesc-
ence to a landlord's intimidating exhortations becomes a forcible eviction.
While not dealing directly with a landlord-tenant relationship, the cases
of Grundy v. Gotf45 and Southern Railway Co. v. Lima Wood & Coal Co.47
shed substantial light on just when a tenant has suffered enough intimida-
tion to sustain an action of unlawful entry and detainer in Virginia. These
cases suggest that the essence of a forcible entry is dispossession of the
tenant against his will coupled with an apparent willingness of the landlord
to use force. It is unnecessary that there be actual violence or that the
landlord come to the brink of such violence, or even that there be threats
of force. There is a forcible entry where the tenant foregoes possession in
the reasonable belief that the landlord intends to take possession by what-
ever means necessary.
Where does that leave us in our hypothetical dialogue?It could be
argued either way. The tenant may urge that the words and actions of the
landlord reasonably suggested an "at all costs" intent, while the landlord
may argue that his was but the administration of strong doses of prodding,
and that the tenant never unequivocally said no. Certainly it would end
in a jury question, and at the risk of speculation, a sympathy verdict for
the tenant.
When lawyers are asked by a landlord/client if he can evict the tenant
himself, most would advise strongly against it. Yet as one observer noted:
Whether this advice is prompted by an unconscious adversion to nonjudicial
42. See, e.g., Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va. 819, 33 S.E.2d 643 (1945).
43. E.g., California Prods. Inc. v. Mitchell, 52 Cal. App. 312, 198 P. 646 (1921).
44. E.g., Phelps v. Randolph, 147 Ill. 335, 35 N.E. 243 (1893).
45. See generally Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 177 (1966) (this annotation gives an excellent over-
view of landlord self-help, but unfortunately without treatment of underlying jurisdictional
statutes important to an understanding of the cases noted).
46. 191 Va. 148, 60 S.E.2d 273 (1950).
47. 156 Va. 829, 159 S.E. 69 (1931).
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remedies or a conscious desire to avoid. . violence, it is highly unlikely that
it was prompted by a clear understanding of the client's civil and criminal
liabilities in such situations."
It is abundantly clear that force cannot be used by the landlord to regain
possession of his premises-the illegality of such action is the very essence
of Virginia's unlawful entry and detainer statute. But what sanction or
remedy does the unlawful entry and detainer statute provide where a forci-
ble entry has been committed by the landlord?
If. . .the plaintiff was forcibly or unlawfully turned out of possession,.
the verdict or judgment shall be for the plaintiff for the premises, . . . [and]
for such damages as the plaintiff may prove to have been sustained by him
by reason of such forcible or unlawful entry. . . . (emphasis added).49
Although it appears that a tenant forcibly ousted can recover both posses-
sion and any damages he may have suffered, apparently no court has ever
awarded the aggrieved tenant damages. In three cases ranging from 1925
to 1966, the courts have made it clear that the tenant could recover dam-
ages only where there had been "unreasonable force."5
Assuming that the object of the unlawful entry and detainer statute was
to prevent self-help, consider the effect of these three cases upon this leg-
islative goal. We observe a series of barriers as the tenant seeks redress for
his "reasonably forcible" eviction. Needing a place to stay, the tenant
might have been satisfied with an immediate return of possession, but in
the lawyer's office he is told that the very earliest he could recover pos-
session would be five days or so. Even then he is liable to be ousted by the
landlord legally in a very short period, assuming the landlord has been
entitled to possession all along. Faced with this state of affairs and the fact
that civil damages have been inaccessible, the Virginia tenant has been
quite likely to abandon all attempts at redress and seek shelter elsewhere.
Considering this lack of incentive for the tenant to pursue his remedy, one
cannot help but wonder how often confrontations like the one above have
gone untested, particularly where there have been no legal aid services
readily available to assert an indigent tenant's cause.
Doubtless some landlords will suggest that this is not a harsh result since
a tenant who is wrongfully holding over has no right to complain of force
that is not excessive and certainly should recover no damages. However,
48. Barnett, When the Landlord Resorts to Self-Help: A Plea for Clarification of the Law
in Florida, 19 FLA. L. REV. 238 (1966).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-793 (1957).
50. Kaufman v. Abramson, 363 F.2d 865 (4th Cir. 1966); Shorter v. Shelton, 183 Va. 819,




the statute was designed to discourage those face to face confrontations
between landlord and tenant which run a substantial risk of violence. A
possible way to give the unlawful entry and detainer statutes teeth and
thereby avoid the use of force is to give the tenant an incentive to seek
redress, but our courts' insistence upon following the common law immun-
ity of the landlord to civil damages makes it necessary to set forth even
more unequivocal language.
Such language has found expression in the Virginia Residential Land-
lord and Tenant Act. In a section specifically designated "Tenant's reme-
dies for landlord's unlawful ouster," the drafters provided that:
If the landlord unlawfully removes or excludes the tenant from the premises
• . . the tenant may recover possession or terminate the rental agreement
and. . . recover actual damages sustained by him and a reasonable attor-
ney's fee. (emphasis added).51
This recently enacted provision should give the unlawful entry and detai-
ner statute the teeth it needs to be effective. In contemporary society there
is clearly no room for the rough and tumble risks that self-help presents.
Anyone who would consider the use of Neanderthal methods to recover
possession rather than turn to duly appointed officials needs more admoni-
tion than a remote chance that a tenant may seek return to temporary
possession. It is commendable that the Virginia Assembly has recognized
this need and has added the risk of a sympathetic jury awarding substan-
tial damages as a deterrent to landlord self-help.
IX. FIXTURES
Frequently a dispute arises between a landlord and his tenant at the end
of the term when the tenant attempts to remove a chattel which he has
affixed to the realty and which the landlord claims as his because it has
become part of the realty. It is to this controversy that the law of fixtures
addresses itself. A fixture is personal property which by its attachment to
the realty becomes a part of the fee.' The English courts regarded any
chattel attached to the realty with apparent permanence as becoming a
fixture and not subject to removal by the tenant, despite the fact that it
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.26 (effective July 1, 1974).
1. Green v. Phillips, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 752 (1875). See generally 1 R. MINOR, REAL PROPERTY
§ 37 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928); 55 VA. L. REV. 1575 (1969). An important area of fixtures law
not treated in this work involves the perfection of a security interest in a fixture under the
Uniform Commercial Code. See Snead, New Tricks For Old Dogs, 2 RICH. L. NOTES 64 (1964).
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could be severed without serious injury to the freehold. 2 The American
courts, however, disenchanted with the harsh attachment test, adopted a
more flexible test of intention.3 Virginia and most American jurisdictions
apply the following criteria in determining whether a chattel becomes a
fixture: (1) actual annexation to the realty, (2) appropriation to the use of
that part of the realty with which it is connected, and (3) the intention of
the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the
freehold-this intention being inferred from the mode of annexation, the
relation of the annexor to the realty, the nature of the chattel affixed, and
the purpose of the annexation.'
It is important to understand that the intention referred to is not the
subjective intent of the annexor, but an objective or imputed intent in-
ferred from the factors listed above.5 Although modern opinions often indi-
cate that the mode of annexation is no longer the single criterion for de-
terming if a chattel has become a fixture,' it still plays a crucial role since
it serves as a basis from which to infer intent. For example, if the tenant
personally intends to remove certain chattels attached by him, he may lose
his right of removal despite his intent if the articles are attached so firmly
that severance would cause "substantial damage" to the realty.7 Thus, as
a practical matter the chief criterion by which intent is judged is the
amount of damage that would be inflicted upon the freehold were the
property severed."
Another important factor in the determination of objective intent is the
relation to the realty of the party making the annexation. Where the person
2. The justification for this rule was to protect the inheritance of the heir; however, it was
applied uniformly to all fixture cases, including situations involving divided ownership as in
the landlord-tenant relationship. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.2 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
3. 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (1967).
4. The leading American fixtures case from which this formula is derived is Teaffv. Hewitt,
1 Ohio St. 511 (1853). See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.3 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
Virginia cases apply the same formula. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Prince
William County, 210 Va. 550, 172 S.E.2d 757 (1970); Boiling v. Hawthorne Coal & Coke Co.,
197 Va. 554, 90 S.E.2d 159 (1955); Mullins v. Sturgill, 192 Va. 653, 66 S.E.2d 483 (1951);
Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S.E.2d 345 (1941); Newport News v.
Warwick County, 159 Va. 571, 166 S.E. 570 (1932); Green v. Phillips, 67 Va. (26 Gratt.) 752
(1875).
5. Mullins v. Sturgill, 192 Va. 653, 66 S.E.2d 483 (1951); Danville Holding Corp. v. Clem-
ent, 178 Va. 223, 16 S.E.2d 345 (1941).
6. E.g., Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S.E.2d 345 (1941).
7. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853); Roberts v. Yancey, 209 Va. 537, 165 S.E.2d 399
(1969); Graeme v. Cullen, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 266 (1873).
8. Substantial damage to the freehold is evidence of a strong indication that the tenant
intended to permanently annex the chattel. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); 34 CHI. L. REV. 617 (1967).
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attaching the chattel is the owner of the realty, the courts presume that it
was his intention to make a permanent accession to the freehold,9 reason-
ing that his design is to improve the property and enhance its rental value.
On the other hand, if it is the tenant who has affixed the chattel, there is
a general presumption that he did so for his own benefit and not to enrich
the freehold.'0
Finally, intent is inferred from the nature of the chattel affixed and the
purpose for which it was annexed. Under the prevailing view, articles
which the tenant has attached for his own domestic comfort are considered
personal in nature since they are not primarily adapted to the purpose of
the realty." For example, tenants have been permitted to remove furniture
and refrigerators,'2 venetian blinds,' 3 window shades," and ordinary mir-
rors'" even though they were attached to the realty. Where a proper exercise
of the tenant's right to remove a chattel causes damage to the realty, the
tenant must compensate the landlord for the injury because he is obligated
to return the premises in the same condition in which they were received.
Since a tenant has no intention of making a gift to the landlord, there is
no reason to allow a landlord to be unjustly enriched by retaining the
chattel. In such cases there is a strong policy for not treating the property
as fixtures.
Where, however, there is a stronger policy on the other side, for ex-
ample, protecting the landlord's freehold from serious injury, such leniency
9. E.g., Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Prince William County, 210 Va. 550, 172
S.E.2d 757 (1970); Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223, 16 S.E.2d 345 (1941).
Although these cases involved commercial leases the logic would also apply to the residential
situation.
10. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 142 U.S. 396 (1891); Van Ness v. Pacard, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 137 (1829).
11. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853). The second criterion of a fixture, namely
appropriation (or adaptation as it is called in Virginia) to the use of that part of the realty
with which it is connected, is important in trade fixture cases since the chattel may become
as essential part of a plant or mill; hoever, it is not relevant in residential cases as domestic
fixtures are usually capable of use in any residence and do not often become essential to the
freehold. See also Plough v. Petersen, 140 Cal. App. 2d 595, 295 P.2d 549 (1956).
12. Commercial Finance Co. v. Brooksville Hotel Co., 98 Fla. 410, 123 So. 814 (1929).
13. Kelieher v. Gravois, 26 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1946) (venetian blinds attached by brack-
ets screwed to window frames were held to be primarily intended for the use of the occupant
and not for the improvement of the building and therefore did not pass with sale of realty).
14. Hook v. Bolton, 199 Mass. 244, 85 N.E. 175 (1908).
15. Cranston v. Beck, 70 N.J.L. 145, 56 A. 121 (1903). Contra, Strain v. Green, 25 Wash.
2d 692, 172 P.2d 216 (1946) (because mirror was attached in such a manner that removal
would leave wall in rough state, it was considered part of the realty and passed with sale of
house).
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is not found. 6 Thus, chandeliers,' 7 wall-to-wall carpet,'" doors and win-
dows,'9 and other articles which are more permanently attached and less
easily removed, have been held to be fixtures. Due to the fact that inten-
tion is inferred from the mode of annexation, the relation of the annexor
to the realty, the nature of the chattel, and the purpose of the annexation
(factors which are quite often in conflict with one another), each case is
ultimately decided on its own particular facts and circumstances.
An agreement between a landlord and tenant is controlling on the ques-
tion of whether or not a chattel was intended to become a fixture. Thus,
the parties can guarantee that their true intention will prevail unaffected
by the rules discussed above. By such an agreement it is possible to ensure
that an article, which otherwise would be considered a fixture, will remain
the personal property of the tenant.2 ° Conversely, a chattel which ordinar-
ily would be removable by the tenant may, by an agreement, be retained
by the landlord as a part of the realty.2' When the express intent of the
parties is contained in the lease, any possible dispute is taken out of the
law of fixtures and is resolved by the law of contracts. In such a situation
the question is not one of intention as such, but one of construction, i.e.
whether the article falls within the contractual provision preventing or
permitting removal. 2
Agreements controlling the disposition of fixtures are subject to the im-
portant limitation that no absurdity or general inconvenience result from
the arrangement.23 Thus, despite the apparent desire on the part of the
16. See generally E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN RAL PROPERTY LAw 860 (1974); 1
R. MINOR REAL PROPERTY § 34 (2d ed. F. Ribble 1928).
17. Strain v. Green, 25 Wash. 2d 692, 172 P.2d 216 (1946).
18. Joiner v. Pound, 149 Neb. 321, 31 N.W.2d 100 (1948); Merchants & Mechanics Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Herald, 120 Ohio App. 115, 28 Ohio Op. 2d 302, 201 N.E.2d 237 (1964).
Contra, Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Black, 350 P.2d 514 (Okla. 1960) (holding wall-to-wall
carpeting attached to floor with small nails and cement around the edges was not so perma-
nently attached as to make it a part of the dwelling).
19. Slane v. Curtis, 41 Wyo. 402, 286 P.372 (1930), reh. denied, 41 Wyo. 417, 288 P.12 (1930)
(doors and windows are considered a part of the realty when affixed and are not removable
by tenant).
20. E.g., Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatres, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 167 S.E.2d 334 (1969); Bolin
v. Laderburg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S.E.2d 251 (1967); Tunis Lumber Co. v. Dennis Lumber Co.,
97 Va. 682, 34 S.E. 613 (1899).
21. Bolin v. Laderburg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S.E.2d 251 (1967).
22. E.g., Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatres, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 167 S.E.2d 334 (1969); Bolin
v. Laderburg, 207 Va. 795, 153 S.E.2d 251 (1967).
23. Sharlin v. Neighborhood Theatres, Inc., 209 Va. 718, 167 S.E.2d 334 (1969) involved a
dispute concerning the interpretation of a provision in the lease allowing the tenant to remove
"all such equipment, fixtures or furniture of whatsoever kind so installed or brought upon
the premises by the lessee ... " The court admitting that the agreement entitled the tenant
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judiciary to have the parties settle their fixture disputes in the lease, courts
will construe such clauses to prevent an absurd or harsh result. This limita-
tion has been applied extensively to commercial leases, and there seems
to be no reason why it could not be used to prevent unfair results in a
residential context. For example, if a tenant signs a standard form lease
containing a clause to the effect that any article attached to the realty
passes to the landlord upon termination of the term, he may be forfeiting
valuable property despite the fact that removal would cause only slight
damage to the freehold. To prevent such an unjustified loss to the tenant,
the courts could construe the clause as being applicable only to those
chattels so permanently attached as to become a part of the realty. The
same end could have been reached under the proposed draft of the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, but the section providing for the
unenforceability of unconscionable provisions24 was not included in the
enacted legislation. Of course, if the clause had been a bargaining point
in the negotiations for the lease, the parties should be held to a strict
adherence to the terms of their contract.
Even where a tenant may properly remove chattels affixed by him to the
realty, he must exercise this right within the time prescribed by law (or
the lease) or he will forfeit the fixtures to the landlord. Under a tenancy
for a fixed period the tenant is required to remove his fixtures before he
surrenders possession of the premises. 25 Where the term is indefinite, the
removal must take place within a reasonable time after the termination of
the tenancy.2 The strict rules concerning the time for removal of fixtures
grew out of an ancient English concept that the tenant's fixtures, due to
attachment, belonged to the landlord subject to a limited right of removal
in the tenant.2 7 However, under the modern, and better view, which recog-
nizes that a tenant's removable fixtures remain his personal property, the
rule seems incongruous.2 8 Unless his actions constitute abandonment, a
to remove fixtures "of whatsoever kind," recognized that agreements of this type must be
interpreted to prevent any absurdity or general inconvenience. Thus, despite the clear lan-
guage of the clause, the court upheld the landlord's recovery for the removal of fixtures so
attached to the building that the parties could not have conceivably intended them to be
removed by the tenant. See also Boling v. Hawthorne Coal & Coke Co., 197 Va. 554, 90
S.E.2d 159 (1955); Tunis Lumber Co. v. Dennis Lumber Co., 97 Va. 682, 34 S.E. 613 (1899).
24. HOUSE BILL No. 220 § 55-248.6 (offered Jan. 28, 1974).
25. Graeme v. Cullen, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 266 (1873). 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952). When the tenant is holding over rightfully he should be allowed to
remove his chattels any time before surrendering possession. Andrews v. Williams, 115 Colo.
478, 173 P.2d 882 (1946).
26. 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
27. Niles, The Rationale of the Law of Fixtures: English Cases, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. 560 (1934).
28. See 5 AMIERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.11 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
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tenant does not lose ownership in ordinary chattels in this manner. The
justification given for the forfeiture rule is the inconvenience to the land-
lord if the tenant were allowed to return to the property and remove his
annexations." However, in many cases forfeiture will unduly punish the
tenant and give the landlord a windfall.
A.J. Casner cites two Arkansas cases as offering a more flexible solution.
In the first, the court held that a tenant's mere delay in removing his
fixtures, without consequent injury to the landlord, would not justify a
forfeiture. 3 The other suggested that a tenant who left removable fixtures
on the land could later remove them if he compensated the landlord for
any damage or inconvenience caused by the delayed removal.3 1 Although
these cases involved commercial leases, the concepts would be even
more adaptable to the residential situation where the tenant's fixtures
usually increase the rental value of the premises. This approach appears
more reasonable in that it fulfills the original purpose of the forfeiture rule
by adequately protecting the landlord, while avoiding an unfair loss to the
tenant.
Where a tenant wrongfully removes fixtures the landlord may recover
damages for the value of the fixtures removed and for any injury to the
premises caused by the removal.3 2 If the remedy at law is inadequate,
the landlord may obtain an injunction to prevent such removal. 3 So too,
where the landlord is wrongfully retaining chattels, the tenant has an
action for the fixtures or their value and for any damage incurred due to
his being deprived of their use. 34 A tenant may also obtain an injunction
29. Id.
30. McLean v. Wells, 207 Ark. 303, 180 S.W.2d 325 (1944) (although the lease in this case
allowed the tenant a reasonable time in which to remove his fixtures, the concept of no
injury-no forfeiture warrants recognition by other courts).
31. Hoing v. River Valley Gas Co., 196 Ark. 1165, 121 S.W.2d 513 (1938) (despite the fact
that a trade fixture was left on premises for seven years, tenant was allowed to remove it upon
payment of a rental fee to compensate the landlord for his inconvenience).
32. Remedies for waste committed by the tenant are set out in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-211,
-214, -216 (Repl. Vol. 1969). For a recent commercial case, see Roberts v. Yancey, 209 Va.
537, 165 S.E.2d 399 (1969) (where tenant wrongfully removed lighting fixtures, paneling, and
canopies for a false ceiling, all permanently attached).
33. Roanoke Marble & Granite Co. v. Standard Gas & Oil Supply Co., 155 Va. 249, 154
S.E. 518 (1930) (remedy for damages held not exclusive, and lower court erred in dismissing
suit to enjoin tenant from removing a large oil tank from premises). See also VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-216 (Repl. Vol. 1969).
34. Beebe v. Richards, 115 Cal. App. 2d 589, 252 P.2d 688, 20 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1953) (where
tenant who operated beauty salon was prevented by the landlord from removing her equip-
ment, tenant recovered possession of some fixtures, the value of those disposed of, and
damages for lost income due to being deprived of her tools of trade); Mullins v. Sturgill, 192
Va. 653, 66 S.E.2d 483 (1951) (plaintiffs as mine operators under lease agreement put equip-
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to protect his interest if the legal remedy is inadequate.3 5
Cases involving commercial fixture disputes are numerous due to the
great value of many trade fixtures. On the other hand, many disputes in
the residential landlord-tenant area do not mature into cases because they
involve only a nominal dollar amount when compared to the cost of litiga-
tion. In effect, an aggrieved tenant or landlord is left without a practical
judicial remedy. Thus, one of the greatest shortcomings of the judicial
system in Virginia and in other states is the lack of any mechanism for
handling small disputes such as those involving domestic fixtures. A pos-
sible solution to this problem is the creation of a commission armed with
quasi-judicial authority to handle disputes between a landlord and tenant.
Such an organization already exists in Fairfax County, Virginia. 36 In addi-
tion, a similar course of action was recommended under the proposed
Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, but this section was de-
leted from the final draft. 3 This approach, which avoids placing an addi-
tional burden on the juridicary system, would be an important step in the
solution of one of the problem areas in the landlord-tenant relationship.
The most glaring weakness in the present system of resolving fixture
disputes is the lack of flexibility. Although the intention test takes into
consideration the circumstances of the particular case, a finding that re-
moval of a chattel attached by the tenant would cause "substantial
damage" to the freehold results in the landlord owning the fixture, despite
the fact that the landlord may be getting an unmerited windfall. 3 In addi-
tion, the possibility of reimbursement by the tenant is not considered
relevant in determining whether damage to the realty is substantial.39 An-
other example of inflexibility arises in the situation where a tenant loses
ment upon premises, and upon termination of operations, a subsequent lessee began using
the equipment-plaintiff was allowed to recover the value of the property).
35. Hershberger v. Johnson, 37 Ore. 109, 60 P. 838 (1900) (where boiler, engine, and sawmill
were placed on land under lease providing they would not become part of the realty and
plaintiff's assignor purchased them as personalty, plaintiff might enjoin sheriff from levying
on the property under a subsequent attachment against the property as realty). See also
Mullins v. Sturgill, 192 Va. 653, 66 S.E.2d 483 (1951) (where defendant's demurrer to bill
praying for injunctions was sustained on the ground the remedy at law was adequate).
36. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA. CODE § 15 E (1973). This body is empowered to investigate the
facts and attempt a conciliation between the parties. If settlement fails, it then presides over
a public hearing and reaches a decision. Failure to comply is deemed a violation of the
ordinance.
37. House BILL No. 220 § 55-248.40 (offered Jan. 28, 1974).
38. Roberts v. Yancey, 209 Va. 537, 165 S.E.2d 399 (1969) (where removal of fixtures
attached by tenant would cause material injury to premises, it was not error to instruct jury
that the landlord was entitled to the improved value even though it might result in returning
the building to the landlord in better condition than when it was received by the tenant).
39. 34 U. CHI. L. REV. at 624 (1967).
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his chattels by not removing them in the time allowed by law. 0 Here again
the landlord may be unjustly enriched if the value of the fixture outweighs
the inconvenience suffered by the landlord. An alternative to the tradi-
tional rules, which merely establish which party shall own the fixture,
would be to allow removal conditioned upon the tenant reimbursing the
landlord for any inconvenience due to delay or damage caused by sever-
ance. This system would accomplish the desired result of avoiding a loss
to the landlord and at the same time prevent an unfair forfeiture from
being worked on the tenant. Where money damages would be insufficient
to protect the landlord's interests, he could obtain suitable equitable relief.
X. THE INDIGENT TENANT
In Virginia, the indigent tenant has gone largely unnoticed by case and
statutory law. Invariably he is trapped where he resides, in substandard,
deteriorating, and oft-times uninhabitable housing. Although able to fer-
ret out the money to pay the rent, he cannot afford to move away and find
better lodging.
A. Tenant Remedies
Traditionally, common law and state legislatures have sought to protect
the landlord, to the point of ignoring the plight of the indigent. The indi-
gent tenant has always had to accept the demised premises in their present
condition. All too often the dwelling is simply uninhabitable, and the
indigent has been forced to remain rather than to take to the streets. The
heart of the problem lies in the acute shortage of low-income housing
available to the indigent. Unscrupulous landlords have taken advantage
of this situation in that they have not been required to warrant the habita-
bility of the premises, and have been content to sit by while once-suitable
housing stock deteriorates. If the indigent was assured habitable low-
income housing, the labors of his predicament would be less strenuous.
Although warranty of habitability has been created in Virginia by the
newly enacted Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act,' this legisla-
tion cannot be fully appreciated without an understanding of the case law
development under this doctrine.
Bolstered by the doctrine of caveat emptor, common law declared that
40. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55.248-55.248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
[Vol. 8:459
LANDLORD AND TENANT
there was no implied warranty of habitability at the beginning of the
tenancy.2 Important exceptions have arisen 3 however, and today the doc-
trine of caveat emptor as it is applicable in a landlord/tenant relationship
may be said to be somewhat eroded.' As a result, although many jurisdic-
tions have not yet adopted the notion that the landlord impliedly warrants
the habitability of the rented premises throughout the tenancy,5 an in-
creasing number of courts have found sound bases for support of such a
warranty.'
Where a doctrine of implied habitability is recognized, the indigent who
is faced with condemnable housing may be allowed to withhold partial
payment of the rent in an effort to induce the landlord to make needed
repairs. In Pines v. Perssion,7 the court authorized such a procedure by
declaring that the landlord's implied warranty of habitability and the
tenant's covenant to pay rent were mutually dependent. Expanding on the
contractual concept of a lease, Marini v. Ireland' held that the tenant need
2. Hughes v. Westchester Dev. Corp., 77 F.2d 550 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Fisher v. Lighthall, 15
D.C. (4 Macky) 82 (1885); Slabe v. Beyer, 149 A.2d 788 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1959); Hariston
v. Washington Housing Corp., 45 A.2d 287 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1946); Caudill v. Gibson Fuel
Co., 185 Va. 233, 38 S.E.2d 465 (1946).
3. The most notable exception dealt with furnished houses let for temporary purposes:
Young v. Povich, 121 Me. 141,116 A. 26 (1922); Horton v. Marston, 352 Mass. 322, 225 N.E.2d
311 (1967); Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31 N.E. 286 (1892); Morgenthau v. Ehrich, 77
Misc. 139, 136 N.Y.S. 140 (1912). See Comment, Implied Warranty of Habitability in Lease
of Furnished Premises for Short Term: Erosion of Caveat Emptor, 3 U. RiCm. L. REv. 322
(1969).
4. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
5. Parris v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 359 F.2d 612 (6th Cir. 1966); Pointer v. American Oil Co.,
295 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Ind. 1969); Thomas v. Roper, 162 Conn. 343, 294 A.2d 321 (1972);
Cameron v. Calhoun-Smith Distrib. Co., 442 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Oliver v.
Cashin, 192 Va. 540, 65 S.E.2d 571 (1951); Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 56 S.E.2d 637
(1949); Powell v. Orphanage, 148 Va. 331, 138 S.E. 637 (1927); Teglo v. Porter, 65 Wash. 2d
772, 399 P.2d 519 (1965).
6. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925
(1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972); Jack Spring, Inc. v.
Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Reed
v. Classified Parking Sys., 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970); Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App.
458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971); Berzito v.
Gambino, 114 N.J. Super. 124, 274 A.2d 865 (Dist. Ct. 1971); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130,
265 A.2d 526 (1970); Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Glyco
v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961).
7. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
8. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). Marini proffers a modern viewpoint of the land-
lord/tenant relationship in salient language, at page 534:
In a modern setting, the landlord should, in residential letting, be held to an implied
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not always interpret the landlord's breach of his "contractual" obligation
as constructive eviction, giving him the right to vacate and cease paying
rent. Under the Marini view, the tenant might prefer to put his rent pay-
ments toward restoring the housing to habitable standards. On the other
hand, Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,9 and to some extent Pines
before it, derived a warranty of habitability from legislative and social
policy as evidenced by applicable housing and health codes.
Prior to the Residential Landlord and Tenant Act's passage, various
Virginia municipalities had taken the initiative in establishing health
and/or housing ordinances, which have to some extent regulated the land-
lord/tenant relationship, while at the same time founding a legislative
basis from which to infer that an implied warranty of habitability indeed
did exist. It is arguable, however, that such a warranty, whether implied
from local ordinances or as set forth in the Residential Landlord and Ten-
ant Act, does not solve the indigent's problems, but rather serves to con-
fuse them. It does not help the indigent to tell him that he can vacate
under the guise of constructive eviction and not have to pay the rent, for
he will have nowhere else to go. It does not help the indigent to know he
can withhold rental payments and put the money toward repair, for the
amount of rent withheld may not suffice to accomplish the major repairs
necessary to make the premises habitable.
How then is the indigent tenant to proceed in raising the condition of
his lodging to a habitable standard? The Code of Virginia previously of-
fered minimal aid; there was only one statute that pertained to housing
regulations, and it addressed itself exclusively to the installation of a
suitable toilet.'0
There are, however, enforcement provisions in the different municipal
covenant against latent defects, which is another manner of saying, habitability and
livability fitness. It is a mere matter of semantics whether we designated this cove-
nant one "to repair" or "of habitability and livability fitness." Actually it is a covenant
that at the inception of the lease, there are no latent defects in facilities vital to the
use of the premises for residential purposes because of faulty original construction or
deterioration from age or normal usage. And further it is a covenant that these facilities
will remain in usable condition during the entire term of the lease. In performance of
this covenant the landlord is required to maintain these facilities in a condition which
renders the property livable.
9. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925. Accord, Mease v. Fox, 200
N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972); Kline v. Bums, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248 (1971).
10. If any landlord shall fail to supply any house of his with a sanitary privy or closet
as required by this section, his tenant shall supply the same in conformity with the
orders of a health officer or health inspector and may deduct the cost thereof from any
sum due the landlord for rent.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32-64 (1950).
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ordinances throughout the state, and the indigent can pursue these pos-
sible remedies. Housing ordinances have taken either of two basic ap-
proaches promulgated to cope with the situation. Several of the larger,
more populated counties in northern Virginia have established Tenant-
Landlord Commissions to supervise the maintenance of minimum housing
standards." The Certificate of Compliance, an alternative method adopted
by the city of Portsmouth, and more recently Richmond, seeks to preserve
the cities' deteriorating housing stock as well as to insure habitable stan-
dards in rental units.'2
Prior to the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, the "Com-
mission" method was based upon a complaint being filed with that body,
alleging a violation of a health or housing ordinance. Now, both parties to
the dispute must desire mediation from the Commission before any recon-
ciliation of the problem can be achieved. The "Certificate of Compliance"
route, however, requires an inspection at the beginning of every new ten-
11. FAIRFAX COUNTY, VA., CODE art. VIII, § 15E-32 (1973). This particular section sets
forth the conduct of Fairfax's landlord/tenant Commission. The Commission receives com-
plaints, and its executive director is charged with making inspections. Emphasis is directed
at mediation and conciliation. However, if no agreement can be voluntarily reached, the
Commission will schedule a public hearing to determine whether or not a violation of the
housing ordinances exists. Upon such determination, the Commission, in a quasi-judicial
manner, may take the proper enforcement action.
Arlington County, although leaving the duties of inspecting to the County Manager, has
also established a landlord/tenant Commission to serve as a clearinghouse of information on
rental problems. The Commission has played an active mediatory role, seeking informal
conciliation of rental disputes.
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act has clouded the future of the "Commis-
sion approach." Although it allows local ordinances to remain in effect, the act strips the
Commission of its quasi-judicial power in solving rental disputes. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-
248.3 (effective July 1, 1974).
12. The focus of the Certificate of Compliance concept is on the landlord's legal require-
ment of obtaining the certificate, thus demonstrating that the rental premises meet the
housing regulations of that locale. A new tenant cannot take possession until such a certificate
is awarded to the landlord.
A Certificate of Compliance ordinance has been in effect in Portsmouth since February of
1972, and has been a burden or boon, depending upon to whom one talks. A key feature of
the Portsmouth law is the stipulation that the compliance be made and the certificate be
awarded before the Virginia Electric and Power Company be allowed to turn on the electricity
for that unit. Some landlords have been able to circumvent this by obtaining one electric
meter to serve the entire apartment dwelling, rather than deploying one meter to service one
apartment unit.
Richmond's plan, patterned after the Basic Housing-Property Maintenance Code (pub-
lished by Building Officials and Code Administrators International, Inc., a non-profit munici-
pal service organization) is brand new. Introduced in January of 1974, the Richmond ordi-
nance is a comprehensive effort to effectiely preserve urban Richmond's housing stock. Rich-
mond chose the Certificate of Compliance concept as the best means of enforcing the mini-
mum housing standards embodied in the ordinance.
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ancy."1 While the Certificate of Compliance ordinance removes from the
tenant the burden of reporting a violation, and to that extent diminishes
the spectre of the landlord's retaliatory action,'4 opponents assert that its
result will be a drastic decline in available housing for the low-income
tenant. ,5
Both approaches are based upon a comprehensive Minimum Housing
Standards Law,'" and such ordinances are ordinarily so detailed as to cover
items ranging from proper specifications of a mandatory vertical bolt dead-
lock 17 to the permissible lead percentage in the paint used.'8 Most areas of
the state do not have such a comprehensive housing ordinance, but are
contented with a hodgepodge of health and building ordinances. Thus, the
tenant, especially the indigent, finds that many of his grievances are not
legitimate in a legal sense. 9 The need for statewide housing standards and
regulations is glaring."0
But just how beneficial are housing ordinances to the indigent? The
cause of action against the landlord is in the appropriate governmental
13. Most Certificate of Compliance ordinances also call for a periodic inspection (every five
years under the Richmond ordinance, if there is a light tenant turnover).
14. Fear of retaliatory action from the landlord is generally thought to be the most inhibit-
ing factor in the indigent's quest for habitable housing. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d
753 (1971).
15. Opponents of the Certificate of Compliance method have always contended that the
typical landlord would prefer to close down his operation rather than finance such major
repairs as might be called for in a compliance inspection. Richmond City Councilman Way-
land Rennie argues that the compliance ordinance is flexible enough to cope with this poten-
tial problem. Mr. Rennie cites a provision (Ordinance No. 73-294, § 24.1-5) which allows less
than full compliance, "when immediate or full compliance will cause undue hardship upon
the owner or occupant."
16. Often in a discussion of the relative merits of each to enforce that housing law, one
tends to overlook the significance of a municipality's having such an ordinance in the first
place.
17. ARLINGTON COUNTY, VA., CODE, ch. 29, § 5.8 (1972).
18. Richmond, Va,, Ordinance 73-294, art. 2, § 24-6, January 14, 1974.
19. The Metro Richmond Housing Coalition (a network of Richmond area civic groups
organized by HOMEWORK, a body formed for the betterment of all housing in Richmond)
states in Section HI of a report issued on June 24, 1973, in support of adoption of a certificate
of compliance law:
• . . while the present code requires an owner to eradicate vermin and rodent infesta-
tion in dwellings occupied by two or more people, there is presently no requirement
that the owner provide adequate trash receptacles and removal which may be a prime
cause of such infestation. In addition to lacking the comprehensiveness of the proposed
ordinance, the existing law provides nothing more than a bandaid approach to the
inspection of housing to insure the maintenance of minimum living conditions.
20. The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act only regulates the legal relationship
between a tenant and the landlord; it does not address itself to the qualitative standards of
the housing, beyond the requirement that the landlord maintain fit premises.
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agency, not the tenant. The indigent tenant can literally not afford the
delays involved in the series of public hearings, inspections, and appeals
which normally follow a housing complaint." The indifferent treatment
with which such complaints are received further serves to discourage the
indigent from crying out.2 Additionally, there is the underlying fear that
the landlord will pay his fine and risk condemnation of the dwelling rather
than spend the larger amount of money needed for the prescribed repairs,
thereby threatening to deprive the indigent of his already meager shelter.
If a civil action were available to the indigent tenant, he might stand a
better chance of improving the condition of his housing. Although the so-
called tort of slumlordism is foreign to Virginia courts, the concept has
emerged in several other jurisdictions.n The leading case of Quesenbury v.
Patrick24 determined the elements of such a tort:
1. existence of a valid housing code;
2. provision in the code for criminal liability;
3. notice of the defects to the landlord;
4. failure of the landlord to make repairs within a reasonable time; and,
5. damage to the victim as a result of the failure to repair.•
Quesenbury is also notable in that it considers the economical and educa-
21. ARLINGTON COUNTY, VA., CODE, ch. 29, § 11 sets forth the enforcement procedure for
that county. Once a violation of the housing ordinance has been established, the landlord has
a reasonable time within which to make the repairs. After that, there will be a second
inspection to validate the repair job. But, if the landlord had wanted to object to the first
violation notice, all he need do was petition for a public hearing. One envisions weeks going
by before the tenant derives any satisfaction from his initial complaint.
22. Housing disputes in Richmond are currently nestled in with the regular Police Court
docket on Thursday mornings, and from casual observation one would tend to think the judge
pays closer attention to crime than overflowing toilets.
The Metropolitan Legal Aid office in Richmond commented that at least 50% of fines levied
in court amount to nothing more than court costs.
23. Quesenbury v. Patrick, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 7683, at 352 (No. 68942, Colo. Dist.
Ct., El Paso County, June 8, 1972); Littlefield v. Rice, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH
Pov. L. REP. 10,524, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 2568, at 238 (Me. Super. Ct., complaint
undated); Rose v. Hewes Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 2410, at 142 (No. 393347, Cal. Super.
Ct., Alameda County, Sept. 16, 1969).
24. 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 7683, at 352 (No. 68942, Colo. Dist. Ct., El Paso County,
June 8, 1972).
25. An almost philosophical justification for the establishment of just this type of slumlord
tort has been offered:
• . . one who undertakes to perform a service for his own economic benefit, but who
performs it in a way both inconsistent with those standards which represent minimum
social goals as to decent treatment and in a manner that itself is violative of the law,
under circumstances where the victim had no meaningful alternative but to deal with
him, commits a tort for which substantial damages ought to lie. Sax & Hiestand,
Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869, 890 (1967).
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tional background of the tenant in figuring the proper measure of dam-
ages.216 The tort of slumlordism is not envisioned as one founded upon
negligence, or even negligence per se, but rather one which imposes strict
liability.27
Slumlordlsm represents the legal frontier in offering the tenant innova-
tive means by which to encourage enforcement of housing codes, and at
this point has been discussed in more law review articles28 than courts.
Such a tort remedy has, however, been actively pursued on several differ-
ent grounds; complaints have alleged that the landlord's violation of the
housing code constitutes actionable nuisance,2 9 or intentional infliction of
mental distress.30 Although the mental distress theory introduces the as-
pect of punitive damages, there remains the problem of proof and the
establishment of proximate cause.3' An action in nuisance would appear
well founded, but remains largely untried.
The tort of slumlordism is a controversial concept, and there is yet
insufficient case law from which one could predict a secure future. But
slumlordism does offer a possible alternative in attempting to enforce
housing codes, and close examination by Virginia courts as to its develop-
ment is warranted.32
26. Listed in Quesenbury v. Patrick, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 7683, at 352 (No. 68942,
Colo. Dist. Ct., El Paso County, June 8, 1972), as elements influencing the amount of dam-
ages are:
(a) plaintiff's lack of education or financial ability to move
(b) widespread practice of the landlord's rental policy
(c) financial loss suffered by the victim.
27. See Comment, Housing Codes and a Tort of Slumlordism, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 522, 540
(1971).
28. See Blum & Dunham, Slumlordism as a Tort-A Dissenting View, 66 MICH. L. REv.
451 (1968); Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 Ill. B.J. 204 (1969); Sax,
Slumlordism as a Tort-A Brief Response, 66 MICH. L. REv. 465 (1968); Sav & Hiestand,
Slumlordism as a Tort, 65 MICH. L. REV. 869 (1967).
29. Ball v. Tobeler, 6 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 4988, at 353 (No. 2 Civ. 38424, Cal. Ct. App.,
filed March 27, 1972).
30. Rose v. Hughes Co., 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. No. 2410, at 142 (No. 393347, Cal. Super.
Ct. Alameda County, Sept. 16, 1969).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46 (1966), which states: "One who by extreme and
outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress . ... "
31. See also Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL. B.J. 204, 210 (1969).
32. Although the tort of slumlordism seems to attract attention in more liberal jurisdic-
tions, it offers some advantages which Virginians should not ignore. Slumlordism is a tenant
initiated remedy, and it would give the indigent an opportunity to recover for past wrongs
done to him. Even if such a tort is ultimately unworkable, it may spark legislative reforms
aimed at the true slumlandlord.
See Falick, A Tort Remedy for the Slum Tenant, 58 ILL. B.J. 204, 212 (1969).
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Aside from the constant worry of finding money to meet the rent, the
indigent's biggest problem is coping with the landlord who seeks to evict
him or increase his rent in some retaliatory action.3 It can be of minimal
satisfaction to the indigent to finally bring the deficient landlord to justice
on one day and receive an eviction notice the next.
The tenant's best defense to retaliatory activity laid in two distinct
directions prior to the passage of the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act. Following the lead of Edwards v. Habib,34 many jurisdictions
upheld a defense of retaliatory eviction on grounds of public policy and
interpretation of housing ordinances.3 5 To allow a landlord's retaliatory
action, Edwards reasoned, would frustrate the effectiveness of the housing
code to upgrade the quality of housing. An abuse of process action, with
the allurement of punitive damages, might serve the tenant well. 6 And at
least one court has said that the doctrine of retaliatory eviction can be used
affirmatively to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of men-
tal distress.3 1 Other courts had based the defense upon constitutional
grounds .3 Now, the new Act has specifically made such retaliatory prac-
tices illegal, and the Virginia tenant is uniformly protected.
33. "Faced with the prospect of summary eviction in retaliation for their efforts, tenants
have been reluctant to seek enforcement of housing and sanitary code provisions or other legal
rights arising under the lease or the laws of the municipal, state or federal government.
Accordingly, the effort to eliminate substandard conditions and uninhabitable dwelling units
from the urban housing market has been seriously inhibited." Developments in Contempo-
rary Landlord-Tenant Law: An Annotated Bibliography, 26 VAND. L. REv. 689, 707 (1973).
34. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016 (1968).
35. The public policy considerations lie in the desirability of having the existing housing
codes effectively enforced. F.W. Berens Sales Co. v. McKinney, 41 U.S.L.W. 2303 (D.C.
Super. Ct., Nov. 21, 1972); Schweiger v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 729 (1970); Riley v. Willette, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 12,263
(Mich. Dist. Ct. 1968); Botko v. Cooper [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP.
11,549 (Minn. Mun. Ct. 1970); Alexander Hamilton Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Whaley, 107 N.J.
Super. 89, 257 A.2d 7 (1969); Markese v. Cooper, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972);
Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Birmingham City Ct. 1968).
36. See Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 GEO. L.J.
519, 547 (1966).
37. Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971).
38. Those constitutional grounds deal with the first and fourteenth amendments. McQueen
v. Druker, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971); Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544 (1971);
Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615 (1970); Church v.
Allen Meadows Apartments, 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Bergdoll v.
McKinney, [1968-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH Pov. L. REP. 11,360 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Dick-
hut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
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But regardless of the legal protection made available to the tenant,
anxiety and apprehension as to retaliation still provide the vengeful land-
lord with a powerful psychological weapon.
B. Landlord Problems
Heretofore the landlord has been couched in terms connoting the true
slumlord, one in the business of exploiting the indigent status of others.
However, an emphasis on the problems of the tenant should not obscure
the very real problems of the landlord in the indigent situation. It is the
landlord, not the tenant, who is responsible for the condition of the build-
ing he rents, and a tenant's utter disrespect for property can cause the
landlord severe financial headaches. It is very difficult for the landlord to
keep the premises in proper statutory repair, if the day after the repair, a
tenant, for some unascertainable reason, creates by his irresponsible action
another batch of housing violations. 9
Back at his office Miller showed me his accountant's report for the year. For
the building just inspected, taxes, mortgage payments and repairs totaled
$10,425. His income: $7,206 ....
"If I'd had no vacancies, of course, I would at least have broken even. But
they just come and go and they don't give a damn about the building. I pray
every day that the city will condemn all three of these buildings for a housing
project and maybe I'll get my money back . .. ."
• . All over the country owners of slum buildings recite the same litany:
"The day after I plaster a wall the hole is back again. . . . The tenants toss
garbage out of the widow . . . . Kids break windows for kicks.
... I have to pay off the cops and inspectors . ... "
Many of these people inherited one, two, three dwellings. The value of their
property kept falling, and now a lot of the buildings can't be sold at all. Many
of the slum tenements are owned by people who live in them. Some put up
their savings years ago to buy a "safe" long-term investment-and got caught
by declining values, high mortgages, and repair bills that never stop.
Far from being a cigar-smoking Daddy Slumbucks living in splendor off the
misery of the poor, the next slum owner you meet may offer to give you a
building. 0
Presumably, the landlord has a civil remedy against a tenant who destroys
his property, but only rarely would the landlord collect on his judgment
against the genuine indigent.4 It is clear that landlords should not take
39. See SATURDAY EVENING POST, Vol. 239, Dec. 17, 1966, at 8 (reprinted with permission,
J. CASNER & B. LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 508 (2d ed. 1969)).
40. Id., at 509.
41. For example, a Certificate of Compliance ordinance (note 12 supra) would seem to give
the landlord the legal advantage of proclaiming for all to see that the premises were indeed
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advantage of indigent tenants, and certainly rented premises should be
maintained in habitable condition, but it is important to remember that
the landlord himself may well be a victim of low-income housing.
C. Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
Broadly speaking, the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
structures and regulates the landlord-tenant relationship. Although the
Act's provisions are obviously meant to include the indigent, there has
been some criticism suggesting that the Act does not take a realistic view
of the indigent's problems.
2
Some fear that it will promote litigation where a more effective means
of redress might be a more informal mediation of the dispute. Although
the Act would protect the indigent from landlord retaliation, often he
cannot afford a lengthy court struggle, and it seems likely that he will
remain frustrated if relief is not readily available.
An escrow provision" seeks to coerce the landlord to make the necessary
repairs to upgrade the quality of the housing, and this does tend to offer
the middle-income tenant a real remedy. But if the housing is sub-
standard and in need of major repair, the landlord may prefer to get out
of the renting business altogether. The indigent's plight can only be wors-
ened if less low-income housing is on the market in the future.
Whether or not the indigent is the forgotten man of the Virginia Residen-
tial Landlord and Tenant Act remains to be seen. What is clear, however,
is the basic need for more and better low-income housing. If the newly
enacted law helps to alleviate this problem, then the indigent's condition
will be improved.
fit at the beginning of the tenancy. If, at the end of the tenancy, a compliance inspection
necessitated repair work being done on the premises, the inspector should logically make the
tenant responsible. But one should remember that it is the habitability of the dwelling which
is the prime concern of the city, not who is at fault in causing the state of disrepair. Therefore,
the landlord might still be saddled with the obligation to repair, before any certificate of
compliance will be issued and the frustrated landlord allowed to re-let.
42. A Charlottesville landlord commented at the public hearing concerning the Virginia
Residential Landlord and Tenant Act that under the proposed law, "tenants have better
rights than squatters." This testimony is representative of a dissenting feeling that the bill
seeks to impose too high a standard on the landlord in a low-income housing situation.
Presently, only a certain percentage of one's welfare check is allotted to housing. If, to
maintain his premises in statutory fitness, the lessor of sub-standard housing has to raise his
rent to meet the costs of repairs, the low-income tenant might well find himself priced right
out of the available housing market. It is just this kind of backfiring potential that has led
opponents to assert that the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act does not treat the
indigent situation in a realistic fashion.
43. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.27-55-248.30 (effective July 1, 1974).
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D. The Public Sector
If the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is unsuccessful, and
the private sector indeed cannot cope with the problem of providing ade-
quate housing for the low-income category of tenant, the public sector
appears structured to undertake the task. The United States Housing Act
of 193711 established a federally-assisted public housing program to be
administered on a local level. In addition, the federal government furnishes
mortgage insurance and interest subsidy payments in a program 5 designed
to construct low-income housing. And in 1972 the legislature in Virginia
created its own housing agency, the Virginia Housing Development Au-
thority. 6
It would indeed be a shame if the public sector were to take over landlord
responsbilities by default, for such would indicate a lack of flexibility in
the private enterprise system to get the job done. While the root of this
inflexibility is difficult to discern, if the proper economic incentive were
provided, perhaps in the form of a tax benefit,47 the private sector might
respond by making low-income housing more plentiful.
XI. THE VIRGINIA RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT AcT
On the last day of the 1974 session of the General Assembly, the Virginia
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. (1970). Section 1401 provides:
It is the policy of the United States to vest in the local public housing agencies the
maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent housing pro-
gram, including responsibility for the establishment of rents and eligibility require-
ments (subject to approval of the Authority), with due consideration to accomplishing
the objectives of this chapter while effecting economies.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1970). This is better known as the "§ 236 program."
46. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-55.24 - 55.52 (Cum. Supp. 1973). Section 36-55.25 sets forth the
purpose for such a housing authority:
It is further declared that in order to provide a fully adequate supply of sanitary and
safe dwelling accommodations at rents, prices, or other costs which such persons or
families can afford the legislature finds that it is necessary to create and establish a
state housing development authority for the purpose of encouraging the investment of
private capital and stimulating the construction and rehabilitation of residential hous-
ing to meet the needs of such persons and families through the use of public financing,
to provide construction and mortgage loans and to make provision for the purchase of
mortgage loans and otherwise.
47. One hopefully feasible theory has the owner of an apartment complex benefiting from
a substantial tax break in return for his offering low-income tenants a certain percentage of
his dwelling units at an affordable price. Such a plan would have the duel effect of providing
more and improved housing for the indigent, while accomplishing a kind of economic integra-
tion of tenants in the same process.
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Residential Landlord and Tenant Act passed both Houses.' Its passage is
particularly significant for three reasons: (1) presently almost 50% of Vir-
ginia's population resides in rental dwellings, (2) our antiquated laws fail
miserably to provide a system capable of adequately defining the rights
and duties of landlords and tenants in today's increasingly urban context
and (3) the new Act is the first substantial step in clarifying and moderniz-
ing our laws.2
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is the product of a
comprehensive study of the Virginia Housing Study Commission.3 The
Commission's report accurately depicted the realities of the rental situa-
tion in Virginia from the perspective of both landlords and tenants, and
concluded that definitive standards were needed by which the parties to
the lease could determine their rights and obligations.
In light of these findings, but cautious of the landlord's disproportionate
influence in the General Assembly, the Commission introduced a watered
down version of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, a
tenant oriented act promulgated by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. Even though the Commission was aware of the proposed Virginia
Act's shortcomings, it was satisfied that the legislation would at least
clarify and to some extent modernize the rights, duties, and remedies of
both parties to the lease. Appreciating the inevitable, many landlords
initially supported the Act as a reasonable compromise between the past
and what the future would bring in alternative legislation or case law.
However, when the proposed Act emerged from the House Committee in
amended form, it appeared that the landlord's proffered support waned.
A local option had been added and landlords feared the relative advantage
of those landlords who would operate in localities that did not adopt the
Act. Despite this apprehension, the Act miraculously emerged from the
Senate Committee on the last day of the session without the local option
and passed both Houses.'
Fear that the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act threatened
too radical a departure from the safe and traditional concepts in this area
of law nearly caused its death. In actuality, the Act is an overdue and
1. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.2, -248.40 (effective July 1, 1974).
2. Report of Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973, at 11, 12.
3. Report of Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973. The Report consists
of findings and recommendations of the Virginia Housing Study Commission and Office of
Housing, Division of State Planning and Community Affairs, to the Governor and General
Assembly.
4. The preceding analysis of the new Act's progress through the General Assembly is based
on The Review's conclusions from numerous discussions with persons who were directly
involved in its passage.
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moderate response to the widespread demands of both landlords and ten-
ants to further protect and clarify their respective interests. Nonetheless,
the new law is indeed a product of compromise and, unfortunately, some
of its expedient solutions to our old problems may engender unanticipated
new ones. With this in mind, the following analysis of the more important
aspects of the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is under-
taken.
A. The Rental Agreement
One of the most confusing aspects of landlord-tenant law concerns the
nature of the rental agreement. What underlying principles govern the
relationship and to what extent the parties can except themselves from
those principles by express agreement often determines the true flavor of
the law. Virginia case law offers no clear cut answer to the key question of
whether a lease is a contract or a conveyance.5 The few cases which peri-
pherally deal with the issue appear to take the law of property's view that
a lease is a conveyance of an estate; however, the essential question of just
what principles govern has not been squarely confronted and resolved.
The newly enacted legislation falls short of fully rectifying this ambigu-
ity; nevertheless, it departs significantly from the law of conveyances in
specific areas where those principles formerly governed. The most notewor-
thy change is a provision sounding in contract law which makes the receipt
of rent dependent upon the fulfillment of the landlord's obligations as
expressed in the rental agreement or imposed by the new Act.' On the other
hand and of equal significance, the Act does not alter the rather harsh law
relative to mitigation of damages. The landlord still has no duty to miti-
gate damages, and he may refuse to treat abandonment of the premises
as a surrender and arbitrarily turn down substitute tenants.7
Thus, the central contract principle of mutual dependency of obligations
has replaced old conveyancing rules as the basis in some specific aspects
of the new Act, while the law of conveyances has continued to prevail over
contract principles at least on the issue of mitigation of damages. One can
only conclude that the Act does not adopt contract as opposed to property
law as the controling principle for landlord-tenant relations, but rather
5. Authorities are not in agreement on whether the lease should be governed by contract
or conveyance principles although there is some authority which places Virginia among those
jurisdictions which recognize the dual nature of the rental agreement. Compare James v.
Kibler, 94 Va. 165, 26 S.E. 417 (1896) with Crowder v. Bank of Commerce, 127 Va. 299, 103
S.E. 74 (1924).
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-248.27,-248.30 (effective July 1, 1974).
7. Id. at § 55-248.33. Under this section the landlord may elect not to accept abandonment
as a surrender and thereby avoid any duty to mitigate damages.
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frees the court to apply general principles of statutory construction in
achieving the legislative intent. However, if the purpose of the Act is to
create a single body of law governing all aspects of the landlord-tenant
relationship, then looking to legislative intent alone, divorced from any
body of substantive law, affords an insufficient basis from which to accom-
plish this result. Since the Act does not have a single thread of theory
woven through it upon which to rely when dealing with problems which
go beyond the obvious implications of specific Code sections, the court may
have no choice but to supplement the Act by looking to the very case
law-with all its confusion and harshness-that the drafters of the Act
were attempting to avoid.
The drafters of the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act real-
ized that conveyancing principles are inappropriate to modern conditions
and resolved the issue in favor of contract law. In addition to providing for
its specific application, such as the landlord's duty to mitigate damages
upon abandonment of the premises, the Uniform Act generally recognizes
the modern tendency to treat all material obligations as interdependent,
a key to the conceptual bases of contractual theory." With due respect to
the practical difficulties of passing legislation which departs from the tra-
ditional concepts of landlord-tenant law, Virginia's failure to go as far as
the Uniform Act in defining what underlying principles are applicable will
cause the uncertainty of the past to continue in the future in the aspects
of the law outside the limited scope of the new Act.'
A significant problem relating to the rental agreement is the extent to
which a landlord can avoid the obligations the law imposes upon him. In
the past, Virginia's position on the use of exculpatory clauses, which re-
lieve the landlord from liability or compel the tenant to indemnify the
landlord for attorney's fees, has not been entirely clear.'" The trend in other
jurisdictions has been to invalidate such provisions on the basis of uncon-
scionability, unequal bargaining positions, or public policy considerations.
Recognizing that such provisions are found mostly in form leases pro-
vided by the landlord and that the tenant is without a real choice in
accepting these terms, the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act
expressly prohibits provisions in the rental agreement wherein the tenant:
8. UNIFORM RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT ACT § 1.404 (1972), found in HANDBOOK OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1972).
9. The General Assembly deleted § 55-248.10 which appeared in the first proposed version
of the new Act. This section would have separated rents and obligations, making the breach
of one such convenant a defense to any action brought to enforce the other.
10. The court's only encounter with the problem was in Taylor v. Virginia Constr. Corp.
which voided such a clause to the extent that it would have barred the recovery of a member
of the tenant's family. 209 Va. 76, 161 S.E.2d 732 (1968).
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(1) agrees to waive his rights under the Act, (2) authorizes any person to
confess a judgment on a claim arising out of the lease, and (3) agrees to
pay the landlord's attorney's fees, or (4) agrees to exulpate the landlord
from all liability." Where the landlord attempts to enforce any of these
provisions the tenant may recover actual damages and reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 2
The new Act remains consistent with old law in allowing a landlord to
include in the rental agreement those terms and conditions not prohibited
by the Act governing the rights and obligations of the parties.'" Yet, the
Act qualifies the landlord's right to include a provision for terminating the
tenancy upon the tenant's breach of specified terms and conditions by
requiring that such a breach amount to a material noncompliance with the
rental agreement" and that the landlord follow certain procedural steps.
The landlord may still bring an action for damages no matter how insignifi-
cant the breach, and if it be willful, recover reasonable attorney's fees.
Presumably, the drafters gave the meaning of material-noncompliance the
flexibility of judicial construction by not defining it in the Act. However,
the absence of definition may permit a landlord to decide what is material
and what is not by merely including an appropriate provision.
A particularly puzzling provision permits the landlord to transfer certain
of his duties specified in the Act to the tenant if the transaction is entered
into in good faith, not for the purpose of evading the obligations of the
landlord and if the agreement does not diminish or affect the obligation of
the landlord to other tenants in the premises. 5 One of the transferrable
duties is to keep all common areas shared by two or more dwelling units
in a clean and safe condition." It is difficult to invision the mechanics of
how a landlord could exculpate himself from his duty to maintain common
areas with common boundaries as to individual tenants without affecting
his obligation to other tenants in the same rental complex. The thought of
appropriating responsibilities and liabilities under such circumstances is
quite confusing. The landlord could eliminate this confusion by exculpat-
ing himself from this duty as to all the tenants in a rental complex but the
argument that such was not in good faith and for the purpose of evading
the landlord's responsibility would be more than convincing.
In review, prohibiting the landlord from completely exculpating himself
of liability reflects sound legislative behavior in light of the realities of
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.9(a)(1)-(4) (effective July 1, 1974).
12. Id. at § 55-248.9(b).
13. Id. at § 55-248.7.
14. Id. at § 55-248.31.
15. Id. at § 55-248.13(e).
16. Id. at § 55-248.13(a)(3).
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today's rental situation. Giving the parties freedom of contract relative to
the rights and liabilities not prohibited by the law also appears reasonable
when considering the need for flexability to provide for the particular
exigencies of a multitude of unique rental situations. Yet it seems pointless
to specify duties in the Act and at the same time allow the landlord to
contract them away without additional consideration only conditioned on
the illusive criteria of good faith and the prohibitions against adversely
affecting other tenants and evading one's obligations. After all, for what
reason would one contract away his obligations other than to avoid them.
B. Landlord Obligations
The Virginia Housing Study Commission Report disclosed that at least
a small minority of landlords take advantage of tight housing markets by
treating tenants unfairly.' 7 Consequently, the new Act details landlord
obligations for the dual purpose of providing landlords with clear guide-
lines as to the scope of their duties and to insure fair treatment of tenants.
1. Tenant's Right to Possession
One not familiar with prior case law may read the new Act as obligating
a landlord to deliver actual possession of the demised premises to the
tenant. Such a reading is probably incorrect. The Act provides that upon
a landlord's willful failure to deliver possession of a dwelling unit, rent
abates until possession is delivered; the tenant has an option to either
terminate the rental agreement by proper notice and collect all prepaid
rent and security or to demand performance by bringing an action for
possession against the landlord for the premises withheld. 8 The key words
"landlord willfully fails to deliver possession" severely limit this deceiv-
ingly substantial tenant right. Under Virginia case law the words "deliver
possession" have a rather restrictive meaning in the context of the implied
convenant of quiet enjoyment. This covenant obligates the landlord to
deliver possession of the premises to the tenant at the beginning of the
term. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted "delivery of
possession" to mean mere recognition of the tenant's right to possess. The
landlord cannot interfere with the tenant's efforts to inhabit the premises,
but he has no positive duty to put the tenant into actual possession.
Unfortunately, the new Act does not significantly abandon the harsh
17. Report of The Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973, at 7.
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.22 (effective July 1, 1974).
19. Hannon v. Dusch, 154 Va. 356, 153 S.E. 824 (1930). See generally the section on Use
and Possession supra.
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result of our prior case law. The landlord has not been given an affirmative
duty to place the tenant in actual possession. A tenant who desires to
enforce the rental agreement has the same remedy under the new Act as
before-an action for unlawful entry and detainer against the person
wrongfully in possession. Similarly, statutory termination under the new
Act where a landlord willfully withholds possession offers the tenant noth-
ing more than did common law in the case of an actual or constructive
eviction.
The new Act's codification of pre-existing case law is a disappointment.
It would be decidedly more equitable to shift the burden of obtaining
actual possession from the tenant to the landlord. In contracting for the
lease, the real basis of the bargain is possession of the premises not the
mere right to possess. The landlord does not intend to sell nor does the
tenant intend to buy a lawsuit. Moreover, the landlord, who is provided
with specific remedies against the holdover tenant by the new Act,"0 is in
a better position to handle the expense of ousting the holdover tenant and
spreading it among tenants as a class, than is the individual tenant who
is in all likelihood low on funds and temporarily without a place to live.
2. Security Deposits
Prior to the adoption of the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant
Act, the Commonwealth had no law regulating security deposits. 2' The
Housing Commission Report noted several problems in this area: (1) the
amount demanded as the deposit, (2) whether interest should be paid, (3)
undue delay in return of security deposits, (4) failure of landlords to report
the nature of deductions from the amount on deposit. 22 The Virginia Act
attempts to respond to these needs in a manner that is not altogether
satisfactory. The pertinent sections of the Act provide for: (1) interest
payments of 3%, (2) itemization of deductions, (3) a duty to return the
amount due the tenant within 45 days after the term ends, (4) a maximum
deposit of two months rent, (5) prior notice of any inspection which must
be made within 72 hours of termination of the tenancy, (6) maintenance
for two years of the records which reflect any deductions against security
deposits, (7) upon termination of the tenancy, use of the security deposit
for the payment of accrued rent or towards the landlord's damages result-
ing from the tenant's failure to fulfill his obligations.?
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.37 (effective July 1, 1974).
21. The only locality with such a law is Arlington which was given the authority to regulate
security deposits in VA. CODE ANN. § 55-222.1 (Cum. Supp. 1973). See the section on security
deposits supra.
22. Report of The Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973, at 7.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.11 (effective July 1, 1974).
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Two major shortcomings deserve attention. If the landlord willfully vio-
lates this section, the tenant's remedy consists of recapturing any security
with interest due him plus actual damages and attorney's fees. 24 Realistic-
ally, actual damages in such instances are apt to be small or nonexistent.
A landlord who operates on a large scale has little to lose and much to gain
through repeated abuse of this section. The remedy for breach should
include some limited amount of punitive damages in order to deter land-
lords from abuse and give tenants an incentive to bring an action where
necessary. Another partial solution ignored by the Act is to require the
landlord to hold the security deposit in a separate account.25 Although this
would not insure against false claims by the landlord, it would at least
prevent him from misusing these funds during the rental period and guar-
antee that sufficient funds would be available for the deserving tenant to
claim at the end of the term.
The second major disappointment is that the Act imposes no duty upon
the landlord to pay interest unless the security has been held for a period
in excess of 13 months.26 Since a large number of residential leases are for
a term of one year or less, this stipulation substantially limits the number
of tenants who qualify for obtaining interest on their security deposits.
There appears to be no justification for excluding tenants who rent for a
year or less from this benefit. The Act as initially proposed had no such
provision; it was added on as the Act traveled through the Assembly, and
is more likely the result of political compromise than legislative reasoning.
3. Duty to Maintain Fit Premises
Virginia courts have not recognized the implied warranty of habitability
advanced by some jurisdictions. 27 The newly enacted legislation has de-
parted from our case law by codifying the landlord's duty to maintain
habitable premises throughout the period of the lease. 8 The standard of
habitability is. in part enumerated by the Act and includes compliance
with local housing codes. Questionable conditions existing on the premises
not covered by the Act nor local housing codes are left to the courts to
decide on the issue of habitability.
This statutory warranty of habitability is a positive step forward because
it serves to insure safe and healthy living conditions for Virginia's 1.9
24. Id. at § 55-248.11(a).
25. The General Assembly killed House Bill 773 which would have provided for the mainte-
nance of the fund in a separate interest bearing account.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.11(b)(1) (effective July 1, 1974).
27. See Luedtke v. Phillips, 190 Va. 207, 56 S.E.2d 80 (1949). For a discussion of the
Virginia view on the implied warranty of habitability see 7 U. RICH L. REV. 322 (1973).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.13 (effective July 1, 1974).
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million inhabitants of rental dwellings. Yet, in fairness to both the landlord
and tenant, the General Assembly should consider the adoption of a state-
wide, comprehensive Housing Code so that there would be no uncertainty
surrounding the landlord's duties and tenant's rights relative to maintain-
ing habitable premises under the new Act.
C. Tenant Obligations
Aside from statutory provisions pertaining to waste,29 Virginia prior to
the new Act had not articulated the tenant's obligations. The Housing
Commission study revealed that the particular areas of controversy have
been: (1) the extent to which tenants are responsible to maintain their
unit, (2) the types of rules and regulations that landlords may enforce and
(3) the ability of tenants to deny access to landlords." In establishing
minimum standards for tenant behavior, the Act attempts to solve these
related problems.
The new law establishes that the essence of the tenant's duty is: (1) to
occupy the premises as a "dwelling unit" only,3' (2) to maintain the prem-
ises in as clean and safe condition as it permits, 2 and (3) to use the prem-
ises in such a manner so as not to disturb the neighbors' peaceable and
quiet enjoyment.3 3 The tenant must also acquiesce to the landlord's regula-
tions providing they are clearly explained, uniformly applied and designed
for the welfare of tenants or protection of the landlord's property.34 Finally,
the tenant cannot unreasonably withold consent from the landlord to enter
the premises if the landlord gives reasonable notice and has a legitimate
reason
.
The tenant's obligations under the Act fills what the Commission found
to be a troublesome void in the law and, on the whole, appears fair, reason-
able and sufficiently articulate, yet still flexible enough to handle the
variable problems for which it will be called into use. However, there
remains one gray area which may lead to future controversy over the divid-
ing line between the tenant's obligation to keep the premises clean and safe
and the landlord's obligation to keep the premises in a fit and habitable
condition. The Act specifies certain particulars which come under these
respective obligations, but beyond this any serious problems will have to
be resolved through judicial interpretation.
29. Id. at § 55-211, -216 (1950).
30. Report of the Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973, at 9.
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.19 (effective July 1, 1974).
32. Id. at § 55-248.16(2).
33. Id. at § 55-248.16(7).
34. Id. at § 55-248.16(a)(1), (3).




Among the needs most vocalized by tenants at the Housing Commis-
sion's Public Hearings, was the need for an adequate means to insure
landlord compliance with rental agreements, particularly provisions relat-
ing to the tenant's life, health and safety. 6 Other jurisdictions have fol-
lowed one of three approaches in remedying the landlord's material breach
in this area. Prior to the new Act, Virginia might have been counted with
those states that allow the tenant to make repairs resulting from the land-
lord's breach and deduct the expense from rent 3 since an obscure health
statute requires the landlord to provide an adequate privy closet, and upon
failure to do so, allows the tenant to supply one and deduct the expense
from rent.38 The new Act does not extend the tenant's remedies along these
lines, but on the contrary, allows the landlord to add to rent the cost of
certain repairs and services for which the tenant is responsible.3 9 Some
states have traditionally used rent abatement statutes as a tenant remedy,
but the new Act permits the tenant to abate rent only when the landlord
fails to deliver possession at the beginning of the term."
The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act emphasizes the rent
escrow approach to the problem, a concept completely new to the Com-
monwealth.' The Act allows the tenant to pay rent into a judicial escrow
account. Such payment constitutes a valid defense to an action by the
landlord for rent providing he has breached a material obligation under the
lease or implied by law, or a threat to life, safety or health exists for which
he is responsible. 2 In order for the tenant to avail himself of this remedy,
he must have notified the landlord of the breach by certified mail and
allowed him a reasonable time in which to rectify the situation.
The Act gives the court wide discretion in disposing of rent escrow cases.
In accordance with its findings, it may: (1) terminate the lease, (2) order
all moneys in escrow to the landlord or tenant as deserved, (3) disburse the
money to a contractor chosen by the landlord to make repairs or (4) con-
tinue the account until the complained of conditions are remedied.43 Not-
withstanding the above, if the landlord makes no reasonable attempt to
remedy the condition within six months, all the money in the escrow ac-
36. Report of the Virginia Housing Study Commission, November, 1973 at 11.
37. See the section on Rent supra.
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 32-64 (1950).
39. Id. at § 55-248.32.
40. Id. at § 55-248.22.
41. Id. at § 55-248.27. See generally the section on Rent supra.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.25 (effective July 1, 1974).
43. Id. at § 55-248.25(1).
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count is awarded to the tenant and the account is renewed for another six
month period. 4
In addition to the escrow remedy, the tenant, upon meeting certain
conditions precedent, can respond to the landlord's breach by terminating
the rental agreement. The tenant must give the landlord written notice to
cure the breach or quit. In thirty days from receipt of such notice the term
will automatically end unless the breach is cured within the first twenty-
one days of the notice period.45 Where the breach is cured within such time,
the tenant may not terminate, but he is still allowed actual damages, and
reasonable attorney's fees if the breach is willful."
The tenant is also provided with ample remedies to protect himself from
unlawful eviction from the premises, either actually or constructively
through interruption of essential services. 7 The tenant can not only regain
possession but recover actual damages and reasonable attorney's fees
which is new to our law.
The Act's provisions relating to tenant remedies supply at least minimal
means to secure the rights and protect the well being of tenants. Moreover,
it gives protection to tenants who rightfully take advantage of these
remedies. Landlords cannot increase rents, decrease services, seek posses-
sion or cause the tenant to quit for a period of six months after the tenant
has complained to or filed suit against the landlord for failure to maintain
fit premises. 8 It deserves mention that the Act also provides safeguards
against tenant abuse of these remedies.
E. Landlord Remedies
A point which is often insufficiently emphasized is that landlords too
have problems with their tenants. Two of the difficulties most often aired
by Virginia landlords are their inability to readily reacquire the leased
premises when it is within their right and to collect overdue rent.49 Alterna-
tively, tenants have complained of harsh remedies which enable the land-
lord to take unfair advantage of minor breaches of the rental agreement. 0
One of the areas in which there has been controversy is where the tenant
breaks a covenant in the lease and the landlord exercises his right to
terminate the tenancy by giving notice to quit. Prior to the newly enacted
44. Id. at § 55-248.29(h).
45. Id. at § 55-248.21.
46. Id. at § 55-248.31.
47. Id. at § 55-248.26.
48. Id. at § 55-248.39.




legislation, the landlord could exercise his right immediately upon giving
such notice.5 1 This worked a hardship on the tenant who could be ousted
in summary fashion without an opportunity to correct the situation no
matter how insignificant the breach. The new Act attempts to remedy this
problem by giving the tenant a twenty-one day grace period after receiving
notice of the landlord's intent to terminate in which to correct the breach
and thereby preclude termination.52 If the tenant fails to remedy the prob-
lem within this time, the landlord, upon expiration of thirty days after the
written notice, may have a claim for possession, for past due rent and a
separate claim for actual damages.53
In its effort to protect the tenant from an unwarranted eviction, the Act
may have gone too far. Since the tenant can save his tenancy by timely
cure of the breach, he is less apt to be concerned about compliance with
his obligations even though he may run the less inhibiting risk of paying
damages and attorney's fees when the landlord is not left whole after the
tenant's cure. Thus, if the twenty-one day grace period becomes common
knowledge to tenants, landlords may be burdened with perpetual abusers
who repeatedly take advantage of this provision. A solution may be to
allow use of the grace period only a limited number of times. As it is, the
new Act appears to have overcompensated for the tenant's previous unde-
sirable position to the unfair disadvantage of the landlord.
Noteworthy is the fact that the twenty-one day grace period is not a
condition precedent to termination of the lease for failure to pay rent. The
newly enacted legislation reiterates the old law allowing the landlord to
terminate the rental agreement upon failure to pay rent within five days
after written notice. 4 This lack of change is somewhat understandable.
Failure to pay rent when due is probably the most frequently occurring
tenant abuse. Allowing repeated abusers a three week grace period time
and again in which to pay overdue rent would be patently unfair to the
landlord who too has monetary deadlines to meet and often relies on timely
rental payments therefore. But one must also consider the law's effect, for
instance, on the old timer whose social security check is late as usual and
whose unscrupulous landlord is anxious to be rid of him knowing that
market conditions are such that he can substantially hike the rent on the
next lease. The landlord in such a case may dutifully hand-deliver notice
to quit the day after rent is due and have the old timer out and the
premises ready to be re-rented by the end of that same week. Perhaps it
51. Johnson v. Goldberg, 207 Va. 487, 151 S.E.2d 368 (1966).
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would have been wiser if the grace period for paying overdue rent was
codified as a "reasonable time" with a statutory presumption that beyond
five days would be unreasonable. This would not only be fair to the land-
lord who is entitled to prompt payment of rent in the majority of cases,
but would also protect the tenant in the occasional hard case.
In general, the new Act provides the landlord with ample means to right
the tenant's wrong. He can, upon giving the tenant written notice, recover
actual damages, obtain injunctive relief or directly require the tenant to
remedy any material non-compliance with the rental agreement at the risk
of forfeiture plus damages for failure to do so. 5 If the breach if willful,
reasonable attorney's fees may be recovered. 56 The landlord can take addi-
tional measures if the tenant's misuse of the premises creates a serious
health or safety hazard. Where the tenant fails to rectify the situation
within fourteen days of the landlord's notice, or sooner in case of an emer-
gency, the landlord may enter the premises, repair the dangerous condition
and add the cost or value of services to the tenant's rent. 7 These additional
measures appear fair considering that the health and safety of all the
tenants and their neighbors are at stake. However, the act does not define
nor say who is to decide what is a serious health or safety hazard and when
an emergency situation exists. If the discretion in these matters is to be
left to the landlord, it is at once obvious that potential for abuse and
harrassment exists.
F. Conclusion
The stated purpose of the Act is to (1) simplify, clarify and modernize
landlord-tenant law, (2) encourage landlords and tenants to maintain and
improve the quality of housing and (3) to establish a single body of law
relating to landlord-tenant relations throughout the Commonwealth. One
would not likely take issue with the soundness of these objectives; indeed
any discussion thereon would ultimately lead to an irresolvable question
of values. Whether or not the intended purpose has been carried out is the
important and more objectively answerable question. Unfortunately, the
answer is a qualified no; qualified because the Act has taken some signifi-
cant steps forward in revising the law to insure and improve quality hous-
ing in rental dwellings. The provisions relating to habitability of the prem-
ises, rent escrow and retaliatory eviction are prime examples. However, too
many archaic laws have remained unchanged and too many gray areas
have remained gray. To some extent this is a reflection of unpromising
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at § 55-248.32.
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political realities. Two of the Act's more critical problem areas have re-
sulted from changes made in the General Assembly. First, the proposed
Act was amended to exclude from its application natural persons owning
ten or less single family residences. Maintaining two bodies of law not only
frustrates the express purpose of the Act, but inequitably denies the ad-
vantages of the new law to a group of landlords and tenants who in some
instances may be the most apt to need its protection. Second, deleted in
the Assembly was a provision in the proposed Act requiring that the rental
agreement be conscionable. This is particularly unfortunate because de-
manding the requirement of conscionability would have given the court an
equitable basis upon which to resolve the many aspects of the landlord-
tenant relationship to which the Act does not address itself.
A problem which plagues the new Act is poor draftsmanship. The very
fact of codification, by virtue of generally categorizing the parties' obliga-
tions and remedies aids in clarifying and simplifying the law, but beyond
this the Act does little to set aside, and in some instances, adds to the
confusion of prior case law. Its imprecise language creates unnecessary
difficulty in gleaning the legislative intent and interpreting its affect on
technical areas of prior law.
The Act does have saving grace. It would not be accurate to say that it
has modernized the law because a substantial part of the Act is a mere
codification of pre-existing law. Yet, as pointed out in the previous analy-
sis, there have been a number of significant changes. More important, the
Act represents a starting point for further progress. Landlord-tenant law
has at least broken away from the shackles of common law conveyancing
principles and the door is now open from which to leave ancient history
and align the law with the contemporary realities of an urban oriented
society.
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